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HIGH ALERT: THE GOVERNMENT'S WAR ON THE
FINANCING OF TERRORISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
DONORS, DOMESTIC CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS, AND
GLOBAL PHILANTHROPY
NINA J. CRIMM*
ABSTRACT
Within days after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.
government extended its already existing commitment to combat
terrorism. President Bush declared a financial war on terrorism,
with the aim of depriving terrorists of their necessary financial
support. He issued Executive Order 13,224, which ordered the
blocking of assets of specially designated global terrorists.' Congress
enacted legislation that not only fortified previously existing
criminal and civil laws, but also added new ones for use in
combating terrorists and terrorism. The Bush Administration
dedicated resources to existing and newly created governmental
structures that would be responsible for enforcing these laws and for
waging the financial war on terrorism. This enhanced legal and
structural arsenal contains multiple means by which the U.S.
government, as well as citizens injured by activities of foreign
terrorists, can pursue economic or criminal sanctions against
terrorists and their private sponsors, including individuals, as well
as foreign nongovernmental organizations, domestic charitable
organizations, and their governing bodies.
Awareness of this greatly expanded potential exposure to liability,
and even criminal sanctions, has already engendered unforeseen
side effects. Some well-intentioned donors reportedly now are
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; LL.M. in Taxation, Georgetown
University (1982); J.D. and M.B.A., Tulane University (1979); A.B., Washington University
(1972). I wish to thank myresearch assistant, Patricia C. Wolfe, for her invaluable assistance.
1. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001).
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reticent to make charitable contributions to domestic charitable
organizations. Law-abiding Muslim charities have documented a
decline in contributions received, and charitable organizations are
struggling to maintain their pre-September 11 levels of commitment
to global philanthropy. As the financial war on terrorism evolves
and the arsenal of weapons is strengthened, the government's
successes not only may starve terrorists financially, but also may
have the unfortunate and unintentional consequence of significantly
reducing resources committed to legitimate global philanthropy.
Such a result, ironically, would contribute to fundamentalists' and
radical terrorists' goal of disrupting globalism, which, if otherwise
uninterrupted, could help to foster civil liberties and to achieve
social and economic security and prosperity abroad that might
diminish the intrinsic potency of terrorist groups and could lessen
much of their appeal to outsiders.
Preventive measures thus are essential to minimize the potential
negative consequences of the government's financial war on
terrorism. To guard against exposure to liability, donors and leaders
of domestic charitable organizations must undertake adequate due
diligence. Moreover, the government must take great care to protect
against overzealous legislation and enforcement actions. Absent
sufficient safeguards, the government's actions may exacerbate,
rather than diminish, the ultimate effects sought by terrorists.
1342 [Vol. 45:1341
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[Flew actions are more reprehensible than diverting money
intended for charity and using it to support hatred and cruelty.
Such abuse corrupts the sanctity of charitable giving, diverts
funds and resources from those in need, betrays the trust and
goodwill of donors, and is a danger to us all.2
The most serious threat to our well being was now clean money
intended to kill, not dirty money seeking to be rinsed in a place
of hiding.3
INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2003, the nation once again was jolted into high alert
after terrorist bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco.4 In the wake
of the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, anxiety has been
building about terrorists' worldwide activities, and for good cause.
With increasing regularity, terrorist acts have devastated human
lives, destroyed property, and thrown countries' economies into
decline. It is clear that the terrorists' deadly goals--on September
11, 2001, and during the two and one-half subsequent years-could
not have been achieved without adequate financing.5 Terrorist
financing reportedly has involved not only classic money laundering,
where the proceeds of illicit activities are washed or layered in order
to conceal their origin,6 but also the diversion or skimming of funds
2. See Testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of the Dep't of the Treasury,
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Subcomm. on Int'l Trade
and Fin., Aug. 1, 2002 (attributing statement to former Secretary of the Treasury Paul
O'Neill), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po3315.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2004).
3. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVTES BEFORE AND AFTER
THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPEMER 11, 2001, S. REP. No. 107-351, at 117 (2002).
4. See Philip Shenon, U.S. Raises Terror Alert to Next to Highest Level: Orange, N.Y.
TIMES, May 21,2003, at A19.
5. Experts repeatedly have stated that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda could not have
succeeded in their September 11 attacks without their financial strength. See, e.g., Matthew
Levitt, Iraq, U.S. and the War on Terror: Stemming the Flow of Terrorist Financing: Practical
and Conceptual Challenges, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 59, 60 (2003).
6. See NBC Evening News, (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 20, 2003) (reporting illegal
drug trade and sidewalk vendor sales of illegal merchandise, such as knock-off purses); see
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from such legitimate sources as profits from small storefront
businesses and charitable donations to domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations and large international nongovernmental organiza-
tions.
The terrorists' heinous acts and their perverse use of funds
donated by well-intentioned contributors to domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations generated outrage across the civilized world and
incensed the U.S. government. In response, the U.S. government
also Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, Deputy Assistant Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Terrorism and Violent Crime Division, in TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND
LOCAL CONTROL 197, 204 (Yonah Alexander & Donald J. Musch eds., 2002) [hereinafter
TERRORISM: DocUMENrsl; Peter J. Kacarab, An In-depth Analysis of the New Money
Laundering Statutes, 8 AKRON TAxJ. 1, 2 (1991).
7. See Testimony of Under Secretary Jimmy Gurul, Before the House Comm. on Fin.
Servs., Oct. 3, 2001, available at http:/www.treas.gov/press/releases/po650.htm (last visited
Mar. 16, 2004). Under Secretary Gurul6 stated:
Unfortunately, available information indicates that some Islamic charitable
organizations have been penetrated, exploited and are now controlled by
terrorists involved with Al-Qaida.... Islamic charitable organizations serving as
cover for terrorist groups adopt innocuous names and co-opt legitimate causes.
Often, well-intentioned individuals seeking to make contributions to provide
relief for refugees from disaster are defrauded-and their funds end up diverted
to finance terrorism.
Id.; see also Prepared Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, General Counsel, Dep't of the
Treasury, Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology and
Homeland Security, June 26,2003, available at httpd/www.treas.gov/press/releases s507.pdf
(last visited Mar. 16, 2004); Dennis M. Lormel, Chief, Financial Crimes Section, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Statement for the Record, in TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS, supra note 6,
at 227, 236; Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, supra note 6, at 204. Tracking the financial sources
of the terrorists' funding often is impossible due to the sophistication of the methods utilized
by individuals attempting to hide their activities. Not only were substantial funds transferred
through many countries, numerous banks and bank accounts, and through the use of credit
cards, but funds were also transferred through the underground "hawala system." Dennis M,
Lormel, Statement for the Record, supra at 237; Testimony of Juan C. Zarate, supra note 6,
at 203. The hawala system is an informal, paperless transfer system ("hawala" means "trust")
that Muslims use throughout the world, including in the United States. Alan Lambert,
Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism: Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money
Laundering in the Americas, 15 FLA. J. INTL. L. 3, 9, 14-15 (2002). Thus, no official bank
records are maintained, and governmental authorities cannot track the funds. Id. In 1993,
Congress passed a law requiring U.S. hawaladars (hawala agents) to be registered with the
government and to file suspicious activity reports similar to those filed by established
financial institutions. See id. at 18. The USA Patriot Act further strengthened provisions
against these transfer systems, subjecting them to existing money laundering and terrorist
financing regulations, including customer identification, recordkeeping, and suspicious
transaction reporting requirements. As of June 26, 2003, over 14,000 money service
businesses have registered with the federal government and are now required to report
suspicious activities. See Prepared Testimony of David D. Aulhauser, supra.
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extended its already existing commitment to combat terrorism in
the Middle East to target threats from wherever they might
emanate, whether from other regions of the world or from within
domestic borders. Within weeks of September 11, this commitment
was strongly manifested militarily, as well as nonmilitarily. On the
nonmilitary front, Congress enacted the USA Patriot Act and
President Bush initiated a financial war on terrorism. Not only did
the USA Patriot Act fortify the previously existing criminal and civil
laws that can be used to combat terrorists and terrorism, but it also
added new ones to the arsenal. Moreover, the Bush administration
dedicated resources to existing and newly created governmental
structures that would be responsible for enforcing these laws and for
waging the financial war on terrorism.
The enhanced legal and structural arsenal produced by these
swift reactions contains multiple means by which the U.S. govern-
ment, as well as citizens injured by activities of foreign terrorists,
can pursue economic or criminal sanctions against terrorists and
their private sponsors, including individuals, foreign nongovern-
mental organizations, and domestic charitable organizations and
their governing bodies. For example, the available arsenal enables
the U.S. government to freeze assets in order to "starve" terrorists
of their financial "life-blood."' The government can bring a criminal
action against persons who knowingly provide "material support or
resources" to a terrorist or a foreign terrorist organization,9 or who
intentionally or knowingly collect or provide funds for use in
carrying out terrorist activities. I0 Moreover, the government has
authority in connection with an individual's violation of either of
these criminal offenses to impose a civil penalty on a domestic
entity, including a § 501(c)(3) organization, if the perpetrator was
responsible for the management or control of that entity and
8. See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140,1142 (Sept. 20,2001);
Bush Calls on World to Freeze Terrorist Assets, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 24,2001; Press
Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet on Terrorist Financing Executive Order
(Sept. 24, 2001), available at http'//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases&2001/09/200O10924-
2.html (last visited Mar. 16,2004). Employing a complex web of statutory and other authority,
President Bush has directed the Department of the Treasury to freeze assets of terrorists and
their sponsors. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2003) (discussed infra Part II.C).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2003) (discussed infra Part II.D).
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committed the offense in that capacity." The government also can
bring charges pursuant to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) based on predicate crimes that include
the offenses of providing material support or resources to a foreign
terrorist organization, or intentionally or knowingly collecting or
providing funds for use in carrying out terrorist activities, as well
as money laundering. 2 Congress recently proposed legislation to
permit the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to suspend the tax-
exempt status under Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) § 501(a) of an
organization that is identified or designated as a terrorist organiza-
tion.'3
Although the arsenal mainly contains weapons available for
governmental use, there exist federal statutes that give individuals
the means of redressing certain injuries caused by terrorism. Most
relevant for purposes of this Article is 18 U.S.C. § 2333, enacted as
part of the Antiterrorism Act of 1992.'" Pursuant to this statute, the
courts have permitted U.S. nationals injured by an act of interna-
tional terrorism, and their estates, survivors, and heirs, to bring
civil actions for damages against domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations
that have channeled funds to terrorist groups."
This is not an exhaustive list of weapons that can be used to
fight the nonmilitary war on terrorism. Nonetheless, this sampling
clearly indicates that the U.S. government (and its citizens)
potentially can bring legal actions that reach donors, domestic §
11. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(f) (2003) (discussed infra note 374 and accompanying text).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003). For further discussion of the charges that can be
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see infra
notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
13. H.R. 7, 108th Cong. § 201 (2003); S. 256, 108th Cong. § 208 (2003). For further
discussion, see infra Part III.
14. Antiterrorism Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4522 (1992), amended by
Pub. L. No. 103-429, 108 Stat. 4377 (1994).
15. See Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussed infra Part
IV). Additionally, relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, U.S. citizens have brought
lawsuits for monetary damages against state sponsors of terrorism. See, e.g., Roeder v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 195 F. Supp. 2d 140 (D.D.C. 2002); Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 184
F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2002); Wagner v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 172 F. Supp. 2d 128 (D.D.C.
2001). For a brief discussion on the statutory history underlying such lawsuits, see Rudolph
Lehrer, Comment, Unbalancing the Terrorists' Checkbook: Analysis of U.S. Policy in Its
Economic War on International Terrorism, 10 TUL. J. INTL & CoMP. L. 333, 355-57 (2002).
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501(c)(3) organizations, and the organizations' officers, directors,
and trustees.
Awareness of this potential exposure to liability, and even to
criminal sanctions, has already engendered unforeseen side effects.
The media have reported that well-intentioned, law-abiding U.S.
Muslims have been reticent to contribute their dutiful "zakat" (2.5%
of a Muslim's annual income), even to reputable Muslim charities,
for fear that the funds might be routed ultimately to terrorists and
that they, as contributors, might be subject to prosecution. 18 Leaders
16. See, e.g., Riad Z. Abdelkarim, After a Year of Uncertainty, American Muslim
Charitable Donations Rebound, ETHNIC NEWS, Jan..Feb. 2004, at 62-63 (reporting Muslims'
fear that compliance with their required zakat contribution, particularly when donated to
charities for disbursement abroad, would result in harassment, arrest, or possibly even
deportation); Alan Cooperman, Stung by Accusations, America's Muslims Alter Giving, CHI.
TRIB., Dec. 11, 2002, at 37 (reporting that Muslims are concerned about zakat" going to "bad
organizations" and that donations to mosques fell an average of 20% in 2002); Laurie
Goodstein, Muslims Hesitating on Gifts as U.S. Scrutinizes Charities, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2003, at B1 (reporting Muslims' anxiety, distrust, and bewilderment regarding Muslim
charities); Pedro Ruz Gutierrez & Jim Leusner, Donors Fret at Potential Terror Links;
Floridians Have Given Generously to Three Charities that Ostensibly Do Good Works Overseas,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 28, 2001, at Al (reporting donors' concerns about being prosecuted
for unwittingly contributing money to groups linked to terrorists); Madhu Krishnamurthy,
Fears About Charities Force Muslims to Change How They Give, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Nov. 11,
2003, at All (discussing Muslims' fear that fulfilling their religious obligations may lead
either to charities' unwise use of their donations or to government scrutiny, and commenting
on the resulting consequence of Muslims' changed giving practices to donate to schools and
mosques for local use rather than to Muslim charities for international disbursement);
Richard L. Moyers, A Shocking Silence on Muslim Charities, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 17,
2002, at 31 (suggesting that because no list of "clean' charitable organizations has been
compiled by the U.S. government, there is a chilling effect on donations to Muslim
organizations, particularly those that work abroad); Jeff Shields et al., Islamic Charities
Feeling the Pinch; Allegations of Terrorist Links, Frozen Assets Dry Up Contributions, S. FLA.
SUN-SENTINEL, June 19,2002, at 1A (stating that the U.S. government's scrutiny of charities
caused well-intentioned Muslims concern about prosecution for unwittingly giving funds to
terrorists); Greg Allen, Muslim Charities and Donors Attempt to Adapt to New Level of
Scrutiny Since 9/11, (NPR radio broadcast, May 12, 2003), available at http://discover.npr.org
(reporting that the Islamic monthly, The Minaret, survey indicated donations to mosques and
charities across the country are down 20-30%); Holly Kernan, Donations to Muslim Charities
Down Due to Increased Government Scrutiny (NPR radio broadcast, Dec. 1, 2001), available
at http://discover.npr.org/features/feature.jhtml.wfld=1134141 (reporting that donors are
concerned that they may be prosecuted and deported for giving money to organizations linked
to terrorists even if the charity is not suspect when the donation is given); see also Eric
Lichtblau with William Glaberson, Millions Raised for Qaeda in Brooklyn, U.S. Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at Al (reporting Yemini Islamic cleric boasted raising $20 million in
donations at mosques that funded al Qaeda); Andy Newman, Brooklyn Muslims Disputing
Any Ties to Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at A13 (reporting that Brooklyn's Al Farooq
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of domestic Muslim charitable organizations, who publicly have
expressed vehement consternation at this chilling effect on a
fundamental religious obligation, have documented a substantial
decline in contributions received by their charities and have
struggled to maintain their charities' levels of commitment to global
philanthropy. 7 Although Muslims and Muslim charities have voiced
most of the public expressions of concern in the United States, 8
Mosque has a history of raising money for Osama bin Laden); Andy Newman & Daryl Khan,
Brooklyn Mosque Becomes Terror Icon, but Federal Case Is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,2003,
at A29 (describing links between clerics collecting funds for the jihad from potentially
unsuspecting donors at mosques).
Driven by their fears, to avoid potential identification, and thus to maintain anonymity as
contributors of zakat, some Muslims have donated cash or money orders. See Abdelkarim,
supra.
Recognition of Muslims'reticence to donate internationally has resulted in domestic private
foundations contributing to domestic Muslim charities more than previously. See Michael
Anift, Assisting Terrorism's Other Victims, CHRON. OF PHIANTHROPY, Sept. 4, 2003, at 8.
17. See, e.g., Cooperman, supra note 16 (reporting that Muslim charities, fearful of
recrimination from the U.S. government, sought guidelines from the Department of the
Treasury for steps they should take before giving funds to groups abroad); Ian Wilhelm,
Muslim Charities Accuse Government of Harming Their Fund Raising, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 9, 2003, at 25 (reporting that donations to domestic Muslim charities
have fallen by 20% since the government began pursuing Muslim nonprofit groups for
material support of terrorists); Allen, supra note 16; Sara Harris, U.S. Government Action to
Seize Funds Allegedly Tied to Terrorists Has Also Affected Some American Muslim Charities
(Minnesota Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 26, 2001) (reporting Muslim charities expect lower
donations). Government officials have taken the position that the government's actions in its
financial war on terrorism should engender donor confidence rather than fear. See Prepared
Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, supra note 7.
18. In Canada, the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group (CLMG), a coalition
of approximately twenty labor, humanitarian, and religious organizations, has expressed
concern that some charities may lose their charitable status. See Marianne Meed Ward, Are
Churches Helping Terrorists? The Government's New Anti-terrorism Bill Requires Charities
to Know Exactly What Their Money Is Being Used for, or They Jeopardize Their Tax-Free
Status, PRESBYTERIAN REC., Oct. 2002, at 9. The CLMG has stated that under proposed
Canadian federal antiterrorism statutes (somewhat similar to U.S. statutes) the term
"terrorism," defined as any act or omission, in Canada or abroad, that is committed "for a
political, religious or ideological purpose," is overly broad. Id. Because any group considered
to be engaging in or supporting terrorism, knowingly or not, could lose its charitable status,
CLMG considers the potential for loss of charitable status as significant for relief,
humanitarian, and religious organizations if the bill's language is not modified. Id.
As an interesting aside, several Virginia politicians who have received political campaign
contributions from persons tied to Muslim § 501(cX3) organizations that are alleged to have
illegally provided material support to terrorists and foreign terrorist organizations have
expressed concern. See Lisa Rein, Va. Muslim Groups in Terrorism Probe Funded GOP Races,
WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2003, at B5 (naming delegates Richard H. Black (Loudoun), Ken
Cuccinelli (Fairfax), and Thomas Davis Rust (Fairfax) as having received campaign
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there is likely a broader, albeit less vocal, hesitation to engage in
global philanthropy. 9
As the U.S. government's financial war on terrorism evolves and
its arsenal of weapons is strengthened, a widespread reluctance of
individuals and institutions to participate fully and actively in
global philanthropic endeavors is understandable. Nevertheless,
these conditions may pose a monumental dilemma. The govern-
ment's success in its proclaimed war may starve the terrorists
financially. That success, however, may also have the unfortunate
and unintentional double-edged effects of significantly reducing
legitimate global philanthropy while at the same time contributing
to fundamentalists' and radical terrorists' goal of disrupting
globalism.2 ° The former-the widespread withdrawal of financial
support for humanitarian aid, the promotion of health, the enhance-
ment of education and other charitable causes, the facilitation of
economic development, the building of social capital, and the
strengthening of social stability-would be particularly lamentable
contributions from M. Yaqub Mirza, "president of the now-defunct SAAR Foundation and vice
president of the Safa Trust"). For a discussion of the SAAR Foundation's purported connection
to terrorist organizations, see infra Part II.B.1. On November 1, 2002, the Washington Post
reported that Virginia Representative James P. Moran "reversed his previous position and
returned contributions from three officers of Muslim organizations in Northern Virginia that
were raided by federal agents last March in an investigation into terrorist financing." Spencer
S. Hsu, Moran Returns Contributions of Muslim Donors: 3 Tied to Groups Raided in Terror
Probe, WASH. POST, Nov. 1, 2002, at B4. Representative Moran is reported to have stated: "I
don't want any contributors to my campaign contributing to any individuals or organizations
even inadvertently that might fund terrorism or organizations involved in terrorism." Id.
19. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, Small Charities Abroad Feel Pinch of U.S. War on Terror,
N.Y. TIMS, Aug. 5, 2003, at A8 (reporting that Environment Tobago, a small indigenous
organization that is able to preserve Tobago's endangered wetlands by relying on donations
from international sources, nearly failed financially last year as a result of declined support
purportedly in response to the U.S. Treasury's issuance of the Voluntary Best Practices
Guidelines (see infra Part II.C.3.b; notes 470-83 and accompanying text, discussing the
Guidelines)).
It is likely that politically sensitive areas will be hit hardest by withdrawal of financial
international support. See Kevin Murray,AdministrationIs Undermining Democracy, BOSTON
GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2003, at Dl (reporting that donations to Palestine and areas of a similar
political nature have declined; that many domestic private foundations are limiting or ceasing
their funding programs in the Middle East and instead focusing their international
philanthropic efforts in such countries as Brazil or Mexico to avoid the appearance of
supporting terrorism).
20. See WALTER LAQUEUR, No END TO WAR: TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FroST CENTURy
212-13 (2003).
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at this time of great need worldwide. 21 With respect to the latter-a
disruption of globalism--critics have suggested that an interruption
of globalism might be beneficial because globalism may not help
many poor countries to achieve democracy, to expand educational
opportunities, and to enhance social welfare.22 Antiglobalism,
however, also can mean a "rejection of modernity and secularism
and the preservation of the status quo."23 The rejection of these
values may prove detrimental to individuals' civil liberties and to
social and economic stability and prosperity abroad. If the U.S.
government's financial war on terrorism effectively precludes
substantial global philanthropic outreach by U.S. donors and §
21. See Nina J. Crimm, Through a Post.September 11 Looking Glass: Assessing the Roles
of Federal Tax Laws and Tax Policies Applicable to Global Philanthropy by Private
Foundations and Their Donors, 23 VA. TAX REV. 1, 10-13 (2003). The domestic and
international needs for financial support of nonmilitary affairs at this time are not and cannot
be met by the U.S. government alone. Indeed, U.S. government appropriations over the past
forty years for nonmilitary international affairs (foreign aid, State Department, United
Nations, information programs, etc.) have sharply dropped in real terms, as a share of our
economy and as a share of the federal budget. Robert J. Lieber, Foreign Policy and American
Primacy, in EAGLE RULES? FOREIGN PoLICY AND AMERICAN PRIMACY IN THE TwENrY-FIRST
CENTURY 1, 10 (Robert J. Lieber ed., 2002). As of 1997, the United States' ratio of official
development assistance to gross national product was at its lowest level since 1950. Laurie
ANN MAZUR& SUSAN E. SECHLER, GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE INITIATIVE, ROCKEFELLER BROS.
FUND, GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE AND THE NEED FOR SOCIAL STEWARDSHIP 10 (1997),
available at http'J/www.rbf.org/pdf/Global.pdf (last visited Mar. 16,2004). Focusing on another
measure-gross domestic product--during the administration of President George W. Bush,
the government has expended just 0.2% on nonmilitary international affairs, whereas during
President John F. Kennedy's administration, the United States expended 1% of its gross
domestic product on nonmilitary international affairs. Lieber, supra, at 10. In real terms,
outlays for international affairs dropped by 20% between 1986 and 2000. Id. U.S.
governmental expenditures for international affairs in 1962 was 5.1% of federal spending, and
it declined to 1.2% of federal spending by 2000. Id. Congressional appropriations to support
U.S. bilateral economic, humanitarian, and developmental global programs also have been
limited annually to between $6.8 billion and $7.2 billion since the late 1990s. See USAID
Country Allocation Summary-Actual Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1999, available at
http'J/www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/cbj2002_table02a.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); GAO,
GAO-02-471, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE: USAID RELIES HEAVILY ON NONGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATIONS, BUT BEMTER DATA NEEDED TO EVALUATE APPROACHES 2-4 (Apr. 25, 2002),
available at http'J/www.gao.gov (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
22. LAQUEUR, supra note 20, at 213. These critics define "globalism" as being synonymous
with the "Americanization" of the world through the imposition of capitalism, market
relations, neoliberalism, and corporate power. Id.
23. Id. at 215.
1352
HIGH ALERT
501(c)(3) organizations, forward momentum for improving peoples'
lives and strengthening civil societies may be lost. '
This Article provides an analysis of the U.S. government's
unfolding financial counterterrorism war and warns donors, as well
as officers, directors, and trustees of charitable organizations, that
the existing weapons in the government's arsenal may indeed have
sobering, if not philanthropically enervating, implications for
individuals and entities engaged in global charitable giving. Part I
examines the economic sanctions that the U.S. government can
impose on terrorists, terrorist groups, and their private sponsors.
This Part discusses the statutory and presidential authorities that
permit the freezing of assets and the blocking of transactions of
designated terrorists and their private sponsors. It explains current
outcomes associated with the government's employment of these
weapons against terrorism. Part II explains a variety of federal
criminal sanctions that the U.S. government can utilize in its
financial counterterrorism war. It focuses primarily on federal
statutes that proscribe money laundering activities, the provision of
material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations, and the
unlawful and willful provision or collection of funds to carry out
terrorist acts. Part III notes the November 2003 enactment of new
IRC § 501(p), which enables the IRS to suspend the § 501(c)(3)
status of an alleged terrorist organization, or of one alleged to
support terrorism. This statute, passed at the behest of the Depart-
ment of Treasury, is an additional government weapon to fight
individuals and groups who may use domestic § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions reprehensibly to funnel funds to terrorists and terrorist
organizations.
Part IV discusses the right of U.S. nationals who are victims of
"international terrorism," and their estates, survivors, or heirs to
sue for damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. Courts have interpreted
that statute to extend to claims against domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations alleged to have supported terrorists and terrorist
organizations. Part V discusses the imperative that donors and
officers, directors, and trustees of § 501(c)(3) organizations under-
take appropriate due diligence in an attempt to assure that donated
24. See Crimm, supra note 21, at 20-21.
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funds are not misused for unlawful purposes, including the mate-
rial support or financing of terrorists or terrorist organizations.
Questions are raised as to whether the governing bodies of most §
501(c)(3) organizations can undertake sufficient due diligence to
protect against criminal and civil liability.
Finally, the Conclusion cautions that the U.S. government must
not further tarnish or abuse well-intentioned, law-abiding donors
and domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations that terrorists and their
supporters may have already misused. The government must be
wise in waging its financial war on terrorism. It must guard against
overzealous reactions, unjustifiable assertions, and the imposition
of unwarranted sanctions against these donors and organizations,
and the organizations' officers, directors, and trustees. Failure to
heed this caution could result in widespread withdrawal of legiti-
mate global philanthropic support by U.S. donors and charitable
institutions. A wholesale blight on financial support for humanitar-
ian aid, the promotion of health, the enhancement of education and
other charitable causes, the facilitation of economic development,
the building of social capital, and the strengthening of social
stability could fuel the destabilization of struggling people abroad.
In that event, the government regretfully could permit fundamen-
talist and radical terrorists to achieve one of their ultimate stated
goals-the stifling of progressive forces around the globe.
I. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS-FREEZING ASSETS AND BLOCKING
TRANSACTIONS
A. Background
A powerful weapon in the U.S. government's financial war on
terrorism is the use of economic sanctions against terrorists,
terrorist groups, and their private sponsors. The discretionary
power to impose economic sanctions during war, as well as during
times of peace upon the declaration of a national emergency, has
long resided with the President of the United States.2
25. See infra Part I.A.1. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
confers broad authority on the President over financial transactions and property in which
any foreign country or national has any interest, provided the President first declares a
1354 [Vol. 45:1341
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1. Statutory Authority for Economic Sanctions
The use of economic sanctions by the U.S. government dates back
to colonial times. 26 Since that period, the form of economic sanctions
has varied, depending on the circumstances warranting the
sanctions and the laws under which they are imposed." During the
twentieth century, although the U.S. government often utilized
economic sanctions as a weapon against foreign states and nationals
of those states, it has imposed sanctions on international terrorist
groups only since 1995.'
The early statutory authority for economic sanctions dates to
1917. Six months after the United States entered World War I,
Congress enacted the Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA), 9
intending to provide a codified set of restrictions on commerce to
make it illegal for U.S. nationals to engage in commerce with
declared enemies of the United States.3' In addition, TWEA formally
national emergency. See Michael P. Malloy, Economic Sanctions and Retention of Counsel, 9
ADMiN. L.J. AM. U. 515, 518-19 (1995).
26. See Malloy, supra note 25, at 518; Stanley J. Marcuss, Grist for the Litigation Mill in
U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 30 LAW & POLY INTL Bus. 501, 501 (1999).
27. See Marcuss, supra note 26, at 503-04.
28. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, TERRORIST ASSETS REPORT, CALENDARYEAR
2002, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON ASSET IN THE UNITED STATES OF TERRORIST
COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PROGRAM DESIGNEES (2002).
It has not been unusual for the government to impose economic sanctions that prohibit
virtually all transactions with a target country, its entities, and its citizens and residents. See,
e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1998); Cuban Assets Control
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1998). It is common also for economic sanctions to
encompass entities owned or controlled by entities or nationals of the target country that are
located beyond the borders of the target country. See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations,
31 C.F.R. § 500.302(aX2) (1998); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 515.302(aX2)
(1998). Also typical in recent years are freeze orders on any assets of a target country, its
entities and nationals that are located in the United States or in the possession or control of
U.S. persons. See, e.g., Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 535.201 (1998); Iraqi
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 575.201 (1999); Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
Bosnian-Serb Controlled Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 585.201 (1998).
29. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411
(1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2003)); see also Malloy, supra note 25,
at 519.
30. See generally HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INT'L TRADE AND COMMERCE, COMM. ON INTL
RELATIONS, 94TH CONG.,TRADING WITHT E ENEMY: LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING REGULATIONS OF INTERNATIONALTRANSACTIONS IN TIME OF DECLARED NATIONAL
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conferred broad discretionary powers on the President in times of
war to restrict or prohibit certain transactions considered poten-
tially threatening to the United States. Pursuant to § 5(b) of TWEA,
the President had authority during times of war to regulate
transactions in foreign exchange, gold or silver, and transfers of
credit, evidences of indebtedness, or property ownership "between
the United States and any foreign country, whether enemy, ally of
enemy or otherwise, or between residents of one or more foreign
countries, by any person within the United States."31
In March 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt exceeded this
wartime authority when he invoked TWEA to declare a "Bank
Holiday" in response to the economic crisis brought about by the run
on bank funds after the Great Depression began. 2 Within five days,
Congress responded by amending TWEA to confer on the President
the discretionary power to impose economic sanctions during times
of peace if the President declared a national emergency.' This
extended power remained in the statute until December 1977, at
which time it was removed,3' once again limiting the President's
economic sanction powers under TWEA to times of war.35
EMERGENCY §§ 11-III (Comm. Print 1976) (reproducing documents concerning use of TWEA
authority from 1940 to 1976).
31. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106,40 Stat. 411
(1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2003)).
32. Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1691 (1933).
33. Act of March 9, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-1, ch. 1, § 2, 48 Stat. 1 (1933) (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (2003)). See Malloy, supra note 25, at 518-19.
34. Act of December 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2003)).
35. Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), Pub. L. No. 65-91, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411
(1917) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2003)) in part provides:
(1) During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he may
designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, ...
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking
institution, ...
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit,
any ... use, transfer, ... or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest, by any person, or with
respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States ....
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Rather than eliminating presidential power to impose economic
sanctions during peacetime upon the declaration of a national
emergency, however, Congress merely shifted that statutory
authority when it enacted the International Emergency and
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in 1977.36 Section 1701(a) of IEEPA
allows the President to impose sanctions under § 1702 "to deal with
any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole
or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the
President declares a national emergency with respect to such
threat."37 The Supreme Court has recognized and validated the
President's broad authority under IEEPA to regulate foreign
interests in property. 8
Although IEEPA, as originally enacted, conferred on the Presi-
dent authority to regulate and impose sanctions with respect to a
wide range of transactions, that authority was further expanded by
the USA Patriot Act, passed in response to the September 11
terrorist attacks.39 Subsection (a)(1) of § 1702 currently provides as
follows:
36. Trading With the Enemy Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101, 91 Stat. 1625
(1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(bXl) (2003)).
37. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (2003).
38. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,232 (1984); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,672
(1981).
39. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act]. The USA Patriot Act also expanded the authorization
of courts specifically to provide ex parte and in camera review of classified information in 'any
judicial review of a determination made under this section ... [that] was based on classified
information." 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106(2). The
Department of Justice considered, as a principal purpose for the addition of paragraph (c), the
authorization for a reviewing court to base a ruling on an examination of the complete
administrative record without requiring the U.S. government to compromise security and
without forcing the government to "choose between compromising highly sensitive intelligence
information or declining to take action against individuals or entities that may present a
serious threat to the United States or its nations." See CHARLES DOYLE, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, THE USA PATRIOT ACT: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, at CRS-41 n.81 (2002) (quoting
Department of Justice proposal section 159, dated Sept. 20, 2001, as an appendix in
Administration's Draft Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, Hearing Before the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 54 (2001)).
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(1) At the times and to the extent specified in section 1701 of
this title, the President may,...
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit-
(i) any transactions in foreign exchange,
(ii) transfers of credit or payments between, by, through,
or to any banking institution, to the extent that such
transfers or payments involve any interest of any foreign
country or a national thereof,
(iii) the importing or exporting of currency or securities,
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States;
(B) investigate, block during the pendency of an investiga-
tion, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, trans-
fer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation
of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in
which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest by any person, or with respect to any property,
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; and
(C) when the United States is engaged in armed hostilities
or has been attacked by a foreign country or foreign nation-
als, confiscate any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, of any foreign person, foreign organization,
or foreign country that he determines has planned, autho-
rized, aided, or engaged in such hostilities or attacks
against the United States; and all right, title, and interest
in any property so confiscated shall vest, when, as, and
upon the terms directed by the President, in such agency or
person as the President may designate from time to time,
and upon such terms and conditions as the President may
prescribe, such interest or property shall be held, used,
administered, liquidated, sold, or otherwise dealt with in
the interest of and for the benefit of the United States, and
such designated agency or person may perform any and all
acts incident to the accomplishment or furtherance of these
purposes.'
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(aXl) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 45:13411358
The above-italicized portions of paragraph (a)(1) were added by
the USA Patriot Act." A major purpose for the language added
in subparagraph (B) was to assist the U.S. government in identify-
ing, investigating, disrupting, and dismantling nontraditional
structures, such as domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations and other
nongovernmental organizations, used by terrorists' supporters to
raise, collect and distribute funds."2 Furthermore, the new language
in subparagraphs (A) and (B) broadens the government's authority
to investigate, regulate, and freeze any property or interest in
property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.' Congress
added subparagraph (C) to indicate clearly that when the United
States is engaged in an unconventional war, the President has the
authority to confiscate and dispose of any property or interest in
property that is within the jurisdiction of the United States and that
belongs to any foreign individual, foreign entity, or foreign country
determined to have planned, authorized, aided, or engaged in an
attack on the United States."
Although 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) vests these authorities in the
President, other federal statutes enable the President to delegate
the 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) authorities to other individuals. The
umbrella provision of 3 U.S.C. § 301 enables the President to
entrust authority to:
the head of any department or agency in the executive branch,
or any official thereof who is required to be appointed by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform without
approval, ratification, or other action by the President ... any
function which is vested in the President by law .......
41. USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 107-56, Title I, § 106, 115 Stat. 272.
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(aX1XB), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106(1).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(aX1XA), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106(1).
44. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(aX1XC), amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 106(1). According to the
Department of Justice, § 1702(aX1XC) was designed to provide expressly that property seized
under IEEPA, as with property seized under TWEA § 5(b), would vest in the United States
during times of national emergency involving 'unconventional warfare where Congress has
not formally declared war against a foreign nation." See DOYLE, supra note 39, at CRS-41 n.81
(citing Department of Justice proposal § 159).
45. 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). The designation and authorization must be in writing and
published in the Federal Register. See id.
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Among those to whom power may be delegated are the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General.
Additionally, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA),' 8 U.S.C. § 1189 specifically permits the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, 7 to designate an organization
meeting stated criteria as a "foreign terrorist organization" after
having first notified Congress of his intent to make such a designa-
tion." After such notification, the Secretary of the Treasury can
require U.S. financial institutions to block all financial transactions
of assets they possess or control with respect to the designated
terrorist organization.'
As will be discussed below in Parts V.B and V.C, these stat-
utes-50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 and 1702(a), 3 U.S.C. § 301, and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189--constitute the basic platform from which the current
Bush administration launched its financial counterterrorism war,
and from which former presidents imposed economic sanctions
during peacetime to redress events considered sufficiently threaten-
ing to declare a national emergency.
2. Seven Decades of Reliance on TWEA and IEEPA Powers
Presidents have utilized their power to impose economic sanc-
tions repeatedly during the past seven decades, notably more often
during times of peace than during times of war.' ° Seven years after
President Franklin D. Roosevelt first invoked TWEA, although
46. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1247 (1996).
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2003); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339(B) (2003).
48. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1189(aXI)-(2XA), (4). See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text
(discussing 'foreign terrorist organization). One court has held that the designation process
under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 is constitutionally flawed, and therefore a designation under that
statute is null and cannot be relied upon for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. United
States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1055-59 (C.D. Cal. 2002). See infra note 300
(discussing United States v. Rahmani).
49. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(aX2)(C) (2003). But see supra note 48 (noting that one court has
held that 8 U.S.C. § 1189 is constitutionally flawed). Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX2)
requires that financial institutions retain and report to the Secretary of the Treasury that
they control or possess funds in which a foreign terrorist organization or its agent has an
interest.
50. See Malloy, supra note 25, at 532.
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without textual basis, to declare the "Bank Holiday" of March,
1933,51 he again relied on TWEA, this time as amended to provide
for his declaration of a national emergency during peacetime.52 On
April 10, 1940, responding to the Nazi invasion of Norway and
Denmark, President Roosevelt issued an executive order that
restricted transfers of property in which either of those two
countries or their nationals had an interest, unless the transaction
was licensed by the Department of the Treasury.53 After China
entered the Korean War in December 1950, President Harry
Truman imposed financial and commercial restrictions against the
People's Republic of China, North Korea, and their nationals, which
remain today with respect to North Korea and its nationals.5 '
President John F. Kennedy established a comprehensive embargo
order on trade with Cuba in 1962."s President Jimmy Carter blocked
Iranian government assets and imposed trade sanctions against
Iran in response to the 1979-1981 hostage crisis.5" President George
H.W. Bush imposed numerous economic sanctions on Iraq in
response to its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. 7
The inaugural application of IEEPA economic sanctions to
individuals and entities came under President Bill Clinton. In
Executive Order 12,947, issued on January 23, 1995, President
Clinton declared a national emergency to respond to the "grave acts
of violence committed by foreign terrorists [and terrorist organiza-
tions] that disrupt the Middle East peace process [and that]
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
51. See supra note 32.
52. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
53. Exec. Order No. 8389, 5 Fed. Reg. 1400 (Apr. 10, 1940) (declaring a "national
emergency" pursuant to TWEA).
54. Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9092 (Dec, 16, 1950) (ordered pursuant to
TWEA).
55. Proclamation No. 3447,27 Fed. Reg. 1085 (Feb, 6, 1962) (ordered pursuant to TWEA).
On July 8, 1963, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) promulgated regulations to
implement the embargo. Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2003).
56. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979); see Iranian Assets
Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 535 (1981); see also Michael P. Malloy, The Iran Crisis: Law
Under Pressure, 1984 WIS. INTL. L.J. 15 (analyzing economic sanctions issued in response to
the hostage crisis).
57. Exec. Order No. 12,722, 55 Fed. Reg. 31,803 (Aug. 2, 1990). See Iraqi Sanctions
Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 575 (1990); see also Michael P. Malloy, The Iraqi Sanctions:
Something Old, Something New, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 413 (1991) (analyzing the sanctions).
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security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.""8
Pursuant to the Executive Order, under his IEEPA authority,
President Clinton blocked all transfers of property or interests
in property of twelve designated foreign terrorist organizations
considered a threat to Middle East peace and specifically listed in
an annex to the Executive Order; 9 along with
(ii) foreign persons (individuals and organizations) to be desig-
nated by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secre-
tary of the Treasury and the Attorney General if such foreign
persons were found:
(A) to have committed, or to pose a significant risk of
committing, acts of violence that had the purpose or effect
of disrupting the Middle East peace processes or
(B) to be assisting in, sponsoring, or providing financial,
material, or technological support for, or services in sup-
port of, violence; and
(iii) (foreign or domestic) persons owned or controlled by, or
acting on behalf of (i.e. as agent for) any of the designated
individuals and entities in the foregoing categories."
Those persons, both foreign and domestic,6 ' designated under
Executive Order 12,947 were labeled Specially Designated Terror-
ists (SDTs).6"
58. Exec. Order No. 12,947, 60 Fed. Reg. 5079 (Jan. 23, 1995).
59. Id. §1(i). 50 U.S.C. § 1702 does not include detailed criteria that the President must
utilize in initially designating these "foreign terrorist organizations"; thereby arguably giving
great latitude. See 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (2000 & Supp. 2003). However, 8 U.S.C. § 1189, the
statute under which the Secretary of State can designate a 'foreign terrorist organization,"
provides more detailed guidance. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
60. Exec. Order No. 12,947, § 1(ii)-(iii), 60 Fed. Reg. at 5079. Twelve foreign terrorist
organizations were named in the original Annex to the Executive Order, including Abu Nidal
Organization (ANO), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Hizballah,
Islamic Gama'at, Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), Jihad, Kach, Kahane Chai,
Palestinian Islamic Jihad-Shiqaqi faction (PIJ), Palestine Liberation Front-AbuAbbas faction
(PLF-Abu Abbas), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFL), and Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC).
61. In 1995, Mohammad Salah became the first American citizen to be listed as a
"Specially Designated Terrorist" (SDT). 60 Fed. Reg. 41,152 (Aug. 11, 1995).
62. Terrorism Sanction Regulations; Specially Designated Terrorist, 31 C.F.R. § 595.311
(2003). Not all SDTs are foreign terrorist organizations. See supra note 61 (referencing the
first American citizen to be listed as an SDT); infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text
(discussing the term "foreign terrorist organization").
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Executive Order 12,947 further prohibited U.S. citizens, resident
aliens, or domestic entities from engaging in any transaction with,
or dealing in property or interests in property of, designated persons
in the foregoing categories. It also particularly specified that the
prohibition included the "making or receiving of any contribution of
funds, goods, or services, to or for the benefit of such [designated]
persons."' The Executive Order delegated to the Secretary of the
Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General, any authority granted to the president by the
IEEPA to carry out the Executive Order." That authority included,
but was not limited to, the promulgation of regulations and rules,
the designation of other persons and organizations, and the re-
delegation of such powers to other officers and agencies.'
On August 20, 1998, President Clinton issued Executive Order
13,099, updating the list of SDTs annexed to his Executive Order
12,947 to add an individual foreign terrorist, Usama (Osama) bin
Muhammad bin Awad bin Ladin, and several terrorist organiza-
tions, including the Islamic Army (al Qaeda).'
These executive orders, along with earlier presidentially imposed
economic sanctions based on TWEA and IEEPA, set the groundwork
for President George W. Bush to take the first major step after
September 11, 2001 in his declared financial war on terrorism. 7
63. Exec. Order No. 12,947, § 1(b), 60 Fed, Reg. at 5079. Additionally, U.S. persons were
prohibited from engaging in transactions in attempts to evade, avoid, or violate the blocking
order. Id. § 1(c), 60 Fed. Reg. at 5079.
64. Id. § 4(a), 60 Fed. Reg. at 5080.
65. Id.
66. Exec. Order No. 13,099, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,167 (Aug. 20, 1998) (designating also Abu
Hafs al-Masri and Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa as SDTs).
67. The United Nations Security Council also recognized and condemned the September
11 terrorist attacks, first by U.N. Resolution No. 1368 on September 12, 2001, followed by
U.N. Resolution Nos. 1373 and 1390 on September 28, 2001, and January 28, 2002,
respectively. Resolution No. 1373, passed and agreed upon by 189 member states of the
United Nations, was unequivocally inspired by, but not specifically related to, the September
11 attacks. Nonetheless, the September 11 attacks are mentioned in the preamble to
Resolution No. 1373. That Resolution condemns international terrorism and threats to the
international community, resolves to take actions against terrorism, establishes binding rules
of international law, and creates a mechanism to monitor compliance with those rules.
Resolution No. 1373 resolves that all United Nations member states shall:
(a) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
(b) Criminalize the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or
indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention
that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in
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B. Executive Order 13,224
Broadening the scope of President Clinton's Executive Order
12,947, President Bush, on September 23, 2001, issued Executive
Order 13,224, in which he stated his findings that:
[Girave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by
foreign terrorists ... on September 11, 2001, ... and the continu-
ing and immediate threat of further attacks on United States
nationals or the United States constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States .... [I] hereby declare a national
emergency to deal with that threat. I also find that because of
the pervasiveness and expansiveness of the financial foundation
of foreign terrorists, financial sanctions may be appropriate for
order to carry out terrorist acts;
(c) Freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources
of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or
facilitate the commission of terrorist acts; of entities owned or controlled directly
or indirectly by such persons; and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or
at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds derived or
generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such
persons and associated persons and entities;
(d) Prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories
from making any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or
other related services available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons
who commit or attempt to commit or facilitate or participate in the commission
of terrorist acts, of entities owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by such
persons and of persons and entities acting on behalf of or at the direction of such
persons.
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES 1373 (2001).
Resolution No. 1373 further contained a nonbinding provision that called upon all member
States to become parties as soon as possible to the conventions relating to terrorism,
particularly the 1999 Convention on the Financing of Terrorism. Id. I 3(d). According to one
commentator, the reason that Resolution No. 1373 did not make that provision binding may
have resulted from political factors, including the reluctance of Security Council member
States to become bound. Paul C. Szasz, The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AM. J.
INTfL L. 901, 903 (2002). One of those member States purportedly reluctant to be bound was
the United States, the original sponsor of Resolution No. 1373. See id. at 903 n.22.
U.N. Resolution 1390 resolved specifically with respect to Osama bin Laden, members of
al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated individuals, groups, entities and undertakings, to
"[flreeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic resources of these
individuals, groups, undertakings and entities." S.C. Res. 1390, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess. 4452d
mtg. I 2(a), U.N. Doc. S/REs 1390 (2002).
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those foreign persons that support or otherwise associate with
these foreign terrorists. I also find that a need exists for further
consultation and cooperation with, and sharing of information
by, United States and foreign financial institutions as an
additional tool to enable the United States to combat the
financing of terrorism.'
Invoking his powers under § 1702(b), President Bush in § 1 of the
Executive Order blocked immediately "all property and interests in
property of... [various] persons that are in the United States or that
hereafter come within the United States, or that hereafter come
within the possession or control of United States persons. "
This Executive Order authorized seizure of the property of
twenty-seven designated foreign persons: twelve individuals and
fifteen "foreign terrorist organizations,"70 including three non-
governmental organizations, the names of which were contained
in an Annex to the Executive Order.7' Moreover, pursuant to the
68. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
69. Id. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(1), the Attorney General may seize property, or if
involved in an investigation by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary may seize the
property. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(1) (2000). For a further discussion of the civil forfeiture
provision, see discussion infra Part I.D.
70. See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text (commenting on the President's
apparent great latitude in designating "foreign terrorist groups"); infra Part I.C.2 (setting
forth the statutory criteria for the Secretary of State to designate a "foreign terrorist
organization" and the OFAC regulatory definition of "foreign terrorist organization").
71. Exec. Order No. 13,224, Annex, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,083 (Sept. 23, 2001). The Annex
designated the following individuals: Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, Abu Hafs the Mauritanian, Abu
Zubaydah, Tariq Anwar al-Sayyid Abroad, Sayf al-Adl, Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Muhammad Atif, Osama bin Laden, Shaykh Sai'id, Muhammad Salah, and Thirwat
Salah Shihata. Id.
Twice on September 24, 2001, President Bush underscored his message that
nongovernmental organizations could be as insidious as the individual terrorists. First, in
remarks in the Rose Garden on September 24, 2001, President Bush commented:
Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes[sic] use
nice-sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for their activities. We
have targeted three such NGOs. We intend to deal with them .... This executive
order means that United States banks that have assets of these groups ... must
freeze their accounts. And United States citizens or businesses are prohibited
from doing business with them.
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Freezes Terrorists' Assets (Sept. 24,
2001), available at http'JAvww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010924-4.htm (last
visited Mar. 16, 2004). Then, in a message to Congress, he stated with respect to his decision
under the Executive Order to suspend humanitarian, medical, and agricultural transfers and
donations: "Regrettably, international terrorist networks make frequent use of charitable or
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President's delegation authorities under 3 U.S.C. § 301 and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1189, it authorized seizure of the property of:
(b) foreign persons [individuals and organizations to be] deter-
mined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, to have
committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
terrorism that threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the
national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States; 7
2
(c) persons [foreign or domestic] determined by the Secretary of
the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General, to be owned or controlled by, or to [be] act[ing]
for or on behalf of, those persons listed in the Annex to this order
or those persons determined to be subject to subsection 1(b), 1(c),
or 1(dXi) of this order;73
(d) ... persons [foreign or domestic] determined by the Secretary
of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State and
the Attorney General;
(i) to assist in, sponsor, or provide financial, material, or
technological support for, or financial or other services to
or in support of, such acts of terrorism ... or
(ii) to be otherwise associated with [other persons desig-
nated pursuant to the order].74
humanitarian organizations to obtain clandestine financial and other support for their
activities. If these exemptions were not suspended ... [they] could be used as a loophole
through which support could be provided to individuals or groups involved with terrorism...."
Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to
Commit, or Support Terrorism-Message from the President of the United States, 147 CONG.
REC. H5964 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 2001). This sentiment was reflected in the designation of
fifteen nongovernmental organizations on the Annex to Executive Order 13,224, which
included: Abu SayyafGroup, Al Qaeda/Islamic Army, Al Rashid Trust, Al-Itihaad Al-Islamiya,
AI-Jihad, Armed Islamic Group, Asbat al-Ansar, Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Islamic Army of
Aden, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Makhtab Al-
Khidamat/Al Kifah, Mamoun Darkazanli Import-Export Company, Salafist Group for Call and
Combat, and Wafa Humanitarian Organization. Exec. Order No. 13,224, Annex, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 49,083.
72. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 1(b), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.
73. Id. § 1(c), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,079.
74. Id. § l(d), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080. This language reflects the provision of 18 U.S.C. §
2339B, which provides that it is a criminal offense for a person to "knowingly" provide
"material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.* 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)
(2003).
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Those individuals and entities, both foreign and domestic, desig-
nated pursuant to Executive Order 13,224 are considered
"[sipecially designated global terrorist[s]" (SDGTs).75
Executive Order 13,224 also prohibits U.S. individuals and
entities from engaging in economic transactions or dealings with
blocked property or interests in property, including the "making or
receiving of any contribution of funds, goods, or services to or for the
benefit of those [designated] persons listed in the Annex to this
order or determined to be subject to this order";7' from engaging in
transactions that attempt to evade, avoid, or violate the prohibited
transactions covered by the order; and from conspiring to violate the
order's prohibitions." Persons who violate these prohibitions are
subject to criminal prosecution. 78
Moreover, President Bush's Executive Order delegates broad
power to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the
Secretary of State and the Attorney General, to make regulations
and rules "to employ all powers granted to the President by IEEPA
and UNPA [the United Nations Participation Act of 19451 ,'79 and to
"take such other actions than the complete blocking of property or
interests in property ... [that the Secretary deems to be] consistent
with the national interests of the United States."' Recognizing the
75. Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 594.201(a), 594.310 (June 6,
2003). Thus, the SDGT label that attaches to certain designees as a result of Executive Order
13,224 is similar to but slightly broader than the SDT label applied as a result of Executive
Order 12,947. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text (commenting on SDT label that
arose from President Clinton's Executive Order 12,947).
76. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 2(a), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080.
77. See id. § 2(c), 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,080.
78. See infra Part II (discussing the various federal criminal sanctions).
79. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 7,66 Fed. Reg. at 49,081 (referring to the United Nations
Participation Act of 1945 (UNPA), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 287c (2003)). The UNPA provides
in subsection (a) that:
[nlotwithstanding the provisions of any other law, whenever the United States
is called upon by the Security Council to apply measures which said Council has
decided ... are to be employed to give effect to its decisions ... the President may,
to the extent necessary to apply such measures, through any agency which he
may designate, and under such orders, rules, and regulations as may be
prescribed by him, investigate, regulate, or prohibit, in whole or in part,
economic relations ... any foreign country or any national thereof or any person
therein and the United States or any person subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
or involving any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
22 U.S.C. § 287c(a) (2000).
80. Exec. Order No. 13,224, § 5, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,081.
20041 1367
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
instant transferability or portability of funds, the President con-
cluded that "[flor those persons listed in the Annex... or determined
to be subject to this order who might have a constitutional presence
in the United States ... prior notice to such persons of measures to
be taken pursuant to this order would render these measures
ineffectual."sl Accordingly, prior notice of a designation made
pursuant to the order is not required.82
C. Outcomes
1. Background
As noted above, economic sanctions have been ordered by U.S.
presidents numerous times during the past seven decades,' and the
resulting administrative tasks-promulgation of rules and regula-
tions, investigations, and other actions-have been delegated to
and implemented by federal agencies under 3 U.S.C. § 301 and 8
U.S.C. § 1189.8 President Roosevelt, pursuant to his April 10, 1940
executive order issued after the Nazi invasion of Norway and
Denmark, delegated to the Department of the Treasury the
administrative work of effectuating the economic sanctions.' To
accomplish its tasks, the Department of the Treasury established
the Office of Foreign Funds Control (OFFC). Its objective under
TWEA was "to prevent Nazi use of occupied countries' holdings of
foreign exchange and to prevent forced repatriation of funds
belonging to nationals of those countries."' OFFC was succeeded by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which was created
initially to carry out the economic sanctions imposed by President
Truman's proclamation in December 1950 after the entry of China
into the Korean War."7
81. Id. § 10, 66 Fed. Reg. at 49,081.
82. Id.
83. See supra Part I.A.2 (providing a brief history of economic sanctions ordered by
presidents).
84. See supra Part I.A.1 (explaining the statutes).
85. See Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Frequently Asked
Questions, at http'/www.treas.gov/officesteotffc/ofac/faqindex.html (last visited Mar. 16,2004)
[hereinafter OFAC FAQ].
86. Id.
87. Id.; see supra note 54 and accompanying text (noting President Truman's
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OFAC remains in existence and is responsible for administering
and enforcing those economic sanction programs that focus primar-
ily on targeted foreign countries and groups of individuals, such as
terrorists.88 It specifically coordinates, administers, and enforces the
prohibition on designated economic transactions between targeted
foreign countries and U.S. individuals and entities in part by
freezing or blocking assets that are subject to U.S. jurisdiction or in
the possession or control of U.S. persons.89 As part of its duties,
OFAC regulates the freezing of assets, collects information on
"foreign terrorist organizations," and publishes and regularly
updates an ongoing list of designated persons.'
In administering its responsibilities, OFAC has promulgated
numerous regulations governing economic sanction programs.9 ' It
adopted specific "Terrorism Sanctions Regulations," which include
regulations regarding definitions, prohibitions, reporting, interpre-
tations, licensing authority, procedures, and penalties.' Among the
regulations are those that establish procedures that allow a person
to seek the unfreezing of assets believed to be blocked mistakenly
and to "seek administrative reconsideration" of a designation.9'
2. Foreign Terrorist Organizations and SDGTs
The terms "foreign terrorist organization" and "SDGT" are not
synonymous, but they can overlap. The term "foreign terrorist
organization" means an "organization designated or redesignated as
proclamation).
88. See OFAC FAQ, supra note 85. Pursuant to Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions
Regulations; Procedures, 31 C.F.R. § 597.802, under current law, the OFAC may take any
action delegated to the Secretary of Treasury pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189 and 18 U.S.C. §
2339B. Delegation by the Secretary of the Treasury, 31 C.F.R. § 597.802 (2003).
89. See Lehrer, supra note 15, at 336 (citing R. Richard Newcomb, Office ofForeign Assets
Control, in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 1998, at 115, 120-21 (PLI Comm. Law &
Practice Course, Handbook Series No. A-782, 1998)).
90. See OFAC FAQ, supra note 85; see also discussion infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the
OFAC regulation creating the label "SDGTr and the OFAC regulation defining "foreign
terrorist organization").
91. Reporting and Procedures Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 501 (2003).
92. Terrorism Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 595-598 (2003).
93. Procedures Governing Removal of Names from Appendices A, B, and C to this
Chapter, 31 C.F.R. § 501.807 (2003); see also Prohibited Transactions Involving Blocked
Property, 31 C.F.R. § 595.201(b) (2003); Procedures for Unblocking Funds Believed to Have
Been Blocked Due to Mistaken Identity, 31 C.F.R. § 501.806 (2003).
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a foreign terrorist organization, [by executive order] or with respect
to which the Secretary of State has notified Congress of the
intention to designate as a foreign terrorist organization under 8
U.S.C. [§1 1189(a).' Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), the organi-
zation must satisfy three statutory criteria: (1) it must be foreign,
(2) it must engage in terrorist activity or terrorism, and (3) that
activity must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national
security of the United States." There is no statutory definition of
"foreign" in 8 U.S.C. § 1189, and from judicial filings it appears that
for purposes of that provision the Secretary of State currently
excludes an organization or group formed under the laws of the
states or the District of Columbia.' Based upon that interpretation,
an organization formed under the laws of the District of Columbia
or one of the fifty states cannot be a "foreign terrorist organization."
The concept of "terrorist activity" as defined in 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B) is broad and encompasses many types of unlawful
activity. These activities include committing or inciting another
person to commit a terrorist activity, preparing or planning a
terrorist activity, gathering "information on potential targets for
94. Foreign Terrorist Organization, 31 C.F.R. § 597.309 (2003).
95. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(aX) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
96. See Joshua A. Ellis, Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations Under theAEDPA"
The National Council Court Erred in Requiring Pre-Designation Process, 2002 BYU L. REV.
675, 679. In the case of People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 182
F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), then-Secretaryof State Madeleine Albright had redesignated several
organizations, including the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), as a "foreign
terrorist organization" for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1189, and the organizations brought
petitions for judicial review of the designations based upon claims of the abridgement of their
constitutional due process rights. On brief, PMOI raised the issue as to whether the U.S.
Office of National Council of Resistance of Iran (USNCRI), a domestic nonprofit organization
under the designated group of PMOI aliases, could be a "foreign organization" within the
meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1189. See Ellis, supra, at 679. The D.C. Circuit panel expressly declined
to address the issue of whether its ruling that "[a] foreign entity ... has no constitutional
rights, under the due process clause or otherwise" applies to "those in the United States" who
are donors or members of an organization designated by the State Department as a foreign
terrorist organization. People's Mojahedin Org. oflran, 182 F.3d at 22 n.6. The Ninth Circuit
remanded that question back to the State Department, which ultimately conceded that it
would not consider USNCRI a "foreign terrorist organization" for 8 U.S.C. § 1189 designation
purposes. See Ellis, supra, at 679, 690-91. An entity formed abroad or a foreign "group of two
or more individuals, whether organized or not, which engages in [terrorist] activities" is
considered a "foreign terrorist group." Id. at 680; accord County Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep't
of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799-800 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that group taking the designation of
"Real IRA" does not have constitutional rights because it failed to demonstrate a property
interest or a presence in the United States).
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terrorist activity," soliciting funds for a terrorist activity or another
terrorist organization, and soliciting an individual to engage in
terrorist activity or to become a member of a terrorist organization. 97
Moreover, an organization engages in terrorist activity when it
provides material support "for the commission of a terrorist activ-
ity," or "to a terrorist organization. 98 Finally, the terrorist activities
must threaten U.S. nationals or the "national security" of the
United States, which "means the national defense, foreign relations,
or economic interests of the United States" here or abroad."
By contrast, designation as an SDGT is not limited only to
persons designated by the Secretary of State after notification to
Congress. Instead, Executive Order 13,224 sets forth the circum-
stances under which the Secretary of the Treasury and/or the
Secretary of State, in consultation with others but without notifica-
tion to Congress, can designate an SDGT ° Moreover, unlike a
"foreign terrorist organization," an SDGT need not be foreign. It is
clear from § 1 of Executive Order 13,224 that any foreign or U.S.
individual, group, or entity can be designated as an SDGT if such
person: (1) assists in, sponsors, or provides financial, material, or
technological support for, or services in support of, terrorism; is
associated with other persons designated pursuant to the order; or
(2) is an agent for any designated individuals or entities. 01 Because
U.S. individuals and organizations can be designated as SDGTs for
providing financial support to terrorists and terrorist groups, well-
intentioned individual donors and legitimate domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations that engage in global philanthropy and that do not or
cannot track the exact end-users of those donated funds may fear
that their assets can be frozen immediately or that they may be
subject to criminal sanctions. "
The current Bush administration publicly manifested its serious
attitude toward compiling a list of SDGTs on September 23, 2001
when, as an Annex to Executive Order 13,244, President Bush listed
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3XBXivXI)-(V) (2000 & Supp. 2003).
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(3XBXiv)VI) (2000 & Supp. 2003) (referring to the definition in 18
U.S.C. § 2339A of "material support").
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(cX2) (2000).
100. See Exec. Order No. 13,244, § 1, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
101. See 4
102. Whether these concerns are well founded is discussed in Part II, infra.
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twelve individuals and fifteen nongovernmental organizations as
SDGTs, the latter of which are also foreign terrorist organiza-
tions.1 °" Within a month, President Bush announced a "Ten Most
Wanted Terrorist" list of SDGTs. 1' A few days later, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury's OFAC0' and the Department of State06
identified additional SDGTs associated with the al Qaeda attacks.
By May 29, 2003, the State Department had added more than 250
individuals and thirty-six entities to its list of designated individu-
als and entities,"°7 and the separate Department of the Treasury list
of SDGTs included 264 individuals and entities." By the end of
2003, pursuant to Executive Order 13,224, 315 individuals and
103. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (listing the SDGTs on the Annex to
Executive Order 13,224).
104. CNN, Bush Announces "Most Wanted" Terrorist List, Oct. 11, 2001, at http://www.cnx.
com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/10/10/inv.most.wantedtindex.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
105. OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, SPECIALLY
DESIGNATED NATIONALS (SDN) LIST, available at http:l/www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/
ofac/sdn/tllsdn.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2004) [hereinafter OFAC SDN LIST].
106. OFFICE OF COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPAT OF STATE TERROR
EXCLUSION LIST (Nov. 15, 2003), available at http'J/www.state.gov/sct/rlsfs/2002/
15222pf.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004). Additional lists are maintained by the European
Union and the United Nations. See Proposal for a Council Regulation Imposing Certain
Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against Certain Persons and Entities Associated with
Osama bin Laden, The Al-Qaeda Network and the Taliban, and Repealing Council Regulation
(EC) No. 467/2001 Prohibiting the Export of Certain Goods and Services to Afghanistan,
Strengthening the Flight Ban and Extending the Freeze of Funds and Other Financial
Resources in Respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan, available at httpJ/ europa.euLinteur-
lex/en/com/regen-register_18.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); UNITED NATIONS, SECURITY
COUNCIL, SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, NEW CONSOLIDATED LISTS, available at
httpJAvww.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/pdflist.pdf (last updated Mar. 12, 2004).
107. See Testimony of Steven Emerson, Director of the Investigative Project, Before the
House Fin. Servs. Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Antiterrorism Financing, Mar.
11, 2003, LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House File; Designation of 39 "Terrorist
Organizations" Under the "Patriot USA Act," 66 Fed. Reg. 63,620 (Dec. 7, 2001) (reporting a
total of thirty-nine terrorist organizations, including some of those designated by President
Bush's Executive Order 13,224); Pakistan Demands Proof to Back U.S. Terror Watch List,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, International News, May 2, 2004, LEXIS (stating that thirty-eight
more terrorist organizations are being watched closely).
108. See OFAC SDN LIST, supra note 105; see also Treasury Designates A-Aqsa
International Foundation as Financier of Terror, Charity Linked to Funding of the Hamas
Terrorist Organization, Regulatory Intelligence Data, May 29, 2003, LEXIS, Federal
Document Clearing House File. As of June 26, 2003, the Department of the Treasury had
designated eighteen nongovernmental organizations. See Prepared Testimony of David D.
Aulhauser, supra note 7.
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entities had been designated as SDGTs, of which thirty-six were
foreign terrorist organizations.' °9
3. Blocked Assets
The concerted counterterrorism efforts of OFAC, the Department
of Justice, and cooperating foreign countries and institutions have
resulted in the U.S. government's freezing of large amounts of
assets."' The U.S. government reports that with the cooperation of
the international community, $125 million in terrorist organiza-
tions' assets were frozen worldwide between September 11, 2001
and June 5, 2003,"' including $36.2 million in the United States."2
As of September, 2002, the U.S. government had frozen $6.3 million
in charitable funds and other countries had seized $5.2 million in
charitable funds.13 These concrete results of the financial war on
109. Bruce Zagaris, US 2003 Money Laundering Strategy Report Emphasizes International
Aspects, INTL ENFORCEMENT L. REP. (2004).
110. The authority to freeze and seize funds connected to terrorist groups is a powerful
weapon, one over which there is a concern for abuse even within the U.S. government. See
Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Cautiously Begins to Seize Millions in Foreign Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May
30,2003, at A16 (reporting concern of U.S. State Department over seizures by the Department
of Justice). The Department of Justice has seized through U.S. correspondent bank accounts
of foreign banks a significant amount of money believed to have been illegally obtained by
terrorist groups. Id. Some of these seizures have involved fraud and money laundering
investigations unrelated to terrorism. Id.
It should be noted that not only can a foreign terrorist organization's funds be blocked
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX2)(A) and 50 U.S.C. § 1702(aX1XAXi), but also pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX3XBXiXIV), a foreign terrorist organization's representatives can be
deported.
111. See Prepared Testimony of John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Before the Committee on
the Judiciary, House of Representatives, June 5, 2003, available at http'I/www.house.
govijudiciary/ashcroft060503.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2004); Press Release, Testimony of
Juan C. Zarate Deputy Assistant Secretary, Executive Office, Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crime, Department of the Treasury, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Mar. 18,
2003) (reporting the freezing of $125 million in terrorist organizations' assets), available at
http'Jtwww.treas.gov/press/releasesajs139.htm (last visited Mar. 8,2004); Testimony of Steven
Emerson, supra note 107 (testifying that the Departments of Justice and Treasury by March
11, 2003, had frozen $113 million in assets of sixty-two U.S. and foreign organizations
supporting terrorism). A recent update reports that as of November 2003, $136 million had
been frozen worldwide. Zagaris, supra note 109. As of mid-January 2004, the Treasury
Department reported that $139 million has been blocked. See Edmund L. Andrews, U.S. and
Saudis Act to Freeze Charity's Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, at A4.
112. See Testimony of Steven Emerson, supra note 107.
113. DEPVtOFTHE TREASURY, CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURYTO THE
FINANCIAL WAR ON TERRORISM, FACT SHEET, 12 (2002), available at http'J/www.treas.gov/
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terrorism include the highly publicized seizures of assets of several
domestic Muslim § 501(c)(3) organizations,"' which fueled distrust
among Muslim donors and precipitated a decline in donations to
numerous mosques and other legitimate Muslim charitable
organizations.1 '
4. Cases Involving Blocked Assets of Domestic § 501(c)(3)
Organizations
According to one scholar, based on figures produced by the
Department of Justice, approximately thirty percent of al Qaeda's
financial resources were derived from donations solicited in the
United States and abroad." 6 With such a significant portion of al
Qaeda's funding attributed to fund raising, it is no wonder that the
U.S. government has allocated substantial resources and efforts to
blocking assets of domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations utilized in
those fund-raising efforts. The affected domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations have brought lawsuits challenging the OFAC
temporary blocking orders during an investigation into whether the
organization illegally funneled assets to terrorists or terrorist
groups. At issue in these cases is whether a preliminary injunction
should be issued to lift a temporary blocking order issued under 50
U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). The courts have not yet fully addressed the
pressfreleases/reports/2002910184556291211.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2004); see also Bruce
Zagaris, U.S. Senate Finance Hearing Reveals New Initiatives on Counter-Terrorism Financial
Enforcement, Counter-Terrorism Financial Enforcement, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 497
(2002).
114. The organizations include the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
(Holy Land), Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. (Benevolence International), and
Global Relief Foundation, Inc. (Global Relief). Additionally, foreign Muslim charities, such as
Al Aksa, have been designated as SDGTs and have had funds seized by the U.S. government.
See Timothy L. O'Brien & Heather Timmons, Muslim Charity Is Tied to Terror Group, N.Y.
TIMES, May 30, 2003, at A16 (reporting that in March 2002, the State Department froze the
assets of Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, a splinter group of Al Aksa, that claimed responsibility
for suicide bombings in Israel).
115. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing the sentiment of Muslim
contributors and the concerns of Muslim charities).
116. See Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr., Introduction, Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Money
Laundering in the Americas, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 3, 4 (2002) (stating that Department of Justice
figures indicate that al Qaeda received approximately 40% of its funds from drugs, 20% from
extortion, 10% from kidnapping, and the remainder from fundraising in the United States and
abroad).
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substantive issue of whether, based on all of the evidence collected
by governmental authorities during its investigations, an organiza-
tion and its managers are guilty of crimes punishable under federal
criminal statutes. To date, the courts consistently have confirmed
the breadth of authority ascribed to the President and his delegates
to issue temporary blocking orders under 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B)
and have sanctioned limitations on the constitutional rights of
domestic organizations in the discrete timeframe of a declared
national emergency when national security and the security of U.S.
citizens are considered at stake.
a. Global Relief Foundation, Inc.
For many years law enforcement and intelligence authorities
investigated and placed under surveillance the Global Relief
Foundation, Inc. (Global Relief), a nonprofit organization chartered
and incorporated in Illinois, for alleged ties to terrorist groups.1 On
December 14, 2001, pursuant to a warrant and under the authority
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the emergency
authority of the Acting Attorney General, the FBI conducted a
search of Global Reliefs headquarters and its executive director's
home and seized materials."1 ' On the same day, pursuant to §
1702(a)(1)(B), based on previously obtained classified and unclassi-
fied information,'19 OFAC determined that Global Relief "had long
been sending millions of dollars to regions, including Afghanistan,
where [Olsama bin Laden and other Islamic terrorists operate."' 2°
Based on that determination, the Secretary of the Treasury issued
a temporary blocking notice freezing the assets of Global Relief
pending the FBI's further investigation of the relationship of Global
117. Brief for Appellees at 11-12, Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir.
2002) (No. 02-2536), available at http:/Avww.ca7.uscourts.gov/briefs.htm.
118. Global Relief Found. v. ONeill, 207 F. Supp. 2d 779,784 (N.D. 111. 2002), affd 315 F.3d
748 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003). Moreover, on November 24, 2003, the
Treasury Department and the IRS announced the suspension of the tax-exempt status of
Global Relief because it has been designated as supporting or engaging in terrorist activity.
See infra note 386 and accompanying text (discussing the ability of the IRS under I.R.C. §
50 1(p) to suspend the tax-exempt status of such organizations).
119. Brief for Appellees at 9, Global ReliefFound. (No. 02-2536).
120. Id.
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Relief, if any, to the September 11 terrorists.'2 1 The blocking notice
was to remain in effect "pending further investigation and resolu-
tion of whether GRF [Global Reliefl has engaged in activities that
violate [IEEPAI"; however, nothing in the order precluded Global
Relief from continuing to receive donations into its blocked
accounts.12 The notice advised Global Relief of the administrative
means it could employ to challenge the blocking order.'" Global
Relief pursued partial administrative relief.2 4 Thereafter, Global
Relief filed an action in federal district court on January 28, 2002,
seeking declaratory and preliminary injunctive relief and a writ of
mandamas.'5 It was not until May 24, 2002 that OFAC first
proposed to designate Global Relief as an SDGT."2 As a result of the
administrative appeal procedures, SDGT status was not immedi-
ately assigned.
127
In its lawsuit,"2 Global Relief argued that the IEEPA did not
grant the authority to block purely domestic assets, and second, that
the interest in assets to be blocked must be an interest held by a
foreigner rather than by a U.S. individual or domestic entity. 129
Global Relief also contended that President Bush's Executive Order
121. Id.; Global Relief Found., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 792.
122. Brief for Appellees at 9, Global Relief Found. (No. 02-2536).
123. Id. at 11.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 12.
126. Id. at 11.
127. Id. On October 14, 2002, OFAC designated Global Relief as an SDGT. See OFAC SDN
LIST, supra note 105.
128. Global Relief first asserted that the warrantless search of its headquarters and of its
executive director's home were ultra vires actions beyond the scope of the powers conferred
by Congress on executive agencies. Global Relief Found, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 788. The district
court concluded that under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. § 1801,
there was probable cause to believe that Global Relief and its executive director were agents
of a foreign power and that the warrantless search and seizure were appropriate under FISA
and not in violation of the First Amendment protected activities of Global Relief and the
executive director. Id. at 789-90. Furthermore, Global Relief argued that OFAC's blocking
order violated the humanitarian relief exception of the IEEPA. Id. at 790. The district court
held that the suspected actions of Global Relief did not warrant Global Reliefs access to the
IEEPA humanitarian relief exception. Id. at 796-97. Global Relief asserted for the first time
in its reply brief that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B rather than 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1XB) was the
appropriate statute to subject individuals and entities, including U.S. persons, to a blocking
order. Id. at 791. The court refused to address the argument because Global Relief had failed
to raise the issue in its brief. Id.
129. Id. at 790.
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13,224 legally could not delegate to OFAC authority to block assets
"during the pendency of an investigation" because the Executive
Order was issued before the enactment of the USA Patriot Act,
which added such language to 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B). 3 ° The
district court disagreed with Global Relief as to each contention.
13 1
With respect to the assertion that § 1702(a)(1)(B) precluded the
freezing of "purely domestic assets," the court focused on the
statutory language, emphasizing that Congress in enacting the
provision repeatedly employed the word "any": once with respect to
interest and then again with respect to property. 132 The court stated
that had Congress intended the provision to apply to only foreign
property, it would have chosen more limiting statutory language. 33
Thus, the court concluded the "plain language" of the statute
dictated a broad intent with respect to the government's ability to
block domestic, as well as foreign, assets.
With respect to Global Reliefs contention that interests in assets
subject to a blocking order under § 1702(a)(1)(B) must be those of
foreign persons, the federal district court first found that the
majority of the funds collected and distributed by Global Relief were
intended for foreign countries, entities, and nationals. 134 The court
also determined that foreign nationals, including Global Reliefs
executive director, had a direct interest in the assets collected and
distributed by Global Relief. " Therefore, the court concluded the
blocking order was directed at appropriate interests and assets."
It particularly noted that to conclude otherwise would completely
undermine the statutory purposes of the act by allowing foreign
nationals and entities to create and use U.S. entities to fund
terrorism in the United States. 13 7
130. Id. at 798.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 793.
133. Id. The court also reviewed and gave deference to OFAC's regulations, which broadly
defined the term "interest." Id. (citing Property; Property Interests, 31 C.F.R. § 535.311
(2002); Interest, 31 C.F.R. § 535.312 (2002); Property; Property Interest, 31 C.F.R. § 595.310
(2002)).
134. Id. at 774 (internal citations omitted).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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As to Global Reliefs position that President Bush legally could
not delegate to OFAC authority to block Global Reliefs assets
during the pendency of an investigation, the federal district court
concluded that the blocking order was not an ultra vires act by
OFAC.' 38 The court found that the catchall language of §5 of the
Executive Order, which:
authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury (and his designee) to
"take such other actions than the complete blocking of property
or interest in property as the President is authorized to take
under IEEPA ... if the Secretary of the Treasury... deems such
other actions to be consistent with the national interests of the
United States,"'39
was sufficient to cover the temporary blocking of assets pending the
outcome of an investigation.
The court then noted that the sequence and timing of events-the
issuance of the Executive Order, followed within a month by the
passage of the USA Patriot Act amending IEEPA, followed
nearly two months later by the OFAC blocking order-supported
the conclusion that OFAC properly utilized all IEEPA powers
legally delegated, even those associated with the authority to
block property during the pendency of an investigation within
§ 1702(a)(1)(B).'" The court reasoned that to require the President
to republish or amend an Executive Order upon Congress' enact-
ment of amendments to legislation, such as IEEPA, would be
inefficient.11
Finally, Global Relief argued on constitutional grounds, claiming
that the government had violated: (1) the Bill of Attainder Clause,
by inflicting punishment (in prohibiting persons from transacting
business with Global Relief) before a determination by trial that
Global Relief has supported terrorism;12 (2) the Ex Post Facto
Clause, by acting under statutory authority not yet enacted when
138. Global Relief argued that President Bush legally could not delegate this authority to
OFAC, because 50 U.S.C. § 1702(aX1XB) was not amended to include such authorization until
a month after President Bush issued Executive Order 13,224. Id. at 798.
139. Id. at 797.
140. Id. at 796-97.
141. Id. at 797-98.
142. Id. at 798-800.
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Executive Order 13,224 was issued;'" (3) the Takings Clause, by
unjustly taking private property;1" (4) the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, by temporarily blocking the assets and business of
Global Relief pursuant to OFAC regulations but without judicial
oversight;"' (5) the First Amendment, by the vagueness of Execu-
tive Order 13,224 and its improper abridgement of Global Reliefs
rights of association and of its free speech;'" (6) the Fourth
Amendment, by the FBI's search of Global Reliefs offices and
seizure of Global Reliefs materials; 47 (7) the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, by requiring Global Relief to answer for a capital or
infamous crime without presentment or indictment by a Grand Jury
and by deprivation of a speedy public trial by jury;' and (8) the
Eighth Amendment, by the government's imposition of an excessive
fine based on Global Reliefs civil forfeiture of its interest in
property.149 Global Relief asserted also that the separation of powers
embodied in the Constitution prohibited a congressional carte
blanche delegation of powers to the president under the IEEPA and
that the combination of functions delegated by the President to the
Treasury's OFAC was impermissible.' The federal district court
addressed each argument and in each case found unlikely any
constitutional violations.' As a result, the court held that Global
Relief failed to satisfy the likelihood of success threshold for
obtaining preliminary injunctive relief.15 2
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court's holdings. The majority opinion, written by Judge
Easterbrook, rather summarily disposed of Global Reliefs constitu-
tional challenges, including its contention that President Bush had
no legal authority when he issued Executive Order 13,224 to
143. Id. at 800-02.
144. Id. at 802.
145. Id. at 803-05.
146. Id. at 805-06. The court in part relied on the Supreme Court's previous determination
that "a sufficiently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech element can
justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id. at 806 (citing United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
147. Id. at 807.
148. Id. at 807-08.
149. Id. at 806-07.
150. Id. at 807.
151. Id. at 798-809.
152. Id. at 809.
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delegate power to block assets "during the pendency of an investiga-
tion.""'3 With respect to the latter challenge, the court held that at
the time of its decision the investigation was completed and that the
legality of the delegation, therefore, was moot. 4
Judge Easterbrook, however, focused considerable attention on
determining whether 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1)(B) applied to permit
any blockage, whether temporary or permanent,"s of domestic
property and funds of a U.S. citizen or a U.S.-chartered entity such
as Global Relief in which foreigners have any interest. 6 Basing its
determination on Congress' purpose in enacting IEEPA to regulate
assets that can be controlled and used harmfully by foreign enemies,
the majority held that the statutory reference to "any interest" is not
limited to bare legal ownership, but also includes a beneficial
interest.5 7 Because Global Relief conducted operations abroad and
applied its funds for the benefit of persons who are not U.S. citizens,
Global Relief's assets were not free of foreign nationals' interests
within the meaning of§ 1702(a)(1)(B).'l Although the court did not
decide the question of whether Global Relief supports terrorism, it
concluded that "the phrase 'property in which any foreign country
or a national thereof has any interest' in [50 U.S.C.] § 1702(a)(1)(B)
does not offer [Global Reliefi a silver bullet that will terminate the
freeze without regard to the nature of its activities." 59
b. The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development
On December 4, 2001, pursuant to Executive Orders 13,224 and
12,947, OFAC designated The Holy Land Foundation for Relief and
Development (Holy Land),"6 self-described as the largest domestic
153. Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2002).
154. Id.
155. See infra notes 221-30 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 981) (2000); infra Part I.D (discussing
civil forfeiture).
156. Global Relief Found., 315 F.3d at 752. Relying on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603(bX3) (2000), and Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982),
the Seventh Circuit found Global Relief a citizen of the United States regardless of the fact
that two of its three board members were foreign nationals. Id.
157. Id. at 753.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 753-54.
160. Holy Land was originally incorporated in California as a nonprofit organization in
1989 as the Occupied Land Fund. In 1991, it changed its corporate name and moved to Texas.
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Muslim charity, as an SDGT and an SDT based on Holy Land's
alleged "acts for or on behalf of" the terrorist organization Hamas.16 1
OFAC blocked all of Holy Land's assets and accounts pursuant to
the IEEPA, Executive Order 13,224 (issued by President Bush), and
Executive Order 12,947 (issued by President Clinton).1 62 In 2002,
Holy Land challenged the U.S. government's seizure and blocking
of its assets and sought a preliminary injunction in federal district
court to enjoin the United States from continuing to interfere with
its access to or disposition of its assets. 1" In its lawsuit, Holy Land
asserted that the SDGT designation and the blockage of its assets
and accounts violated the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and that those
actions of OFAC were unconstitutional.'"
With respect to Holy Land's assertion that its designation as an
SDGT and the resulting blocking of its assets violated the APA, the
federal district court first addressed Holy Land's argument that
"OFAC exceeded its statutory authority under the IEEPA because
Hamas does not have a legally enforceable interest in [Holy Land's]
property.""~ The court held that IEEPA does not constrain the term
"interest" to a legally enforceable interest.1' Relying on courts' prior
interpretations of the IEEPA,'67 the federal district court concluded
that the IEEPA language merely requires that a foreign country or
foreign national have "any interest" in property." In response to
Holy Land's argument that OFAC's designation of Holy Land as an
SDGT was arbitrary and capricious, the court held that the
administrative record provided sufficiently"substantial" support for
OFAC's determination.
69
As for Holy Land's contention that its SDGT designation and the
blocking of its assets violated the RFRA by impermissibly burdening
Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64 (D.D.C. 2002).
161. Id. at 64.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 66.
166. Id. at 67.
167. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 224, 225-26, 233-34 (1984); Consarc Corp. v. OFAC, 71
F.3d 909, 913-14 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Consarc Corp. v. Iraqi Ministry, 27 F.3d 695, 701-02 (D.C.
Cir. 1994).
168. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 67-68.
169. Id. at 67.
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its religious beliefs,17 the federal district court held that Holy
Land's arguments failed as a matter of law. 7' The court found that
Holy Land had failed to identify itself as a religious organization
and a religious believer, and thus had not shown that an exercise of
its own (i.e., a nonprofit corporation's) religious beliefs had been
substantially burdened.
17 2
Holy Land's constitutional challenges to OFAC's actions were
based upon the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the
Takings Clause, the Fourth Amendment, and First Amendment
rights of freedom of association and speech.'73 Although the federal
district court found that OFAC failed to provide Holy Land with
notice or a hearing before taking its actions against Holy Land, it
concluded that Holy Land's procedural due process rights had not
been violated because under the standards of TWEA or IEEPA,
extraordinary circumstances existed that justified reasonable
governmental actions to secure promptly an important governmen-
tal interest.174 The federal district court further determined that
OFAC had not acted arbitrarily or capriciously and that therefore
Holy Land's substantive due process rights were not violated. 7 '
Based on Global Relief Foundation and other cases involving IEEPA
and TWEA, the court rejected, without long discussion, Holy Land's
contention that the temporary blocking of Holy Land's assets
constituted an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause.7" The court, however, commented
that "it is premature to determine that the temporary deprivation
is equivalent to a vesting. It is clear, then, that the current depriva-
tion has not 'go[ne] too far,' so as to constitute a taking, even though
... [Holy Land] may some day have a more viable claim." 77
170. Id. at 83. Holy Land also argued that the RFRA was violated by an impermissible
burdening of the religious beliefs and rights of Holy Land's Muslim donors and employees.
The court found that Holy Land did not have "associational standing." Id. at 83-84.
171. Id. at 83.
172. Id. The court accepted Holy Land's assertion that Holy Land's use of donations from
Muslim donors and employees for charitable and humanitarian purposes constituted the
exercise of religion under RFRA. Id.
173. Id. at 64.
174. Id. at 76-77 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974)).
175. Id. at 77.
176. Id. at 78.
177. Id.
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The federal district court also rejected Holy Land's First Amend-
ment arguments, one based on freedom of association and the other
based on freedom of speech. 178 With respect to Holy Land's freedom
of association argument, Holy Land had contended that OFAC's
designation and blocking order imposed guilt by association and
that OFAC had failed to establish a specific intent by Holy Land to
support the illegal activities of Hamas 79 The court reasoned that
OFAC's actions pursuant to IEEPA and the Executive Orders were
not taken against Holy Land by reason of association alone, that is,
membership in, or endorsement of, Hamas.' ° Quoting the Ninth
Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno,' the federal district
court stated that "there is no constitutional right to facilitate
terrorism,"8 and it found that designation of Holy Land as an
SDGT and the blocking of Holy Land's assets merely prevented Holy
Land from financially supporting Hamas' terrorist acts. " Moreover,
based upon the notion that requiring the government to establish
that Holy Land had a "specific intent" to support the illegal conduct
of Hamas would undermine the purpose of Congress and the
economic sanctions programs, the court held that the First Amend-
ment does not require proof of such "specific intent."'8"
With respect to Holy Land's assertion that the government
violated its freedom of speech rights under the First Amendment
by blocking its donations for humanitarian purposes, the federal
district court analyzed both the speech and nonspeech implica-
tions.' Relying on the Supreme Court's determination in United
States v. O'Brien that "a sufficiently important governmental
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms,""s the court concluded
that in the instant case the Executive Orders and the OFAC
blocking order did not violate Holy Land's First Amendment
178. Id. at 80.
179. Id
180. Id. at 80-81.
181. 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Humanitarian Law Project II].
182. Holy Land Found., 219 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
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rights."8 7 The court applied the O'Brien four-part intermediate
scrutiny test:
[The Government's restriction] passes intermediate scrutiny if
(1) [the governmental regulation] is within the constitutional
power of the Government; (2) it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; (3) the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that inter-
est-and found that all four parts were satisfied."'
Finally, Holy Land asserted that the government violated its
Fourth Amendment rights by freezing its bank accounts and
conducting an unlawful search of its offices and seizure of its
property without a warrant.'89 The federal district court concluded
that because courts previously have held that blocking assets
pursuant to the IEEPA and Executive Orders does not constitute a
seizure, Holy Land failed to state a Fourth Amendment claim with
respect to OFAC's freezing of Holy Land's bank accounts."g The
court, however, did find that Holy Land stated a Fourth Amend-
ment claim with respect to the government's entry onto its corporate
premises and removal of its property without a warrant.' 91 Because
Holy Land's office premises were searched without a warrant, the
court agreed with Holy Land that it inexcusably was subjected to a
classic unlawful search and seizure.'92
Holy Land appealed the federal district court's affirmation of
OFAC's actions and the dismissal of a substantial portion of Holy
Land's complaint. On June 20, 2003, the D.C. Circuit court issued
its decision affirming the federal district court's holdings.'93 The
circuit court first ruled that, as demonstrated by the administrative
record, OFAC had neither exceeded its authority under the APA 94
187. Id. at 81-82.
188. Id. at 81 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
189. Id. at 78.
190. Id. at 78-79.
191. Id. at 78.
192. Id. at 79-80.
193. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1656 (Mar. 1, 2004).
194. Id. at 162.
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nor violated Holy Land's due process rights in designating Holy
Land as an SDGT."9 ' It then supported the federal district court's
decision rejecting Holy Land's assertion that the IEEPA permits
blocking of property only where a "legally enforceable" interest
exists.196 The circuit court stated that the language of 50 U.S.C. §
1702(a)(1)(B) "imposes no limit on the scope of the interest,"197 that
deference must be given to the OFAC regulations, for the issuance
of which Congress specifically delegated authority,98 and that prior
case law supported a broad interpretation of the statute's concept of
property.'
The circuit court, moreover, held that Holy Land's First Amend-
ment rights had not been abridged even if the federal district court
erred by considering evidence beyond allegations in Holy Land's
original and amended complaints.2' The court found, based on the
entire administrative record presented by Holy Land in its defense,
that Holy Land had been given every opportunity to rebut the
conclusion that it financially supported Hamas and that it failed to
do so. Because there is no First Amendment right or other constitu-
tional right to support terrorists, the constitutional rights of Holy
Land had not been abridged.
Finally, the circuit court concluded that the government's
designation of Holy Land and its blocking order with respect to Holy
Land's assets would support a grant of summary judgment for the
195. Id. at 163 (citing People's Mojahedin Org. ofIran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1242
(D.C. Cir. 2003), in which the court expressed "ft]he Due Process Clause requires only that
process which is due under the circumstances of the case," which there required only the
disclosure of unclassified portions of the administrative record in the designation notice to the
organization).
196. Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 163.
199. Id. (relying on Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002), which
interpreted property interest to include beneficial interest and not merely a traditional bare
legal interest). See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Seventh
Circuit's decision.
200. Holy Land Found., 333 F.3d at 164-66. The circuit court agreed with Holy Land that
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(bX6), if matters outside the pleadings are
considered, a motion to dismiss is considered to be converted into a motion for summary
judgment. Id. at 165. Accordingly, all parties must be, but were not here, given an opportunity
to present all relevant material. Although the circuit court found the federal district court's
failure to comply with Rule 12(bX6) as an abuse of discretion, it held the error to be harmless
and without prejudice to Holy Land. Id. at 162.
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government without imposing a substantial burden on Holy Land
or violating Holy Land's freedom to exercise religion pursuant to the
RFRA. The circuit court, agreeing with the federal district court,
questioned whether a nonprofit organization, such as Holy Land, is
a "person" protected by the RFRA. It concluded that even "accepting
the dubious proposition that a charitable corporation not otherwise
defined can exercise religion as protected in the First Amendment,
preventing such a corporation from aiding terrorists does not violate
any right contemplated in the Constitution or the RFRA.""'
c. Benevolence International Foundation, Inc.
Benevolence International Foundation, Inc. (Benevolence
International), incorporated in Illinois and maintaining ten overseas
offices, received a blocking notice from OFAC on December 14,2001,
stating that the U.S. government had reasons to believe that
Benevolence International might be engaged in activities in
violation of IEEPA. 2 The notice blocked all funds, accounts, and
business records of Benevolence International pending further
investigation and required production and surrender of all of its
records and computers.' Also on December 14, 2001, the FBI
searched the offices of Benevolence International and the home of
its chief executive officer, Enaam Arnaout, seizing financial records,
personal property, and office equipment. °' Benevolence Interna-
tional filed an action in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of the FBI's searches and of the OFAC blocking
order.2t 5 Subsequently, Benevolence International filed a motion
for preliminary injunction requesting the return of property
seized and the removal of the OFAC blocking order.2'0 Benevolence
International filed numerous affidavits and documents in support
of its claim that it had "never provided aid or support to people or
organizations known to be engaged in violence, terrorist activities,
201. Id. at 167.
202. Benevolence Int'l Found. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935, 936 (N.D. 11. 2002).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 937.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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or military operations of any nature." 7 On April 29, 2002, the
United States filed criminal charges against Benevolence Interna-
tional and Mr. Arnaout for having "knowingly submitted false
material declarations under oath" by affidavit with respect to the
pending civil lawsuit.0 '
A day after the government filed the criminal charges, it also filed
a memorandum in the civil lawsuit, requesting that discovery in the
civil proceeding be stayed due to the concurrent criminal proceeding
against Benevolence International and Mr. Arnaout. In making its
decision, the district court balanced (1) Benevolence International's
rights to proceed expeditiously with the civil litigation and to
prepare promptly its civil case, particularly in light of the possible
prejudice that its blocked funds would have on its ability to continue
to operate and the ability of its grantees to operate, against (2) the
public interest in withholding full disclosure of the evidence
Benevolence International sought from the civil proceeding.' The
federal district court concluded that the balance strongly favored a
stay of the civil proceeding during pendency of the criminal action,
basing this decision on (1) the potential for a long-enduring and
voluminous discovery process in the civil lawsuit, (2) the need to
eliminate duplication of judicial efforts and to utilize the criminal
proceeding as an opportunity to determine the veracity of Mr.
Arnaout's sworn affidavit supporting Benevolence International's
motion for a preliminary injunction in the civil lawsuit, and (3) the
public's interest in law enforcement. 10
With respect to the criminal proceeding, after grand jury
indictments charging Mr. Arnaout with perjury, racketeering
conspiracy, providing material support to organizations engaged in
violence, money laundering, mail fraud and wire fraud,2 ' in
February 2003, Mr. Arnaout pleaded guilty to providing financial
207. Id.
208. Id. (internal citations omitted).
209. Id. at 939.
210. Id. at 940-41.
211. See United States v. Arnaout, 231 F. Supp. 2d 797 (N.D. II. 2002); United States v.
Benevolence Intl Found., Case No. 02 CR 414, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17223 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
13, 2002).
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support to terrorists.212 As of this writing, the civil lawsuit had not
moved forward.
d. Summary
These cases clearly indicate that not only do the President and his
delegates have constitutional authority to designate a domestic §
501(c)(3) organization as an SDGT, but that even if not designated
as an SDGT, the Department of the Treasury, through OFAC,
constitutionally can issue a blocking order under IEEPA against a
domestic § 501(c)(3) organization that the government has reason-
able grounds to suspect supports terrorism. The courts in the above-
discussed cases involving temporary blocking orders issued
pursuant to § 1702(a)(1)(B) have repeatedly dismissed as unpersua-
sive unconstitutionality arguments based on the Bill of Attainder
Clause, the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the
separation of powers inherent in the Constitution, as well as the
First Amendment's rights of free speech and association, the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause with respect to temporary seizure of
interests in property, the Sixth Amendment's right to a speedy jury
trial, and the Eighth Amendment's right to avoid excessive penal-
ties.
Should law-abiding domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations be con-
cerned about whether these three cases indicate a wholesale witch-
hunt or a new form of McCarthyism? 213 Absolute reassurance cannot
212. See Eric Lichtblau, Threats and Responses: The Money Trail; Charity Leader Accepts
a Deal in a Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2003, at Al. Criminal charges were brought
against Mr. Arnaout pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 956(aXl), and 2339A, which included
money laundering, providing material support to terrorist organizations, mail fraud, wire
fraud, obstruction of justice, and conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or injure persons in a
foreign country. United States v. Arnaout, 236 F. Supp. 2d 916, 916-17 (N.D. IIl. 2003).
213. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 8-10 (2003) (suggesting that the government's application of
such antiterrorism statutes as 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B creates an atmosphere of
McCarthyism).
Whether the antiterrorism statutes have created an atmosphere of McCarthyism should
be of concern. Media reports, such as those in October 2003 by Edwin Black, who, in the past
investigated and reported on corporate philanthropic involvement in American and Nazi
eugenics, may be indicators. In the October series of articles, Mr. Black reported that grant
money from the Ford Foundation, a § 501(c)(3) organization, may have ended up in the hands
of Palestinian nonprofit organizations, several of which, including Hamas, are listed by the
U.S. State Department as terrorist groups. Edwin Black, Funding Hate: How Aware is Ford
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be readily given. These cases, however, appear to be instances of
effectively shutting down, at least temporarily, the potential means
to move tax-exempt funds to foreign terrorists and terrorist groups
by organizations that appear to have little, if any, legal purpose.
Even if these organizations arguably had some legitimate charita-
ble, religious, and/or political purpose, they should not, and cannot,
be disconnected from terrorist activities that they sponsored or
financially supported. Under the guise of benevolence, these
organizations may have garnered donor support and raised funds
needed to sustain terrorist activities.214 Based on their representa-
tions of chaste and unadulterated adherence to charitable missions,
the U.S. government granted them what now appear to be unwar-
ranted income tax exemptions. 2" The right of the government to
regulate § 501(c)(3) organizations, which benefit from the IRC §
501(a) income tax exemption, is longstanding.216 Conferral of tax-
exempt status on an organization is predicated upon its providing
substantial "public benefit." If an organization is wholly or partially
organized or operated contrary to public policy21 or to support or
Foundation of Way Its Funds Are Being Used?, Global News Service of the Jewish People, Oct.
16, 2003, available at http'/Avww.jta.org [hereinafter Black, Funding Hate]; Edwin Black,
Transparency A Concern As Millions Go to Mideast, Global News Service of the Jewish People,
Oct. 16, 2003, available at httpJ/www.jta.
214. This sustenance argument goes beyond the argument that money is fungible. See infra
notes 322-24 and accompanying text (regarding Professor David Cole and the Ninth Circuit
decision in Humanitarian Law Project II, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000)).
215. Whether Georgetown University Law Center Professor David Cole would agree with
me is not entirely clear, but I believe that he would. He acknowledges that "cutting off
material support for terrorist activity is undoubtedly a worthy and appropriate goal." Cole,
supra note 213, at 13. His article does not suggest (and in fact does not address the issue) of
whether a domestic § 501(c)(3) organization deserves tax-exempt status if it funnels money
to a foreign terrorist organization.
216. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 605 (1983) (permitting
revocation of the university's tax-exempt status for its failure to comport with public policy
on nondiscrimination); Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,546-48
(1983) (holding that proscription against substantial lobbying activities imposed on § 501(cX3)
organizations did not violate Fifth Amendment equal protection rights even though §
501(cX19) organizations are not subject to a substantial lobbying prohibition).
217. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 591-92. The majority opinion, written by Chief
Justice Burger, made a sweeping statement:
Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers
a public benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not itself
choose or be able to provide, or which supplements and advances the work of
public institutions already supported by tax revenues.... [Aln institution must
fall within a category specified in [§ 501(c)(3)] and must demonstrably serve and
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engage in illegal activities, the government clearly has the right to
deny tax-exempt status and to impose other appropriate sanctions
against that organization.
The three cases discussed above, although perhaps extreme
examples, hint at the practical and legal obstacles to challenging
OFAC's actions. As one scholar has written:
On a practical level, OFAC's historically lackadaisical adminis-
trative practices, combined with its broad authority under
TWEA and IEEPA and the deference courts show to foreign
policy measures, can intimidate those who are subject to OFAC's
controls. In order to challenge a particular decision, the stakes
would have to be sufficiently large to offset the fear of upsetting
future dealings with an agency vested with a tremendous
amount of authority and subject to relatively little oversight."'8
Outcomes of litigation typically do not favor persons who have
disputed OFAC's actions. Challenges are sometimes considered as
raising "nonjusticiable" political questions, and those challenges
determined to raise justiciable questions often fail because the
courts give great deference to the Executive and Legislative
branches to conduct foreign policy and to safeguard national
security.219 The hurdles imposed for winning constitutional chal-
lenges are high.220
be in harmony with the public interest. The institution's purpose must not be so
at odds with the common community conscience as to undermine any public
benefit that might otherwise be conferred.
We are bound to approach these questions with full awareness that
determinations of public benefit and public policy are sensitive matters with
serious implications for the institutions affected; a declaration that a given
institution is not "charitable" should be made only where there can be no doubt
that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public policy.
Id. (internal citations omitted). Several years later, the Tax Court ruled that the IRS's
revocation of the § 501(cX3) status of a private school for its failure to present sufficient
evidence that it operated in good faith in accordance with a nondiscriminatory policy toward
black students was appropriate. Calhoun Acad. v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 284, 305 (1990).
218. Peter L. Fitzgerald, If Property Rights Were Treated Like Human Rights, They Could
Never Get Away with This: Blacklisting and Due Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions
Programs, 51 HASTINGS LJ. 73, 136 (1999) (internal citations omitted).
219. See id. at 139.
220. See id. at 140-60.
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D. Permanent Civil Asset Forfeiture
In addition to blocking assets temporarily, confiscating assets
permanently also can be important to the government's financial
war on terrorism. Both are clearly contemplated by Executive Order
13,224 and by the federal statutory regime governing civil forfei-
tures of assets. Under 18 U.S.C. § 981, real or personal property
(and proceeds and substituted assets) is subject to forfeiture to the
United States if the property is involved in certain types of enumer-
ated transactions or attempted transactions,221 three of which are of
particular relevance to this Article. The first, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A), is a transaction or attempted transaction in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (relating to money laundering of financial
instruments),222 which is briefly discussed below.2" The second,
under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(H), involves a violation or attempted
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (relating to prohibitions against
terrorist financing),22 ' also discussed below.2" The third, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(G), relates to planning, perpetrating,
supporting, conducting, concealing, or committing an act of domestic
or international terrorism against the United States, citizens or
residents of the United States, or their property.226
221. 18 U.S.C. § 981(aX1) (2003); see 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX2) (2003) (requiring a "financial
institution" to retain control or possession of funds in which a terrorist organization, or its
agent, has an interest and to report the existence of the funds to the Secretary of the
Treasury); see also infra Part II.C (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2003)).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 981(aX)(1A) (2003). That paragraph provides in pertinent part, "[any
property, real or personal, involved in a transaction or attempted transaction in violation of
section 1956, ... of this title, or any property traceable to such property."
223. See infra Part II.B.
224. 18 U.S.C. § 981(aXIXH) (2003). That paragraph provides that "[any property, real or
personal, involved in a violation or attempted violation, or which constitutes or is derived from
proceeds traceable to a violation, of section 2339C of this title." This provision was added by
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub.
L. No. 107-197, § 301, 116 Stat. 721, 728 (2002).
225. See infra Part II.D.
226. 18 U.S.C. § 981(aX1XG) (2003). That paragraph provides:
All assets, foreign or domestic-
(i) of any individual, entity, or organization engaged in planning or perpetrating
any act of domestic or international terrorism (as defined in section 2331)
against the United States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their
property, and all assets, foreign or domestic, affording any person a source of
influence over any such entity or organization;
(ii) acquired or maintained by any person with the intent and for the purpose of
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The civil forfeiture statutes permit the seizure of property under
IEEPA to be accomplished without notice by the Attorney General,
or if the property is seized in a violation investigated by the
Secretary of the Treasury (or his delegate, e.g., OFAC), then without
notice by the Secretary of the Treasury.2 7 Depending on the
circumstances, the seizure can take place with or without a
warrant.
228
In recent years, the U.S. government has increasingly utilized
civil forfeiture as a sanction to confiscate property based on the
greater latitude and likelihood of success it offers in comparison to
an action for criminal forfeiture.2 9 Civil forfeiture does not require
a criminal proceeding, which means that there need be no criminal
conviction, and the defendant does not benefit from the constitu-
tional protections available in a criminal proceeding. 230 Because a
civil forfeiture is based on in rem rather than in personam jurisdic-
tion,231 the government need only show probable cause. 2  If, for
instance, probable cause is based on the grounds that property was
"used to commit or facilitate the commission of a criminal offense,
or was involved in the commission of a criminal offense," the
government must show "a substantial connection between the
property and the offense."' According to one author, probable cause
is not much more than a "hunch"2 3 -that is, probable cause is
supporting, planning, conducting, or concealing an act of domestic or
international terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the United States,
citizens or residents of the United States, or their property;, or
(iii) derived from, involved in, or used or intended to be used to commit any act
of domestic or international terrorism (as defined in section 2331) against the
United States, citizens or residents of the United States, or their property.
This provision was added by the USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 806, 115 Stat. 272,
378 (2001).
227. 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(bXl), 983(aX1) (iXI), (2XD) (2003).
228. 18 U.S.C. § 981(bXl)-(2) (2003). The seizure can be made without a warrant if there
is probable cause to believe the property is subject to forfeiture and the seizure is made
pursuant to a lawful search or arrest. 18 U.S.C. § 981(bX2)(BXi) (2003).
229. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2003) (civil forfeiture) with 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2003) (criminal
forfeiture). See Todd Barnet, Legal Fiction and Forfeiture: An Historical Analysis of the Civil
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, 40 DUQ. L. REV. 77, 94 (2001).
230. Barnet, supra note 229, at 94.
231. See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Forfeitures and Penalties § 1 (2001).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 983(c) (2003).
233. 18 U.S.C. § 983(cX3) (2003).
234. See Barnet, supra note 229, at 94 (citing LEONARD W. LEVY, A LICENSE TO STEAL: THE
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY 48 (1996)).
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demonstrated if circumstances warrant suspicion or the reasonable
belief of a connection between the property and a crime.235 In cases
involving the crimes of money laundering, financing of terrorists, or
material support of terrorism, this connection apparently can be
made rather easily by the government.236
Once the government establishes probable cause, the burden of
proof shifts to the property owner to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property is not related to the crime.237 As one
scholar has stated:
The significance of this burden shift to the rights of property
owners cannot be overstated. It places innocent property owners,
even those who have been acquitted of criminal charges, and
third parties in the position of having to prove a negative. The
owner must demonstrate, not that he was innocent or lacked
knowledge, but that the property was not involved or connected
in any way to the commission of a crime .... It matters not
whether the owner of the property was involved in the crime, or
even aware that criminal activity was taking place. The owner
does not even have to be accused or even suspected of involve-
ment in the criminal activity for his property to be forfeited. If
the owner cannot prove the object's innocence, the government
has a right to the property that relates back to the time of its
illegal use." 8
Assuming the government prevails in a civil forfeiture proceeding,
it gains permanent title to the forfeited property and can dispose of
or utilize it for purposes it deems appropriate, including distribution
to a victim of the offense that gave rise to the forfeiture. 9
235. Id.
236. See supra Part I.C.4 (regarding the seizure and temporary blocking of assets of Global
Relief, Holy Land, and Benevolence International).
237. 18 U.S.C. § 983(dXl) (2003).
238. See Barnet, supra note 229, at 94-95 (citation omitted); see also Marc S. Roy, United
States Federal Forfeiture Law: Current Status and Implications of Expansion, 69 MISs. L.J.
373, 383-84 (1999) (suggesting that the property owner may find himself treated "virtually
as an interloper" and that the in rem characterization further disadvantages the property
owner because it enables the government upon a judicially successful claim to assert title
retrospectively to the time that the proscribed illegal act occurred).
239. 18 U.S.C. § 981(e)(6) (2003). For a discussion of actions brought byvictims of terrorism
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, see infra Part IV. Theoretically the government might be able to
distribute returned forfeited funds to law-abiding, well-intentioned donors who lost control
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It is not surprising then that the government finds the economic
sanction of civil forfeiture such an attractive enforcement tool.
While 18 U.S.C. § 981 enables the U.S. government to gain perma-
nent title to assets of terrorists, subsections (a)(1)(A), (G), and (H)
are so sweeping and the burdens of innocent owners, such as an
unsuspecting § 501(c)(3) organization acting as a depository and
distributor of donated funds, so high for proving that assets were
not used in a crime of money laundering, financing terrorism, or
committing terrorism that domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations, which
may be unaware that they are being used for illegitimate and illegal
purposes, rightfully should be concerned.
II. FEDERAL CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
A. Background
During 2001 and 2002, in the aftermath of the September 11
terrorist attacks, Congress reinforced the arsenal of criminal
sanctions that the government can utilize in its financial counter-
terrorism war. With the October 2001 passage of the USA Patriot
Act, various existing statutes were strengthened, predicate offenses
under RICO were expanded, and new provisions were added under
which criminal sanctions can be imposed against wrongdoers.2"
Eight months later, Congress enacted the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002,241
which implemented a United Nations convention signed by the
United States in 2000, criminalized certain financial transactions
made in furtherance of various terrorist activities, further expanded
predicate offenses under RICO, and fortified the wiretap and money
laundering statutes."2
of the funds when they gifted them to the § 501(cX3) organization for true charitable purposes.
Practically, such a distribution to the donors seems unlikely.
240. See infa Part II.B-C (discussing provisions added by the USA Patriot Act).
241. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat. 724 (2002).
242. Id. (adding 18 U.S.C. § 2339C and amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B, 2332b(gX5),
and 196 1(I)(B)); see also MESSAGE FROMTHE PRESIDENT OFTHE UNITED STATES TRANSMITrING
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL TO IMPLEMENT THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF TERRORIST BOmINGS AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE
SUPPRESSION OF THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM, H.R. Doc. No. 107-139 (2001).
1394 [Vol. 45:1341
20041 HIGH ALERT 1395
In light of this enhanced statutory authority, well-intentioned
U.S. donors and domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations legitimately may
be concerned about increased exposure to possible criminal sanc-
tions. It is not inconceivable that the government could overzeal-
ously charge, although not necessarily indict or convict, even an
innocent donor or charitable organization with one or more criminal
offenses2 4 if the government found that donations ultimately were
collected for and/or were funneled to a terrorist or terrorist organi-
zation.2"
For example, the government can charge terrorists' alleged
private supporters (including financial contributors such as donors
and § 501(c)(3) organizations) with the illegal provision of material
support or resources to terrorists and terrorist organizations under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A or 2339B, and/or the provision or collection of
funds for use in terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2339C. These are
243. Multiple criminal charges are typical and, if convicted, the perpetrator is subject to
multiple criminal penalties. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1341, 1343, 1952, 1961-63, 2339A,
2339B, 2339C (2003); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 956, 1505 (2002). For example, in United
States v. Hammoud, No. 3:00CR147-MU (W.D.N.C. Mar. 10, 2003), the defendants were
convicted by a jury of using proceeds of a cigarette smuggling scheme to fund foreign
terrorists. See Testimony of John Ashcroft Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 4,
2003, LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House File. The charges included conspiracy to
provide material support for foreign terrorist organizations under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, as well
as money laundering, illegal wire transfers, credit card fraud, and other illegal activities.
Defendant Mohamad Hammoud was sentenced to a total of 155 years in prison. He has
appealed to the Fourth Circuit, claiming his sentence is excessive. See Convicted Terror
Suppporter Appeals 155-Year Sentence, ORLANDo SENTINEL, Mar. 9, 2003, at A22. Another
illustrative case is United States v. At-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1260 (M.D. Fla. 2003),
which charged fifty counts, including conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) of RICO,
conspiracy to provide material support to designated terrorist organizations under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, and conspiracy to murder, maim, or injure persons at places outside the United
States under 18 U.S.C. § 956(aX 1), among others. Some of these charges carry sentences of
life imprisonment; others carry shorter sentences; others carry shorter sentences. Similarly,
Enaam M. Arnaout, former chief executive officer of Benevolence International Foundation,
Inc. (Benevolence International), a domestic Muslim charity, was charged with conducting
Benevolence International's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d), including mail fraud, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, money laundering, and
providing material support to terrorist groups. He also was charged with conspiracy to kill,
kidnap, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 956(a)(1) and
2339A. United States v. Arnaout, 236 F. Supp. 2d 916, 916-17 (N.D. ll. 2003). In February
2003, Mr. Arnaout pleaded guilty to one count of providing material support to terrorists-for
funneling money to pay for boots, uniforms, and other equipment for Islamic fighters in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chechnya. See Kim Barker & Matt O'Connor, Last Push Against
Charity Leader; U.S. Takes Issue with Guilty Plea, CHI. TRiB., June 14, 2003, at 14.
244. See infra Part II.C-D.
1396 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1341
strong charges and powerful statutes, and defendants who have
challenged their application have been less than successful."
Rejecting these challenges, courts have adhered to the notions that
the government can regulate domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations"
and that it can regulate contributions to such organizations that
engage in lawful (but not speech-related), as well as harmful or
illegal, activities.247
Additionally, the government can bring RICO charges, which
must be based on two predicate criminal offenses.' 4 These can
include the offenses of providing material support or resources to a
foreign terrorist organization, or of intentionally or knowingly
collecting or providing funds for use in carrying out terrorist
activities.249 The courts have concluded that an economic motive for
acts proscribed by the statutes is unnecessary to convict under
RICO.' The actors of the September 11 attacks purportedly did not
have an economic motive. The September 11 attacks, and other acts
of terrorism, as well as the material support of terrorists and
terrorist groups, nevertheless ostensibly were motivated by a desire
to hurt the pocketbooks of Americans and disrupt the U.S.
economy,25' as well as by politics, religious fanaticism, national-
ethnic tensions, social problems, or other noneconomic motives.252
245. See, e.g., infra Part II.C-D.
246. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
247. See, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project 11, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); cert. denied 532
U.S. 904 (2001).
248. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2003).
249. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332b(gX5)(B), 2339A, 2339B, 2339C (2003).
250. NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994) (rejecting the notion that the term
"enterprise" as used for purposes of the RICO statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, encompasses
and implies an economic motive requirement and extending these provisions to encompass
actions of ideologically motivated abortion protestors). The Supreme Court's decision certainly
brings within the realm of RICO persons who are ideologically, politically, socially, or
religiously motivated. See, e.g., Huntingdon Life Scis. v. Rokke, 986 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Va.
1997) (using the RICO statutes with respect to animal rights advocates); see also Xavier
Beltran, Applying RICO to Eco-Activism: Fanning the Radical Flames of Eco-Terror, 29 B.C.
ENVTL. AFn. L. REV. 281 (2002).
251. See, e.g., Remarks by the President to Business, Trade and Agriculture Leaders, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 26, 2001, LEXIS, News and Business, News Group File; John Solomon, FBI
Probe Stops Other Terrorism; Arrests Stem from Worldwide Effort, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept.
28, 2001, at A7; U.S. to Purchase 100 Million Cipro Tablets, Bus. RECORDER, Oct. 25, 2001,
LEXIS, News and Business, News Group File.
252. For a broad view on the roots of terrorism historically, including the September 11
attacks, see LAQUEUR, supra note 20, at 11-29. For comments with respect to the September
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The U.S. government has broadly and liberally charged alleged
terrorists and private supporters of terrorism, such as abortion
activities or eco-terrorists, with RICO violations.253 Now, in its post-
September 11 war on terrorism, the government can unleash the
strength of RICO against terrorists and their alleged funders and
supporters.
Risk aversion suggests that donors and domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations should be adequately apprised of these complex
statutes. Donors should seriously undertake due diligence before
contributing funds to domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations for global
philanthropic purposes. Likewise, leaders of domestic § 501(c)(3)
organizations must comply with due diligence standards before
collecting and distributing funds. If due diligence is impossible or
inadequate, assets should not be transferred or distributed by either
donors or § 501(c)(3) organizations. The obvious consequence of such
extreme caution, unfortunately, may be a significant reduction in
the flow of philanthropic funds, particularly abroad.
B. Anti-Money Laundering Initiatives
The USA Patriot Act both enacted new and fortified existing,
anti-money laundering statutes,254  leading one scholar
11 attacks, see Richard H. Drummond, Terrorists Twist Islam Into Something Never Intended,
TEL. HERALD, Oct. 9, 2001, at A4; Peter Ford, Why Do They Hate Us?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 27, 2001, World, at 1. With respect to domestic terrorism by pro-life groups,
see Reinhardt Krause, War Coalition to Fray as Fight Grows, Says Ex-CLA, Defense Chief
James Schlesinger on Terror; Cabinet Veteran Discusses Going it Alone, How to Help Moderate
Islamic Countries, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Oct. 26, 2001, at A3; Abraham McLaughlin &
Howard LaFranchi, Lessons of Past in Stopping Terrorism, CHRISrIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 31,
2001, USA, at 1; Kathleen Parker, All is Fair in War, Except Insensitivity, DENY. POST, Sept.
28, 2001, at B7; Robert Satloff, Commentary, Israel's Not the Issue; Pass It On, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2001, California, pt. 2, at 13; The U.S. 'Has to Bring Moderate Muslims In," Bus. WK.
ONUNE, Ocr. 18,2001, LEXIS, News and Business, News Group File; Fareed Zakaria, The
Politics of Rage: Why Do They Hate Us?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 15, 2001, at 22. With respect to
domestic terrorism by pro-life groups, see Editorial, "Bombing for God" a Contradiction,
OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Feb. 4, 1998, at 8. With respect to eco-terrorism, see Laurent Belsie,
Eco-Vandals Put a Match to 'Progress,' CHRIsTIAN Sci. MONITOR, July 5, 2001, Features, at
11; Scott McInnis, Terrorism in Any Form Is Intolerable, DENy. POST, Nov. 25, 2001, at E4;
Michael Powell, Doctor's Killer Called Terrorist, Saint; Motives Debated in Killing of Abortion
Provider, WASH. POST, Mar. 18, 2003, at A3. See also, Crimm, supra note 21, at 5-6 & nn.1-2.
253. See supra note 243.
254. The anti-money laundering provisions added and expanded by the USA Patriot Act,
most of which were enacted in its Title III (International Money Laundering Abatement and
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Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001), are too numerous--over 210 potential predicate crimes
to money laundering and money spending were added-to explore in this Article. Among the
notable provisions is a statute that expanded specific delegations of power to the Secretary
of the Treasury to adopt regulations. See, e.g., USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 311,115
Stat. 272, 298-304 (2001) (conferring on the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with
other appropriate regulatory authorities, the power to issue regulations and orders involving
additional "special measures" and "due diligence" requirements for fighting money
laundering); id. § 325, 115 Stat. at 317 (empowering the Secretary of the Treasury to
promulgate regulations to prevent financial institutions from enabling customers to conceal
financial activities by taking advantage of the financial institutions' concentration account
practices); id. § 326, 115 Stat. at 317-18 (instructing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue
regulations requiring financial institutions to implement minimum new customer
identification standards and record keeping). The USA Patriot Act bolstered a number of
reporting requirements, but may have overlooked one possible reporting gap-cash donations
in excess of $10,000 to domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations. Currently, under I.R.C. § 60501 any
person, including nonfinancial institutions, engaged in a trade or business (other than
financial institutions required to report under the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA)) must file a report
with the IRS on the IRS Form 8300 if cash transactions in excess of $10,000 occur. Form 8300
information is considered tax return information, and is subject to the procedural and
recordkeeping requirements of I.R.C. § 6103 that safeguard taxpayers, including restrictions
on disclosure to other federal and state authorities. For example, pursuant to current I.R.C.
§ 6103(iX7), the Secretary of the Treasury is permitted to disclose return information,
including a taxpayer's name, but excluding other taxpayer return information, to federal law
enforcement agencies or federal intelligence agencies only upon written request if the
taxpayer is personally and directly involved in an investigation of or response to a terrorist
incident, threat, or activity. Subsequent disclosure of the information by the federal law
enforcement agencies to state or local law enforcement agencies, where necessary, is
permitted. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(iX7), amended by Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-134, § 201, 115 Stat. 2427 (2002). Although the dissemination restrictions
recently were modified to account for investigations into terrorism, Form 8300 is not as
accessible to law enforcement authorities as the various reports mandated by the BSA, which,
along with alerts and other money laundering information, are available electronically. To
address this inaccessibility to detailed information on Form 8300, those persons that must file
Form 8300 now also must file suspicious activities reports (SARs) with the Department of the
Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN). See USA Patriot Act §§ 361,
362, 115 Stat. at 329-33; see also H.R. REP. No. 107-250, at 38-39 (2001). Nonetheless,
according to Rev. Rul. 90-61, 1990-2 C.B. 347, cash contributions in excess of $10,000 received
by domestic § 501(cX3) organizations are not subject to the reporting requirements of I.R.C.
§ 60501. Congress did not legislate otherwise in the USA Patriot Act, and unless domestic §
501(cX3) organizations are considered "financial institutions" within the meaning of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5312(aX2), they would not be required to file SARs with FinCEN. For a discussion of
whether domestic § 501(cX3) organizations are considered "financial institutions" within the
meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 5312(aX2XZ), see infra notes 341-50 and accompanying text.
The USA Patriot Act instructed the Administration to take steps to obtain the cooperation
of other governments and international financial institutions to collaborate in efforts to
ensure that funds are not used to support terrorists. USA Patriot Act §§ 328, 330, 360, 115
Stat. at 319-20, 329; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311 (2003); 22 U.S.C. §§ 262(p)-(r) (2003). Additionally, it
provides long-arm in rem jurisdiction over foreign money launderers' assets. USA Patriot Act
§§ 317-19, 115 Stat. at 310-15. Of particular importance to U.S. donors and charitable
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to describe the Act as containing the "most comprehensive anti-
money laundering requirements since the Bank Secrecy Act of
1970.""'s Many of these new or enhanced statutes-too numerous
and complex to recount individually in this Article" 6-specifically
target not only traditional, but also nontraditional, financial
networks that are utilized by terrorists and their organizations.257
In conjunction with its anti-money laundering statutory author-
ity, the government has voiced its commitment to identifying,
disrupting, and dismantling the financial infrastructures and
sources of funding of terrorists and terrorist organizations.2 8 As
organizations who believe assets were wrongly confiscated, § 316 of the USA Patriot Act sets
forth the means by which an innocent owner of assets confiscated under "any provision of law
relating to the confiscation of assets of suspected international terrorists" may contest the
forfeiture. Id. § 316, 115 Stat. at 309-10 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2000)).
Congress focused on not only the use of traditional financial institutions to move money
illegally, but also on the transmission of assets and money laundering by hawalas. Id. § 373,
115 Stat. at 339-40 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1960 (1994)). Now, persons involved in
unregistered or unlicensed money transmitting businesses, or who are licensed or registered
but are connected with the transmission of funds known to have been used to promote or
support criminal activity or known to be derived from criminal activity, can be fined or
imprisoned, or both. Id.
The USA Patriot Act also enhanced the provisions of RICO. For example, the definition of
"racketeering activity" was expanded to include 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, so that the provision of
material support or resources to terrorist organizations is a predicate offense under RICO. Id.
§ 376, 15 Stat. at 342 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1956(cX7XD) (2000), which already included as
a RICO predicate offense the provision of material support or resources to terrorists within
the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A). Note that 18 U.S.C. § 2339C was added as a RICO
predicate offense by the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention
Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-197, § 301, 116 Stat. 727 (2002). See infra Part
II.D.
255. George H. Millard, New and Innovative Rules in the World of Finance: Organized
Crime, Terrorism, and Money Laundering in the Americas, 15 FLA. J. IML L. 3, 20 (2002).
256. See supra note 254 (listing several anti-money laundering statutes).
257. See infra Part II.D (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2339C).
258. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF TREAsuRY AND U.S. DEPt OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING STRATEGY 23-24 (2002).
It is notable that the goal of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an international
group of thirty-one nations co-chaired by the United States and Spain, is to combat money
laundering. FATF member nations are committed to detecting and freezing funds intended
to support terrorism. In October 2001, FATF issued eight standards as baseline
recommendations for governments worldwide to combat the financing of terrorism. See Press
Release, FATF Cracks Down on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 31, 2001), available at
httpA/www.oecd.org/fatf. The standards seek to deny terrorists and their supporters access
to international financing systems. Id. On October 11, 2002, FATF issued a set of
International Best Practices regarding due diligence practices for nonprofit organizations to
combat money laundering. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Combating the
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part of its efforts to achieve those aims, the Department of the
Treasury, in October 2001, established Operation Green Quest, a
multi-agency terrorist financing task force, formed to identify
systems used by terrorist organizations to raise and move funds. 9
Operation Green Quest targets systems, individuals, and organiza-
tions for scrutiny and then coordinates investigations of those
persons and entities suspected of illegal money laundering activity.
To date, such investigations have resulted in the previously dis-
cussed blocking orders, have uncovered various money laundering
schemes, and have led to criminal prosecutions and criminal
forfeitures.2"
In early March 2003, the Department of the Treasury announced
the creation of a new Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and
Financial Crimes (EOTF/FC). The EOTF/FC is charged with
coordinating and heading the Department of the Treasury's "multi-
faceted efforts to combat terrorist financing and other financial
crimes, within the United States as well as abroad."26' Additionally,
EOTF/FC is responsible for providing policy guidance to OFAC and
to FinCEN.262 Furthermore, the Department of the Treasury, in
cooperation with the Department of State, will award up to $5
million for information leading to the dismantling of funding
mechanisms, such as "underground financial systems, illicit
charities, [and] corrupt financial service providers," used to finance
a terrorist organization.2
Abuse of Non-Profit Organisations, International Best Practices (Oct. 11, 2002), available at
httpJ/www.fatf-gafi.org/TerFinanceen.htm.
259. Press Release, U.S. Customs Service, Fact Sheet on Expansion of Operation Green
Quest (Jan. 9, 2003), available at httpJ/www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/press_
releases/012003/01092003.xml (last visited Mar. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Operation Green
Quest Overview]; Press Release, U.S. Customs Service, Operation Green Quest Overview
(Feb. 26, 2002), available at httpJ/www.customs.gov/xp/cgovnewsroom/press-releases/22002/
02262002.xml (last visited Mar. 16,2004). Operation Green Quest is led by the U.S. Customs
Service, and includes agents and analysts from IRS, U.S. Secret Service, ATF, FBI, OFAC,
FinCEN, the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and the Naval Criminal Investigative Service.
Id.
260. See Operation Green Quest Overview, supra note 259.
261. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Department
Announces New Executive Office for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes (Mar. 3,2003),
available at http'J/www.treas.gov/press/releasess77 (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
262. Id.; see also supra notes 254, 259 and accompanying text (discussing FinCEN and
OFAC).
263. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Terrorist Financing Rewards Program, Mission,
[Vol. 45:13411400
HIGH ALERT
The enhanced array of anti-money laundering laws and initia-
tives (along with other federal criminal statutes)264 that can be used
against terrorist financing, and the governmental commitment to
enforce those laws, arose in response to allegations that laundered
funds helped terrorists build financial empires that are used
destructively worldwide. 265 For example, according to congressional
testimony, terrorists' supporters have obtained funds through illegal
acts, have washed those monies, along with legally obtained funds,
through § 501(c)(3) organizations and their bank accounts in order
to acquire the appearance of legitimately obtained income, and have
diverted such monies to support terrorist groups.2 "c A senior special
agent with the U.S. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment remarked that money is often collected and passed through
multiple charities, some of which are "phantom operations," in order
to disguise its origin and destination.267 Two prominent examples
illustrate how terrorists allegedly have laundered money to fund
their unlawful activities.
1. The Virginia-Based SAAR Network
In 1984, a Pakistani native formed the SAAR Foundation (SAAR),
a Virginia nonprofit § 501(c)(3) organization, ostensibly for the
purposes of spreading belief in the Islamic religion and doing
charitable work.2' SAAR, along with more than a hundred Muslim
available at httpJAvww.treas.gov/rewards/mission.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2004).
264. See discussion infra Part II.C-D.
265. See, e.g., Testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher Before the
Oversight and Investigations Subcomm. of House Fin. Servs., Mar. 11, 2003, LEXIS, Federal
Document Clearing House File.
266. See, e.g., GAO, GAO-04-163 TERRORIST FINANCING: U.S. AGENCIES SHOULD
SYSTEMATICALLY ASSESS TERRORISTS' USE OF ALTERNATIVE FINANCING MEcHANISMs (Nov.
2003), at "What GAO Found," available at httpJ/www.gao.gov; Prepared Testimony of David
D. Aufhauser, supra note 7; Testimony of Steven Emerson, supra note 107; Testimony of
Richard Hoglund, Interim Director, Office of Customs Investigations, Before the Oversight and
Investigations Subcomm. of House Fin. Servs., Mar. 11, 2003, LEXIS, Federal Document
Clearing House File.
267. See Amanda Garrett, Terrorists'Money Takes Convoluted Path in U.S.; Web of Links
Leads Investigators to Imam, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 18, 2004, at Al (reporting how
multiple money laundering by various clergy and "charities" appears to have supported the
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad).
268. Douglas Farah & John Mintz, U.S. Trails Va. Muslim Money, Ties: Clues Raise
Questions About Terror Funding, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2002, at Al.
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think tanks, charities, and companies in the SAAR network (SAAR
network), was reported to be financed by Sulaiman Abdul Aziz
Rajhi, a member of the Saudi Arabian royal family.269 SAAR shared
office space in Virginia with two other organizations, the Safa Trust
and the International Institute for Islamic Thought (IIIL).27°
Allegedly, the IIIL had ties to al Qaeda as well as other terrorist
organizations.27'
The government began investigating SAAR in 1995, following a
raid of the offices of a Tampa, Florida group of Muslim activists
affiliated with the University of South FloridaY2 By late 2001,
Operation Green Quest categorized SAAR as a high priority.2 7 3
The government pursued three areas of investigation: SAAR's
alleged funneling of $20 million through multiple offshore ac-
counts to two bankers designated by the government as terrorist
financiers;27' the purported laundering of $1.8 billion in charitable
donations allegedly received by SAAR in 1998;27 and allegations
that the SAAR network had ties to and financed terrorist organiza-
tions such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic
Jihad (PIJ), al Qaeda, and others. 6
On March 20, 2002, federal agents raided the offices of SAAR, the
Safa Trust, the IIIL, and the homes of some of their representatives.
The raid, for which twenty-nine search warrants were issued, was
based upon the government's belief that these entities provided
material support to foreign terrorist organizations through the
funneling of funds via charities, businesses, and nongovernmental
269. Id.
270. Testimony of Matthew A Levitt Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and
Urb. Aff., Aug. 1, 2002, LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House File.
271. Although SAAR officially dissolved in December 2000, many of its functions were
transferred to the Safa Trust. Douglas Farah & John Mintz, Fighting Terror Funds and
Fundamentalism: Funding Inquiry Targets Muslim Groups, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 2002,
at A30.
272. Farah & Mintz, supra note 268, at Al; see infra Part II.B.2.
273. Farah & Mintz, supra note 271, at A30.
274. Farah & Mintz, supra note 268, at Al.
275. Id.; see also Farah & Mintz, supra note 271, at A30. SAAR representatives explained
that the $1.8 billion reported as charitable contributions on its 1998 federal tax return was
a clerical error, and that SAAR did not receive that amount in charitable donations. Farah
& Mintz, supra note 271, at A30; Farah & Mintz, supra note 268, at Al.
276. Farah & Mints, supra note 268, at Al.
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organizations. 277 As of April 20, 2003, no arrests or indictments had
resulted from these raids.2"' Several bank accounts have been
seized, however.
2. Sami Amin Al-Arian
In a separate, though connected,279 instance, the government
contends that terrorists and their supporters used wealthy U.S.
citizens to launder money.' Sami Amin A1-Arian, a professor and
religious scholar at the University of South Florida, has been
indicted and is alleged to have acted illegally on behalf of the PIJ,2s
a SDGT, through the Islamic Concern Project (ICP). The ICP is a
self-described humanitarian group representing itself as a charity
for Palestinians. 82 The indictment charges Al-Arian, and others,
with (1) misleading or defrauding donors with respect to the use of
their contributed funds, (2) passing money through wealthy U.S.
citizens to create fraudulent tax deductions, and (3) laundering
donations through ICP that ultimately were intended to support
PIJ.2" According to information captured by an FBI wiretap, Al-
277. See Testimony of Richard Hoglund, supra note 266. The federal magistrate who signed
the search warrants sealed the affidavits that supported the government's raid. See Testimony
of Nihad Awad, Executive Director, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Before the House
Int'l Relations Comm., Subcomm. on Int'l Operations, Oct. 9,2002, LEXIS, Federal Document
Clearing House File; Testimony of Matthew A Levitt, Senior Fellow, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urb. Aff., Aug. 1, 2002,
LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House File.
278. Tim O'Neil & Andrew Schneider, Terrorist Link is Denied, ST. LOUiS POST-DIsPATCH,
Apr. 20, 2003, at D1.
279. Apparently, the government was led to Sami Amin AI-Arian by its extensive Virginia
and Georgia raids of the SAAR network offices. See Mary Jacoby, Friends in High Places, ST.
PETERsBURG TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at ID; see also supra Part II.B.1. The indictment against
Al-Arian alleges that the Islamic Academy of Florida (IAF), which was incorporated by two
men who served as directors of the IIIL and were suspected of association with foreign
terrorist organizations, funded IAF, the World and Islam Studies Enterprise, a think tank
once headed by AI-Arian, and the Islamic Committee for Palestine, a charity once headed by
Al-Arian. See Mary Jacoby & Graham Brink, Saudi Form of Islam Wars with Moderates, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at IA; supra note 271 and accompanying text.
280. See Glenn R. Simpson, U.S. Links Scholar to Possible Terror Funding, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 17, 2003, at A4.
281. See id.
282. See Testimony of Steven Emerson, supra note 107. See generally Simpson, supra note
280, at A4.
283. See Simpson, supra note 280, at A4; see also Criminal Indictment Count One 1 62,
United States v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
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Arian raised $53,000 for ICP, including $25,000 in cash raised
during a trip to Chicago.2' The Chicago donors claimed charitable
contribution deductions for their cash contributions to ICP. 28
Subsequently, Al-Arian allegedly passed the same cash to wealthy
individuals in the 40% income tax bracket, who would "re-donate"
the cash to ICP and then claim a charitable contribution deduction
of 40% on the same money.2  The idea was not only to increase the
overall worth of the donated funds by providing a double charitable
contribution deduction, but also to launder funds intended for PIJ,
a known terrorist organization.
C. Prohibition on the Provision of Material Support to Terrorists
and Terrorist Organizations Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and
2339B
1. Background
"Virtually every criminal 'terrorism' case that the government has
filed since September 11 has included a charge that the defendant
provided material support to a terrorist organization." 7 Indeed, a
New York Times headline on April 6, 2003, shouted: "1996 Statute
Becomes the Justice Department's Antiterror Weapon of Choice."2
These quotations, referring to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, also could apply
easily to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and certainly the quotations portray the
potential prosecutorial strength of these statutes.2 9 The statutes,
284. See Criminal Indictment Count One 1 62, Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1258.
285. Id.
286. See id.; Testimony of Steven Emerson, supra note 107.
287. Cole, supra note 213, at 9 (referring to charges brought against John Walker Lindh;
Lynne F. Stewart, the attorney for Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman; five men from Lackawanna,
New Yoik indicted in United States v. Goba and subsequently sentenced to prison pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; James Ujaama, a Seattle activist; a group of men from Detroit, indicted
in United States v. Koubriti; and a Portland, Oregon group). See, e.g., United States v. Sattar,
272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (dismissing on constitutional grounds the 18 U.S.C. §
2339B charges brought against Lynne F. Stewart); United States v. Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d
418, 419 (E.D. Mich. 2003); United States v. Goba, 240 F. Supp. 2d 242, 244 (W.D.N.Y. 2002)
(finding 18 U.S.C. § 2339B an act of violence for purposes of denying release from detention
on bail); United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 547 (E.D. Va. 2002).
288. Eric Lichtblau, 1996 Statute Becomes the Justice Department's Antiterror Weapon of
Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at B15.
289. Bolstered by the media's publicity, the statutes also might have a preventive effect by
increasing a person's reluctance to engage in proscribed activities.
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enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994290 and the AEDPA, 291 respectively, criminalize the
provision of material support or resources to terrorists or terrorist
organizations. Congress revisited and fortified both statutes after
the September 11 attacks. With the enactment of the USA Patriot
Act, Congress enhanced 18 U.S.C. § 2339A by extending the maxi-
mum sentence that can be imposed for violation of the statute,292
expanding the definition of "material support or resources," 293 and
adding the covered offense to the list of predicate offenses under
RICO.29' The USA Patriot Act also strengthened 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,
as it had § 2339A, by extending the maximum sentence for violation
of the statute 5 and adding the covered offense to the list of RICO
predicate offenses.29
According to the statutory language, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A
criminalizes the provision of material support to terrorists:
(a) Offense. Whoever provides material support or resources or
conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership
of material support or resources, knowing or intending that they
are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation
of... [multiple listed sections, including §2332b which covers acts
of terrorism that transcend national boundaries] ... of this title
... or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an
escape from the commission of any such violation, or attempts
or conspires to do such an act, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of
any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or
for life....2
290. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, §
120005(a), 108 Stat. 1796, 2022-23 (1994). Before its amendment by the USA Patriot Act, the
statute was amended by Section 323 of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 323, 110 Stat. 1214, 1255 (1996).
291. See AEDPA § 301, 110 Stat. at 1247.
292. See USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 810(c), 115 Stat. 272, 380 (2001).
293. Id. § 811(f), 115 Stat. at 381.
294. Id. § 805(a), 115 Stat. at 377.
295. Id. § 810(d), 115 Stat. at 380.
296. Id. § 805(b), 115 Stat. at 377.
297. In addition to the penalties specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a), violation of § 2339A is
grounds for the government to subject assets to civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981. See
supra Part I.D.
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(b) Definition. In this section, the term "material support or
resources" means currency or monetary instruments or financial
securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or
assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification,
communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethalsubstanc-
es, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical
assets, except medicine or religious materials.'
The 18 U.S.C. § 2339A definition applies by cross reference to 18
U.S.C. § 2339B,2  which imposes criminal sanctions on anyone
who "knowingly provides," or "attempts or conspires" to provide,
"material support or resources" to a designated "foreign terrorist
organization. "3 "° The current requisite statutory intent- knowledge
-not only includes actual knowledge but also situations in which
a person "should have known,"3"' thereby potentially including
298. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a)-(b) (2003).
299. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(gX4) (2003).
300. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX1) (2003). The term "terrorist organization" is defined as "an
organization designated as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act." Id. § 2339B(gX6) (2003). See supra notes 94-99 and infra note 386 and
accompanying text for a discussion of that term.
One court has determined that even though invalidating 8 U.S.C. § 1189 might have
serious negative effects on counterterrorism efforts, the statute is facially unconstitutional
because subsections (aX3XA) and (bX2) are contrary to the Due Process Clause. United States
v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002). The court focused on subsections (aX3XA)
and (bX2), which provide that in designating an entity as a "terrorist organization" the
Secretary of State must create an administrative record reviewable by the court, and that the
administrative record including classified materials, can be submitted to the court ex parte
and for in camera review. Id. The court reasoned that there are no circumstances under which
the Secretary of State must give a constitutionally protected organization notice or an
opportunity to object to information in the administrative record that might contradict the
Secretary's designation. Id. Accordingly, the court held that when an organization is
designated as a "foreign terrorist organization" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189, the designation
is null and void, and it cannot be relied upon to prosecute under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Id. at
1059.
The court distinguished People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. United States
Department of State, 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), by noting that the court in that case found
that the PMOI was not entitled to U.S. constitutional rights because it was neither present
in the United States nor owned property in the United States. See Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d
at 1056. Finally, the court also dismissed the holding in National Council of Resistance ofIran
v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001) as illustrative of a constitutional
application of 18 U.S.C. § 1189.
301. In drafting the USA Patriot Act, Representative George W. Gekas (R-Pa.) addressed
the level of intent required under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B through questions to Attorney General
John Ashcroft. Mr. Ashcroft indicated that "we think the standards should be actual
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officers, directors, and trustees of domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations
who fail to fulfill their due diligence obligations."0 2 According to the
government, this level of intent is aimed at protecting innocent and
well-intentioned donors to charity,"~ and by extension of principle,
it safeguards the interests of beneficiaries whom donors ultimately
intend to receive the charitable fruits of their donations. Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, a perpetrator can be fined, imprisoned up to
fifteen years, or both, and if any person's death results from acts
that violate the statute, a lifetime sentence can be imposed. 0'
2. Constitutional Challenges
Litigants and commentators have argued that the definition of
"material support" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B is
impermissibly vague, too broad, or that it otherwise violates
constitutional rights."5 One such challenge produced mixed results.
knowledge or should have known, that's a pretty high standard, but we don't want people to
be responsible if they appropriately thought they were giving to a charity." Testimony of John
Ashcroft, United States Attorney General, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Sept. 24,
2001, available at http'//www.house.gov/udiciary. There has been discussion about possibly
lowering the standard to knowing and reckless endangerment. See Prepared Testimony of
David D. Aufhauser, supra note 7.
302. See infra Part V.A. It has been reported that the Ford Foundation provided funding
to nongovernmental, pro-Palestinian organizations. As a result of pressure by the Treasury
Department, the Ford Foundation commissioned an audit by Ernst & Young. The audit
revealed numerous ambiguities that prevented auditors from ascertaining how such grants
were utilized by the pro-Palestinian organizations. See Black, Funding Hate, supra note 213.
303. See Testimony of John Ashcroft, supra note 301.
304. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX1) (2003). In addition to the penalties specified in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(aX1), violation of § 2339B is grounds for the government to subject assets to civil
forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981. See supra Part I.D.
305. A well known challenge involved Lynne F. Stewart, an attorney for Sheikh Omar
Abdel Rahman. The government indicted Stewart, Mohammed Yousry, Ahmed Abdel Sattar,
and others for conspiring to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist
organization, and with providing and attempting to provide material support and resources
to a foreign terrorist organization. United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). In particular, the indictment alleged that the defendants conspired to provide, and did
provide, communications equipment, personnel, transportation, and other support to a foreign
terrorist organization, the Islamic Group (IG), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The
defendants challenged the charges on grounds of constitutional vagueness. Id. at 355.
First, the government asserted that the defendants had provided a communications
pipeline by which Sattar transmitted messages from Sheikh Rahman, a prisoner, to IG
leaders through the use of telephone conversations and by which Stewart released Sheikh
Rahman's statement to the press. Id. at 356. The defendants challenged those charges on
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grounds that § 2339B was unconstitutionally vague with regard to its prohibition on
"providing" material support or resources in the form of "communications equipment." Id. at
360. The defendants asserted that the indictment merely charged them with talking and their
usage of communications equipment was not the "provision" of equipment to the IG. Id. at
357. They contended that Congress did not intend § 2339B to criminalize the mere use of
communications equipment, as opposed to criminalizing the actual provision of the equipment
to terrorists and terrorist groups. Id. at 356. Relying on legislative history, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York agreed with the defendants and ruled that "by
criminalizing the mere use of phones and other means of communication the statute provides
neither notice nor standards for its application such that [the statute] is unconstitutionally
vague as applied." Id at 358.
Second, the government indicted the defendants and unknown co-conspirators for providing
personnel, including themselves, to assist IG. Id. at 359. The defendants argued that the
statute fails to provide fair notice of the types of acts statutorily prohibited for the provision
of "personnel,' and urged the court to follow the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Humanitarian Law
Project 11, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 358. The court again ruled
for the defendants, stating that:
It is not clear from § 2339B what behavior constitutes an impermissible
provision of personnel to an FTO [foreign terrorist organization]. Indeed, as the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Humanitarian Law Project, "Someone
who advocates the cause of the (foreign terrorist organization] could be seen as
supplying them with personnel." ... The Government accuses Stewart of
providing personnel, including herself, to IG. In so doing, however, the
Government fails to explain how a lawyer, acting as an agent of her client, an
alleged leader of an foreign terrorist organization, could avoid being subject to
criminal prosecution as a "quasi-employee" allegedly covered by the statute. At
the argument on the motions, the Government expressed some uncertainty as
to whether a lawyer for an FTO would be providing personnel to the FFO before
the Government suggested that the answer may depend on whether the lawyer
was "house counsel" or an independent counsel--distinctions not found in the
statute.... The Government attempts to distinguish the provision of "personnel"
by arguing that it applies only to providing "employees" or "quasi-employees"
and those acting under the "direction and control" of the FTO. But the terms
"quasi-employee" or "employee-like operative" or "acting at the direction and
control of the organization" are terms that are nowhere found in the statute or
reasonably inferable from it.
Moreover, these terms and concepts applied to the prohibited provision of
personnel provide no notice to persons of ordinary intelligence and leave the
standards for enforcement to be developed by the Government....
Moreover, the Government continued to provide an evolving definition of
"personnel" to the Court following oral argument on this motion. Added now are
"those acting as full-time or part-time employees or otherwise taking orders from
the entity' who are therefore under the FTO's "direction or control."
Id. at 359-60 (citations omitted).
As a result of these rulings, the court dismissed the charges against the defendants for
conspiring to provide, and providing and attempting to provide, material support and
resources to an foreign terrorist organization in violation of § 2339B. Id. at 361.
Finally, the defendants argued that § 2339B is unconstitutionally overbroad. Id. at 361-62.
The court disagreed. It concluded that the statute is content-neutral and that its purpose in
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In Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno (Humanitarian Law Project
II), David Cole, of the Institute for Public Representation and a
professor at Georgetown University Law Center, who represented
the plaintiffs, sought a preliminary injunction to bar the enforce-
ment of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B."°c The plaintiffs argued that the statute
was impermissibly vague and otherwise unconstitutional. Specifi-
cally, the plaintiffs argued that the statutory definitions of "foreign
terrorist organization" and of"material support" were impermissibly
vague. 30 ' The Ninth Circuit, affirming the federal district court,3"
agreed that the portion of the statutory definition of material
support that prohibits the provision of personnel and training to
foreign terrorist organizations was impermissibly vague, and must
be severed from the statute when it appears to prohibit activity
protected by the First Amendment.3' The court reasoned that the
statute does not permit persons of ordinary intelligence to deter-
mine the type of training or provision of personnel that is statutorily
prohibited. 310 Subsequently, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit
ruled, contrary to the government's assertion, that the vagueness
of the statutory provision is not remedied merely because the
terms "personnel" and "training" are defined in the United States
Attorneys' Manual. 31 According to that opinion, the definitions in
deterring and punishing the provision of material support or resources to foreign terrorist
organizations is a legitimate purpose not aimed at speech but rather at conduct. Id. at 362.
306. See 205 F.3d 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000).
307. Id. at 1137.
308. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1215 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
309. See Humanitarian Law Project II, 205 F.3d at 1137.
310. Id. Similarly, in a January 22, 2004 decision, the U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California held that the terms "expert advice or assistance" in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A
and 2339B were unconstitutionally vague. Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, Case No.:
CV 03-6107 ABC (MCX), 2004 U.S. Dist. LFXS 926, at *43-44 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2004).
However, applying the test of Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003), the court found that the
plaintiffs had failed their burden of proving that those same terms were substantially
overbroad under the First Amendment. Id. at *46-47. Finally, the district court found that the
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the statutory prohibition on providing "expert advice or
assistance" punishes pure speech by penalizing moral innocents for culpable acts of a group.
Therefore, the court held that the statutory prohibition does not criminalize associational
speech. Id. at *51-53.
311. Humanitarian Law Project v. United States, 352 F.3d 382, 403 (9th Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Humanitarian Law Project 1II].
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the United States Attorneys' Manual do not constitute adequate
notice to the public-at-large. 2
The plaintiffs then argued in Humanitarian Law Project II
that the statute violates their First and Fifth Amendment rights
by conferring "unfettered discretion" on the Secretary of the
Treasury.313 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' argument, finding
that the Secretary's discretion is limited.314
Plaintiffs further asserted that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is unconstitu-
tional because it proscribes a donor's donating funds even if the
donor does not have the specific intent to aid in the unlawful
purposes of the foreign terrorist organization.315 The court re-
sponded that "[miaterial support given to a terrorist organization
can be used to promote the organization's unlawful activities,
regardless of donor intent."316 According to the court's narrow
interpretation, "specific intent to aid" a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion is not required for violation of the statute. 17
Finally, plaintiffs contended that the statute abridged a donor's
First Amendment right to free speech on the ground that monetary
donations were a form of protected speech. Further, they asserted
that the statute abridged their First Amendment freedom of
association with foreign organizations that function as political
advocacy groups.318 In essence, plaintiffs argued that the statute
imposes guilt by association or membership.1 9 The court disagreed,
noting that the government may regulate contributions to organiza-
tions that engage in lawful non-speech-related activities. 320 The
court stated that the government "may certainly regulate contribu-
tions to organizations performing unlawful or harmful activities,
even though such contributions may also express the donor's
feelings about the recipient."32' Applying the intermediate scrutiny
standard to assess whether the statute was properly tailored to
312. Id. at 404-05.
313. Humanitarian Law Project 1I, 205 F.3d at 1133.
314. Id. at 1137.
315. Id at 1133.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 1134.
318. Id
319. Id. at 1133.
320. Id. at 1135.
321. Id.
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achieve the governmental interest of preventing the United States
from being used as a place for fundraising for foreign terrorist
organizations, the court decided that the statute was properly
tailored.322
In support of its conclusion, the court relied on its interpretation
of congressional intent. The court stated that when Congress
"incorporated a finding into the statute that 'foreign organizations
that engage in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal
conduct that any contribution to such an organization facilitates
that conduct," it meant that all material support transferred to a
foreign terrorist organization aids its unlawful purposes.3 23 Because
money is fungible, the court maintained that even contributions
earmarked by a donor for peaceful goals can be used to carry out
terrorist activities by freeing up funds that a terrorist group can
dedicate to its unlawful activities.324
In a law review article criticizing the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
Professor Cole suggests that the congressional finding on which the
court based this final conclusion cannot be based on "a factual
'finding"' but rather arises as merely "a normative claim."3" He
states:
Finally, the freeing up argument surely overstates the extent to
which donations to a group's lawful activities are in practice
translated into illegal activities. No one would seriously suggest,
for example, that the millions of dollars donated to the ANC in
the 1980s to support its lawful anti-apartheid work were simply
transformed into bombs and weapons for its military wing. Most
"terrorist organizations" do not exist for the purpose of engaging
in terrorism. They generally have a political purpose or goal-for
example, ending apartheid in South Africa or obtaining self-
determination for Palestinians in the occupied territories-and
use a variety of means to attain that end. Some of those means
may be terrorist and some may be perfectly lawful. But it simply
does not follow that all organizations that use or threaten to
use violence will turn any donation that supports their lawful
activities into money for terrorism. According to a senior Israeli
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. See Cole, supra note 213, at 12.
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military officer, even Hamas, the organization reportedly re-
sponsible for an untold number of unspeakable suicide bombings
in Israel, spends ninety-five percent of its resources on a broad
range of social services .... Yet the material support law presumes
that even a donation of crayons to a day-care center affiliated
with Hamas will "facilitate" terrorism.s26
Professor Cole expanded his arguments in litigation on behalf of
the eight plaintiffs whom he had represented in Humanitarian
Law Project I. In Humanitarian Law Project v. United States
(Humanitarian Law Project III), a new claim was raised for the first
time on appeal before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit."'
Plaintiffs asserted that § 2339B violates their Fifth Amendment
right to due process of law because the statute fails to require proof
that a person charged with violating the statute personally had a
guilty intent when supplying "material support" to a designated
organization.32 In contrast to the testimony of Attorney General
Ashcroft before the House Judiciary Committee,329 the government
acknowledged at oral argument in the case that "a donor to a
proscribed organization could be convicted under the statute even
if he or she was entirely unaware that the organization was
designated as a terrorist organization."33 Judge Pregerson, joined
by Judge Thomas, was firm in the majority opinion that § 2339B
does not impose strict liability on persons who provide "material
support" to designated terrorist organizations, but rather that it
326. Id. at 12-13 (internal citations omitted); see also Ian Fisher, Defining Hamas: Roots
in Charity and Branches of Violence, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at A8 (reporting that the
pillars of Hamas are "religion, charity and the fight against Israel").
327. 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003).
328. Specifically, the plaintiffs feared prosecution under § 2339B. Their asserted interest
was to provide pecuniary and nonfinancial support only for the peaceful political and
humanitarian activities of two designated organizations, the Kurdistan Workers Party, a.k.a.,
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LUTE), which
engaged not only in humanitarian and peaceful political activities, but also in terrorist
activities, meant respectively to assist Turkish Kurds and Tamils in Sri Lanka. Id. at 388,
390-92. After designation of PKK and LTTE as foreign terrorist organizations, each plaintiff
ceased supporting the organizations. Id. at 392. The Court may have been considering
organization like Hamas, which is not solely a terrorist organization, although it does
sometimes engage in terrorist activity. See Glenn R. Simpson, Unraveling Terror's Finances,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2003, at A2.
329. See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
330. Humanitarian Law Project III, 352 F.3d at 400.
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requires the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt a
contributor's "knowledge, either of an organization's designation or
of the unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated."331 The
majority focused on five federal cases unrelated to § 2339B as
supporting their judgment that the Fifth Amendment right to
"personal guilt" applies to § 2339B.33 2 The opinion distinguished §
2339B from the "narrow class" of statutes not requiring such
personal "evil intent" because the purposes of those laws are to
regulate "industries, trades, properties or activities that affect
public health, safety or welfare." 3 First, the opinion cited the
harshness of the § 2339B criminal sanction-the potential of a
maximum life sentence-when compared to cases within the narrow
class of statutes not requiring mens rea. Furthermore, the opinion
stated that the "conduct regulated by §2339B does not fall into
'public welfare' category of conduct ... excepted from a scienter
requirement" because those exceptions apply to situations where the
inherent danger of the conduct itself should warn a person of
possible legal regulation." 4 The majority opinion considered
"[ciharitable contributions made to organizations ... [as] not [as]
'inherently dangerous' as are grenades, firearms and corrosive
liquids."35
By requiring mens rea for successful prosecution under § 2339B,
the majority opinion of the three-judge panel in Humanitarian Law
Project III attempted to curb prosecutorial power by precluding the
potential to convict, and therefore punish, "moral innocents-
donors entirely unaware that an organization is designated by the
government as a terrorist organization. 6 Nonetheless, one judge
331. Id. at 403.
332. Id. at 395-99 (citing particularly Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Scales
v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Brown v.
United States, 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964) (en banc), affd on other grounds, 381 U.S. 437
(1965); Hellman v. United States, 298 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1961)).
333. Id. at 399 (relying largely on United States v. Launder, 743 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1984)).
334. Id. at 401.
335. Id. at 402.
336. Id. The majority opinion vividly illustrated"moral innocents" to include"a person who
simply sends a check to a school or orphanage in Tamil Eelan run by the LTTE," and "a
woman who buys cookies from a bake sale outside of her grocery store to support displaced
Kurdish refugees to find new homes." Id.
The legislative history of § 2239B might suggest an intention, at least by some in Congress,
to require a mens rea requirement for prosecution under the statute. Senator Orrin Hatch
expressed his belief that a person must knowingly provide support to the terrorist function
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dissented. Judge Rawlinson's dissent was largely based upon his
view that the five federal cases relied upon by the majority were
inapposite." 7 His dissenting position may signal that in the future
other courts might not readily agree with the majority of the three-
judge panel in Humanitarian Law Project III.
3. Implications for Donors and § 501(c)(3) Organizations
As a result of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Humanitarian
Law Project 11, many individuals could be caught in troublesome po-
sitions.338 Even after the three-judge panel ruling in Humanitarian
Law Project III, it is not clear whether the full Ninth Circuit or
other federal courts might virtually expunge the scienter standard
of specific intent from the statute. 39 This could leave officers,
directors, and trustees who ultimately are responsible for the use of
donations received by their § 501(c)(3) organizations open to
liability. Also, well-intentioned donors still may be exposed to
liability. On a practical level, it is unlikely that an innocent,
reasonable Muslim giving obligatory zakat, for example, or another
well-intentioned reasonable donor making a donation to his or her
place of worship, to a humanitarian relief organization, or to any
other seemingly legitimate charitable organization would consider,
of a group to be prosecuted under the provision. Nevertheless, when it enacted § 2339B,
Congress eliminated any discussion of a mens rea requirement. See James P. Fantetti,
Comment, John Walker Lindh, Terrorist? Or Merely a Citizen Exercising His Constitutional
Freedom: The Limits of the Freedom of Association in the Aftermath of September Eleventh,
71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1373,1379 (2003). Some argue that Congress' failure to include specifically
any mens rea requirement in the language of § 2339B allows prosecutors to obtain a
conviction in virtually every case 'without proof of individual wrongdoing.' See David Cole,
An Ounce of Detention, AM. PROsPECr, Sept. 2003, at 50. Even if an accused donor could avoid
prosecution or conviction because of the lack of the requisite mental state, the burden remains
with the donor to prove the lack of knowledge about the use of the contribution for an illegal
cause. See R. Robin McDonald, Patriot Act: Are Abuses Real?, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
Nov. 19, 2003.
337. Humanitarian Law Project 11, 352 F.3d at 406 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
338. The statute and the Ninth Circuit's opinion confer tremendous prosecutorial power
on the government. See Humanitarian Law Project II, 205 F.3d 1130, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2003).
339. Humanitarian Law Project II, 205 F.3d at 1133-34. The court left in place the
"knowledge" requirement. According to the court, specific intent to aid terrorists or a terrorist
group is not necessary to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
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first, the notion that money is fungible, and second, the prospect
that his or her altruism might assist a foreign terrorist group. °
What about the domestic § 501(c)(3) organization itself? Beyond
the temporary freezing and/or permanent confiscation of its assets,
might it further be exposed and subjected to liability? The current
answer is probably "yes," as the following sections elucidate.
a. Section 501(c)(3) Organizations as "Financial Institutions"
for Purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B-31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Z)
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(2), "any financial institution
that becomes aware that it has possession of, or control over, any
funds in which a foreign terrorist organization, or its agent, has an
interest, shall ... retain possession of, or maintain control over" the
monies and must report the holdings to the Secretary of the
Treasury.' Even if a "financial institution" does not distribute the
funds directly to a foreign terrorist organization, sanctions can
apply. Knowing failure to comply with the statute's mandates
subjects the financial institution to a civil penalty of the greater of
$50,000 per violation or twice the amount of funds at issue. 2
For purposes of § 2339B, the definition of "financial institution"
is contained in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2).' It includes conventional
banking-type institutions (e.g., insured banks, commercial banks,
savings and loans, private bankers, credit card companies) and some
less traditional, nonbanking businesses (e.g., casinos, card clubs,
pawnbrokers, persons involved in real estate closings and settle-
ments, and persons engaged in vehicle sales).3 Giving the Depart-
ment of the Treasury latitude to include additional businesses
within the § 5312(a)(2) definition of "financial institution," Congress
enacted two catchall definitional paragraphs, one of which is
pertinent for this discussion.345 Subparagraph (Z) of 31 U.S.C.
340. One author aptly described 18 U.S.C. § 2339B as "essentially a strict liability crime."
George C. Harris, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil Liberties in. the Name of
National Security, 36 CORNELL lNrL L.J. 135, 143 (2003) (book review).
341. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX2) (2003).
342. Id. § 2339B(b) (2003).
343. Id. § 2339B(gX2) (2003); 31 U.S.C. § 5312(aX2XA)-(Z) (2003).
344. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(aX2XA)-(Z).
345. The other expansive definitional phrase is contained in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(aX2XY),
which provides "any business or agency which engages in any activity which the Secretary of
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§ 5312(a)(2) provides as one definition of "financial institution," "any
other business designated by the Secretary [of the Treasury] whose
cash transactions have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax,
or regulatory matters."3' Thus far, Treasury and OFAC regulations
that interpret the definition of "financial institution" focus exclu-
sively on the more traditional notions of the term and have not
addressed this expansive statutory phraseology. Whether 31 U.S.C.
§ 5312(a)(2)(Z) might be interpreted to include § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, in their capacities as collectors and disseminators of cash
donations, as businesses "whose cash transactions have a high
degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters"347 is
currently not clear, but such an interpretation certainly is not out
of the realm of possibility.
348
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) includes 31 U.S.C. § 5312 and was
enacted to require certain reports or records "where such records
have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings."349 To accomplish that purpose, the
the Treasury determines, by regulation, to be an activity which is similar to, related to, or a
substitute for any activity in which any business described in this paragraph is authorized
to engage." The language "similar to" was added to the statutory phraseology by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6185(a), (gX1), 102 Stat. 4354, 4355 (1988).
This phrase appears to cover such nontraditional financial institutions and networks as
unregistered hawalas. Nonetheless, as part of the counterterrorism provisions of the USA
Patriot Act, Congress amended the definition in 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312(aX2XA) and (R) to clearly
cover persons and networks of people who "engage as a business in facilitating the transfer
of money domestically or internationally outside of the conventional financial institutions
system." USA Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 359(a), 15 Stat. 272, 328 (2001). For an
explanation of the term "hawala," see supra note 7.
346. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2XZ). In contrast, Bank Secrecy Act Treasury regulation 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.11(n) rather narrowly defines the term "financial institution" to include a bank, broker,
money services business, telegraph company, casino, card club, or person subject to a state
or federal bank supervisory authority. Definitions, 31 C.F.R. § 103.11 (2002). That regulation
defines the term "bank" to include rather traditional concepts of a bank, such as a commercial
bank or trust company, a savings and loan association, or a foreign bank. Id. § 103.11(c).
Similarly, the current OFAC regulations essentially mirror the statutory language that lists
the more traditional types of financial institutions, and they do not elucidate what is meant
by such other businesses designated by the Secretary of the Treasury. See id. § 595.316
(defining "U.S. financial institution"); id. § 597.307 (defining "financial institution").
347. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Z).
348. During recent hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Committee was
urged to consider whether charities should be treated as "financial institutions" for purposes
of the Bank Secrecy Act. Testimony of Jonathan Winer, Member, Council on Foreign Relations,
Before the the Senate Judiciary Comm., Nov. 20, 2002, LEXIS, Federal News Service File.
349. Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1115 (1970) (codified as
1416
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BSA requires "financial institutions" to report domestic transactions
in U.S. currency and to report transactions involving foreign
financial agencies.35 ° The regulations promulgated after passage of
the BSA define a "financial institution" in terms of a "person" and,
based on legislative history and congressional intent, the courts
have held that individuals, as well as all cognizable entities having
legal status, can be "financial institutions."35 ' Recognizing that
money launderers attempt to conceal associations with large cash
transactions and to evade the BSA's reporting requirements, in
1987, Congress amended 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2) to expand the
definition of "financial institution" beyond businesses that engage
in conventional banking services. The legislative history of the BSA
indicates that the reporting requirements were designed to provide
a strong and sweeping tool for law enforcement agencies to locate
and investigate large currency transfers of the proceeds of unlawful
acts.352
b. Section 501(c)(3) Organizations as "Financial Institutions"
for Purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B-Treasury's Voluntary Best
Practices Guidelines May Portend the Future
To date, the Secretary of the Treasury has not issued regula-
tions under 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(Z) that apply the "high degree of
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d, 1829b, 1951-59 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) 5312 and 31 U.S.C.
§§ 321, 5311-22 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), anended by 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312(a)(2XT), (u5),
5316(a)(1)-(2), 5316(d), 5317(b)-(c), 5318(a)-(f), 5321(aX1)-(2), 5321(b)-(d), 5322(a)-(c)).
350. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a), covering reports on domestic coins and currency transactions,
provides:
When a domestic financial institution is involved in a transaction for the
payment, rectipt, or transfer of United States coins or currency (or other
monetary insti u.nents the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes), in an amount,
denomination, or amount and denomination, or under circumstances the
Secretat y prescribes by regulation, the institution and any other participant in
the transaction the Secretary may prescribe shall file a report on the transaction
at the titae and in the way the Secretary prescribes. A participant acting for
another person shall make the report as the agent or bailee of the person and
identify the person for whom the transaction is being made.
351. See, e.g., United States v. Levy, 969 F.2d 136, 139-40 (5th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Goldberg, 756 F.2d 949,955 (2d Cir. 1985).
352. II.R. REP. No. 91-975, at 11-12 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4394, 4395-97;
116 CONG. REc. 16951, 16954 (1970) (testimony of Rep. Patman describing the Department
of the Treasury's need for such a tool).
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usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory matters"3r language to
domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations that collect and disburse donated
funds. In November 2002, however, the Department of the Treasury
issued Voluntary Best Practices Guidelines that may portend the
future issuance of such regulations. The purpose of the Voluntary
Best Practices Guidelines is to assist U.S.-based charities in
avoiding any ties to terrorist organizations that might lead to
further blocking actions." 4 Nonetheless, in these guidelines, the
Department of the Treasury specifically warns: "Compliance with
these guidelines shall not be construed to preclude any criminal or
civil sanctions by the Department of the Treasury or the Depart-
ment of Justice against persons who provide material, financial, or
technological support or resources to, or engage in prohibited
transactions with, persons designated pursuant to ... [AEDPA
(which encompasses § 2339B) or IEEPA]."3 5 It appears that this
warning contemplates that the Department of the Treasury at some
future date may consider U.S.-based charities and private founda-
tions "financial institutions""s for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B." v
In that event, any domestic § 501(c)(3) organization that becomes
aware that it possesses or controls funds in which a foreign terrorist
organization or its agent has an interest, and knowingly fails to
retain possession or control of the funds and to make proper reports
to the Secretary of the Treasury, could be fined under 18 U.S.C. §
2339B.3 ' The threshold standard of intent required to violate the
statute appears to be relatively low. This low threshold, along with
the fact that the statute permits the civil sanction to be applied
even if a "financial institution" itself does not directly distribute
353. 31 U.S.C. § 5312(aX2XZ) (2003).
354. U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, ANTI-TERRORIST FINANCING GUMELINEs: VOLUNTARY
BEST PRACTICES FOR U.S.-BASED CHARITIES (2002) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES],
available at http'/www.treas.gov/pressreleases/docs/tocc.pdf (last visited Mar. 16,2004). The
guidelines were issued at the request of Muslim-oriented charities, which indicated concern
that the government might block their donations in efforts to prevent terrorist funding. See
Cooperman, supra note 16, at 37.
355. VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES, supra note 354, at 2.
356. See J. Christine Harris, New Treasury Guidelines on Terrorist Funding Draw
Criticism, 97 TAX NOTES 1009 (2002); Mark Rambler, New Developments for International
Charitable Giving: The War Against Terrorist Financing, 39 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 33, 35
(2003).
357. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(aX2), (b) (2003).
358. Id
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the funds to a foreign terrorist organization or its agent, should
heighten concern among domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations and
should spur them to undertake significant due diligence precau-
tions.
Even if § 501(c)(3) organizations are not "financial institutions"
for purposes of § 2339B, they may not be insulated from liability. As
discussed in the next section of this Article, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C
confers power on the government to prosecute entities that unlaw-
fully and willfully provide or collect funds to carry out terrorist
activities.359
D. Unlawful and Willful Provision or Collection of Funds to Carry
Out Terrorist Acts
In June 2002, Congress enacted the Suppression of the Financing
of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002 (Suppression
of Financing Act).' The Suppression of Financing Act implements
the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism (International Convention), which was adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1999, 31 and
ratified by the United States on June 26, 2002.32 The International
Convention is aimed at stopping the flow of financial resources that
support international terrorism. 363 The International Convention
obligates signatory states to criminalize conduct relating to
raising money and other assets that support terrorist activities.-
More specifically, the Preamble to the International Convention
359. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (2003).
360. Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-197, 116 Stat. 727 (2002). Most of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C became effective on June
25, 2002. However, paragraph (bX1XD) (concerning jurisdiction over a perpetrator found
outside the United States when the offense occurs in the United States) and paragraph
(b)(2(B) (concerning jurisdiction over a perpetrator found in the United States when the
offense occurs outside the United States) did not become effective until July 26, 2002. See id.
361. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9,
1999, 39 IL.M. 270 [hereinafter International Convention].
362. See International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999),
available at httpi/untreaty.un. org/ENGLISHfrreatyEvent2003/treatyl1.htm (last visited
Mar. 16,2004). The United States signed the International Convention on January 10, 2000.
Id. As of April 9, 2003, seventy-nine countries had ratified the International Convention. Id.
363. See S. EXEC. REP. No. 107-2, at 20 (2001).
364. Id.
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calls on States to "take steps to prevent and counteract, through
appropriate domestic measures, the financing of 'terrorists and
terrorist organizations, whether such financing is direct or in-
direct through organizations which also have or claim to have
charitable, social or cultural goals or which are also engaged in
unlawful activities"365 and to cooperate with one another in that
effort.3" Thus, the International Convention was intended as a
powerful counterterrorism regime.
Consistent with its obligations under the International Conven-
tion, Congress, in enacting the Suppression of Financing Act,
provided a puissant counterterrorism measure. Among the Suppres-
sion of Financing Act's provisions was the addition of § 2339C to
365. International Convention, supra note 361, Preamble, 39 I.L.M. at 270. The
International Convention provides that States must exercise criminal jurisdiction over the
lawful and willful provision or collection of funds with the intention that they be used or in
the knowledge that they are to be used to carry out certain terrorist acts. Id. art. 7, 39 I.L.M.
at 273; S. ExEC. REP. No. 107-2, at 20 (2001). States must freeze funds allocated or used for
supporting terrorist activities. International Convention, supra note 361, at art. 8. The
language is similar to the language approved in Security Council Resolution 1373, para. 1(c),
supra note 67, as well as the language of Executive Order 13,224. See supra notes 68-82 and
accompanying text. The International Convention further requires States to criminalize under
their domestic laws offenses enumerated in the Convention if they have an international
nexus, and to provide assistance to other States with investigations and criminal or
extradition proceedings regarding the listed offenses. International Convention, supra note
361, arts. 2-15, 39 I.L.M. at 271-76.
According to Michael Chertoff, former Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, International Convention would provide the U.S. law enforcement
agencies with a new means of halting the misuse of charitable institutions to finance
terrorism. S. Exac. REP. No. 107-2, at 30. Mr. Chertoffexplained that the United States would
no longer be acting alone. The International Convention requires States to have laws that
address the financing of terrorist acts, including laws of extradition. As a result, the
cooperation of other States would be an "indispensable tool." Id. at 30-31. Upon further
questioning, however, Mr. Chertoff acknowledged that some countries with large Muslim
populations, such as Saudi Arabia, had not signed the International Convention. Id. at 38. It
should be noted, however, that Saudi Arabia did sign the International Convention two days
after the hearings at which Mr. Chertoff testified. See International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorism (Dec. 9, 1999), available at http'J/untreaty.un.org/ENGLISHI
StatuslChapter.xviii/treatyl1.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). As of April 9, 2003, however,
Saudi Arabia had not ratified the International Convention, nor had other signing countries
with significant Muslim populations such as Egypt, Sudan, Indonesia, and others. See id.
366. The International Convention obligates nations either to submit for prosecution or to
extradite any person in their jurisdictions who unlawfully and willfully provides or collects
funds with the intent that the money be used to carry out terrorist activities. International
Convention, supra note 361, arts. 9-11, 39 I.L.M. at 274-75. Within stated limits, States are
obligated to cooperate with one another in criminal investigations, or criminal or extradition
proceedings. Id. arts. 12-15, 39 I.L.M. at 275-76.
20041 HIGH ALERT 1421
Title 18 of the United States Code. 67 The language of § 2339C
tracks that of certain provisions in the International Convention.
In particular, 18 U.S.C. § 2339C targets domestically formed
entities, including domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations, entities
formed outside the United States but located in the United States,
and the individuals who manage or control those entities, who
might directly or indirectly fund terrorism. The statute requires
some international nexus with respect to the terrorist financing,
such as someone operating abroad, or a nexus with interstate or
foreign commerce.'" Subsection (a) of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C makes it a
crime to unlawfully.. 9 and willfully37 0 (directly or indirectly) provide
or collect funds, or conspire to do so, with the intention that such
funds be used in full or in part to carry out a terrorist act in the
United States,371 or to cause death or serious bodily injury when, by
the nature or context of the act, its purpose is to intimidate a
population or to compel a government or an international organiza-
tion to undertake or abstain from any action.3 72 The provision states
unequivocally that "[flor an act to constitute an offense ... it shall
not be necessary that the [provision or collection of the] funds were
actually used to carry out a predicate act."73
367. It bears noting that, as with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, the government can easily
charge a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C along with other offenses. For example, the
Suppression of Financing Act added § 2339C, a federal crime for acts of terrorism that
transcend national borders under 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b)(g)(5). Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 107-197, § 301, 116 Stat. 727
(2002). Accordingly, for example, anyone can be prosecuted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C
in combination with 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and both of those provisions are predicate offenses
under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Id. The Suppression of Financing Act also made 18 U.S.C. §
2339C a predicate offense under the wiretap statute of 18 U.S.C. § 2516(lXc). Id.
368. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(b) (2003).
369. The term "unlawfully"" is intended to embody what would be considered under U.S.
law as common law defenses." H. REP. No. 107-307, at 12 (2001).
370. The term "willfully" means "voluntary or intentional." Id.
371. This predicate act of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)(A) encompasses offenses within listed
treaties specified in subsection (e)(7) of the statute.
372. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(1)-(2). Paragraph (a) of the statute implements International
Convention Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 3-5. H. REP. No. 107-307, at 12. Subsection (b)
establishes the jurisdiction of the United States with respect to perpetrators of offenses in
subsection (a), whether the perpetrators are located in the United States or abroad. This
subsection is consistent with the obligations that the United States has under the
International Convention, but in certain instances goes beyond those obligations. See id.
373. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(aX3) (2003).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The penalties for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a) are harsh.37 '
First, anyone who violates the provision can be fined, imprisoned for
up to twenty years, or both.37 Second, subsection (f) of the statute
creates an additional civil penalty to be imposed on any domestic
legal entity or any foreign legal entity located in the United States
of at least $10,000, payable to the U.S. government, if any person
responsible for the entity's control or management, while in that
representative capacity, "committed any offense" under 18 U.S.C. §
2339C(a).376 The responsible person, such as an officer or director,
need not be convicted of the offense in order for the government to
impose the civil penalty against the legal entity.377
Subsection (c) makes it a separate offense to conceal or disguise
the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of material
support, resources, or funds if such acts were taken knowing or
intending that the material support, resources, or funds were
provided in violation of either 18 U.S.C. § 2339B or § 2339C(a).378
Subsection (c) applies to any individual or entity in the United
States or any U.S. national or domestically formed legal entity,
including a § 501(c)(3) organization. An offense under subsection (c)
is punishable by fine, imprisonment of up to ten years, or both.7 9
To date, no indictments have been brought under 18 U.S.C. §
2339C against either individuals or organizations. As a result, there
are many unknowns. At this juncture, the statute has not been
challenged as unconstitutionally vague or otherwise unconstitu-
tional. It cannot be determined now how zealously the government
374. In addition to the penalties specified in 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(d), violation of§ 2339C is
grounds for the government to subject assets to civil forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 981. See
supra Part I.D.
375. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(d)(1) (2003).
376. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(f) (2003). According to the House Judiciary Committee report, in
determining the amount of the penalty, 'the court should consider the legal entity's net worth,
the volume of business it transacts, its ability to pay, the amount of the transaction involved
in the Subsection 2339C(a) offense, and the nature of the predicate act." H. REP. No. 107-307,
at 13. The additional civil penalty of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(f) implements International
Convention Article 5. Id.
377. H. REP. No. 107-307, at 13.
378. According to the House Judiciary Committee report, this provision goes beyond the
obligations of the United States under the International Convention. This provision was
intended to enhance the means by which law enforcement agencies can combat the financing
of terrorists and terrorist organizations. Id. at 12.
379. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(dX2) (2003).
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might attempt to apply the statute, nor how the statute would be
interpreted by a federal court. The statutory language is broad, and
a domestic § 501(c)(3) organization must be extremely wary of being
used unsuspectingly by others as a means of channeling funds to
terrorists and terrorist groups. The statute specifically makes it an
offense to "willfully," that is, voluntarily, provide or collect funds
with the intent or "knowledge" that they may be used in full or in
part for terrorist activities.- ° Whether "willfulness" might be
interpreted as the mere affirmative act of accepting offered dona-
tions or fundraising cannot now be known. Also currently unknown
is whether the government may take the position that the element
of "knowledge" incorporates the concept of "should have known" if
adequate due diligence were undertaken. If that is the standard,
what might constitute adequate due diligence? Must the due
diligence be so thorough as to provide information that is beyond the
ability of most § 501(c)(3) organizations to collect or determine?
Moreover, whether the statutory caveat-that the offense is
committed whether the collected or provided funds are actually used
for terrorism38 -would prevail if challenged is presently unknown.
The statute certainly incorporates the notion that money is fungible
and that the provision of one dollar to be used for legitimate
purposes by a terrorist group frees another dollar from other sources
to be used for illegal purposes. This "freeing of assets" theory was
found acceptable by the Ninth Circuit in the context of 18 U.S.C. §
2339B. 2 In Humanitarian Law Project II, the court focused on the
congressional finding that "foreign organizations that engage in
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct."' The
same language was reiterated in congressional hearings discussing
the International Convention and the need for its implementation
by Congress, 3 " which ultimately resulted in enactment of 18 U.S.C.
380. 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(aXl) (2003).
381. See supra note 373 and accompanying text (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2339C(a)(3)).
382. Humanitarian Law Project I, 205 F.3d 1130, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2000) (responding to
plaintiff's challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B by construing the statute's scienter requirement of
knowledge to lack the need to know that a donor's funds were actually used for terrorist
activities and applying a "freeing up" of assets theory).
383. Id. at 1136.
384. Prepared Statement of Ambassador Francis X Taylor Before the Comm. on Foreign
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§ 2339C, including the statutory caveat in subsection (a)(3). Finally,
as a general matter, if the statutory caveat were challenged, it is
unclear whether such a challenge would prevail. On the one hand,
the Ninth Circuit in Humanitarian Law Project II and III has shown
reluctance to give carte blanche to the government's contention that
the antiterrorist provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B are constitutional
under the First and Fifth Amendments. On the other hand, the
federal courts historically have given deference to Congress with
respect to matters of foreign policy and national security.-as
III. SUSPENSION OF DESIGNATED ORGANIZATION'S TAx-EXEMPT
STATUS
Although over the past two and one-half years Congress strength-
ened numerous statutory provisions available for waging the
financial war on terrorism, it was not until November 2003 that it
statutorily remedied the former inability of the IRS to suspend
the tax-exempt status of a designated SDGT, a designated foreign
terrorist organization, or an identified supporter of terrorism.' As
Relations, SEN. EXEC. REP. No. 107-2 (2001), Appendix, at 18.
385. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (giving deference to Congressional
interest in protecting foreign policy and national security with respect to the Passport Act);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (deferring to congressional interest in
protecting foreign policy and national security with respect to the Alien Registration Act,
which permits deportation of certain aliens); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 207 F. Supp. 2d
779, 787-88 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 315 F. 3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002); Palestine Info. Office v. Shultz, 674
F. Supp. 910, 918 (D.D.C. 1987), affd, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
386. Pub. L. No. 108-12 1, § 108, 117 Stat. 1335, 1339 (2003). Section 108(a), adding I.R.C.
§ 501(pX2), describes a terrorist organization that has been designated or otherwise identified
as:
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS- An organization is described in this paragraph
if such organization is designated or otherwise individually identified-
(A) under section 212(aX3XBXviXII) or 219 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act as a terrorist organization or foreign terrorist organization,
(B) in or pursuant to an Executive order which is related to terrorism and
issued under the authority of the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act or section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 for
the purpose of imposing on such organization an economic or other
sanction, or
(C) in or pursuant to an Executive order issued under the authority of any
Federal law if-
(i) the organization is designated or otherwise individually identified
in or pursuant to such Executive order as supporting or engaging in
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enacted, new I.R.C. § 501(p) denies eligibility of any such organiza-
tion for I.R.C. § 501(a) tax-exempt status and enables the IRS to
suspend the existing tax-exempt status of any such organization
designated either before or after the provision's November 11, 2003
enactment.387 Moreover, during the suspension period, not only is
the tax-exempt status of the designated organization under I.R.C.
§ 501(a) removed, but for a donation directly or through a trust to
a § 501(c)(3) organization, the new § 501(p) precludes the availabil-
ity to a donor of a charitable contribution deduction that would be
otherwise allowable under I.R.C. §§ 170,545(b)(2), 556(b)(2), 642(c),
2055, 2106(a)(2), or 2522.'8
Pursuant to prior law, the IRS could revoke permanently the §
501(c)(3) status of an organization, but only after the IRS conducted
an examination of the organization, issued to the organization a
letter proposing the revocation, and permitted the organization to
exhaust its administrative appeals rights, the outcome of which was
then subject to judicial review under I.R.C. § 7428. By contrast, the
new § 501(p) permits suspension of an organization's tax-exempt
status without an opportunity for prior challenge. 9 A suspension
does not preclude the organization from continuing to operate,
subject to taxation, during the suspension period. If the IRS
determines at a later date that the suspension is erroneous, the
statute permits a credit or refund of any taxes overpaid by the
organization." 9
Congress sent a powerful, and needed, message by enacting
the new § 501(p). The Department of the Treasury prominently
announced the IRS's swift action after enactment of the new
§ 501(p) to suspend the tax-exempt status of Benevolence
terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(aX3XB) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act) or supporting terrorism (as defined in section
140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989); and
(ii) such Executive order refers to this subsection.
387. Id. § 108(a)-(b), 117 Stat. at 1339 (adding I.R.C. § 501(pXl)). The suspension period
begins with the date that an organization is first designated or identified and ends when all
designations or identifications of the organization have been rescinded. I.R.C. § 501(pX3)
(2003).
388. I.R.C. § 501(pX4) (2003).
389. Id. § 501(pX5).
390. Id. § 501(pX6).
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International, Global Relief, and Holy Land and, consequently, to
disallow donors' charitable contribution deductions for donations to
these organizations. 9' These suspensions emphasize the govern-
ment's serious enforcement attitude toward organizations viewed as
supporters of terrorism. Yet, in removing tax enticements and
benefits, the new provision may have an unintended effect. Instead
of law-abiding donors' redirecting donations solely to trustworthy
and highly reputable § 501(c)(3) organizations that can assure the
adequacy of their due diligence to identify the funds' ultimate
beneficiaries, donors may suspend their charitable contributions
altogether or, as in the case of some Muslim donors," send
donations abroad through Internet channels, friends, and nontradi-
tional informal networks.
IV. PRIVATE CIVIL ACTIONS
In addition to the numerous federal statutes that enable the U.S.
government to combat terrorism, Congress in the early 1990s
enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338 to provide a private civil cause of
action against persons (including individuals, organizations, and
entities) other than sovereign states for victims of "international
terrorism" not occurring during acts of war.3' 9 Congress intended to
391. See Treasury and IRS Suspend Tax Exempt Status of Three Organizations Identified
with Terrorism Nov. 14, 2003, LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House File.
392. See, eg., Greg Allen (reporter) & Robert Siegel (anchor), Muslim Charities and Donors
Attempt to Adapt to New Level of Scrutiny Since 9/11, A1 Things Considered (National Public
Radio broadcast, May 12, 2003); see also Kevin Murray, Administration is Undermining
Democracy, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2003, at Dll (stating that the majority of funding for
terrorist organizations is from banks, businesses, Internet donations, and individual
remittances); supra note 16 (citing Muslim fears about giving to § 501(cX3) organizations,
including to mosques).
393. Congress initially enacted the provisions as part of the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Pub.
L. No. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (1990), but the statutes were repealed because of a
technical deficiency. Congress subsequently re-enacted the provisions as part of the Federal
Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 1003, 106 Stat. 4506, 4522 (1992).
The exclusion of claims brought on account of war was intended to bar actions for injuries
resulting "from military action by recognized governments as opposed to terrorists, even
though governments also sometimes target civilian populations." S. REP. No. 102-342, at 46
(2002).
Pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), a foreign state, its
agencies, and its instrumentalities are presumed to be immune to lawsuits unless a specific
exception removes that immunity. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2003). One such exception is 28
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give U.S. nationals a remedy for a "wrong that, by its nature, falls
outside the usual jurisdictional categories of wrongs that national
legal systems have traditionally addressed."39" For injury to the
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5), which removes immunity when:
money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death,
or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by
the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee of
that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment....
As part of AEDPA, Congress amended FSIA in 1996 to particularly include
provisions that could be applied to rogue states to hold them accountable for acts
of terrorism perpetrated on U.S. citizens. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(aX7) specifically
excepts sovereign states from immunity to lawsuits seeking monetary damages
by U.S. nationals, plaintiffs, or victims for "personal injury or death that was
caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage
taking, or the provision of material support or resources ... for such an act...."
This statute permits private actions against foreign countries that the Executive
branch has designated as a state sponsor of terrorism occurring either in the
United States or extraterritorially. These provisions did not address private
causes of action against individuals, organizations and entities who engage in
terrorist acts.
Id. On June 17, 2003, Senator Richard G. Lugar introduced a bill, the Benefits for Victims of
International Terrorism Act of 2003 (BVITA), to establish a comprehensive federal program
to provide benefits to U.S. victims of international terrorism. S. 1275, 108th Cong. (2003),
LEXIS, Congressional Bill File. The bill is intended to be a workable federal program to
provide benefits to terrorism victims who are U.S. nationals, including individuals physically
injured, killed, or held hostage on account of an act of "international terrorism," which is
determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the
Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury Department. Id. §§ 2-4. For a
discussion of the definition of "international terrorism,* see infra notes 394-405 and
accompanying text. Pursuant to the bill, uniform payments would be made to eligible
claimants from a Victims of International Terrorism Benefits Fund to be established by the
U.S. government. This fund would include appropriated amounts, contributions from
individuals, entities, and foreign governments, and possibly from blocked assets. S. 1275, §
10; Benefits for Victims of Terrorist Attacks: Hearing on S. 1275 Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Sen. Richard G. Lugar and Stuart E.
Eizenstat, Partner, Covington and Burling), LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House File.
The bill prohibits double recovery with respect to the same act of international terrorism
involving a victim's injury or death, or due to a person's being held hostage. S. 1275, § 8(a).
It further specifies that if a person files a civil action against a foreign state, government, its
agencies or instrumentalities, or against the U.S. government, or its agencies or
instrumentalities and recovers financial payment through judgment, relief under the BVITA
is prohibited. Id. § 12(c)(1). The bill, however, does not prohibit recovery under both BVITA
and 18 U.S.C. § 2333, if both were to apply with respect to a single act of international
terrorism.
394. S. REP. No. 102-342, at 22 (1992). The term "international terrorism" is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2331(1) as:
activities that-
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of
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individual, or his property or business, pursuant to these statutes
victims, their estates, survivors, or heirs are entitled to sue in the
federal district courts for compensatory and treble damages. 3 5 The
statute allows for "the imposition of liability at any point along the
causal chain of terrorism [that] would interrupt, or at least imperil,
the flow of money."
31
The statutes initially arose in response to Klinghoffer v. Palestine
Liberation Organization.397 Mr. Klinghoffer was murdered by
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) terrorists who attacked a
cruise ship in the Mediterranean Sea. Mr. Klinghoffer's family,
U.S. nationals, sued various commercial entities under state tort
laws, general maritime law, and the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA)..39  The defendants filed third-party complaints to bring
the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of
any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping;
and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the
locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum....
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (2003).
395. S. REP. No. 102-342, at 22 (July 27, 1992).
396. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2003). 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2337 have been criticized
for not providing sufficiently comprehensive coverage. See, e.g., Hearing of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., Terrorism Financing, Nov. 20, 2002 (testimony of Nathan Lewin), LEXIS,
Federal News Service File (detailing the need to (1) include specifically in 18 U.S.C. § 2333
"aiding and abetting" as a basis for civil liability; (2) statutorily authorize the federal
prosecutors to share information relevant to lawsuits brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2333; (3)
lengthen the statute of limitations for filing lawsuits under 18 U.S.C. § 2333; and (4) extend
18 U.S.C. § 2333 to financially enable plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue litigation before a final
judgment by providing seized funds as payments for attorney fees). On November 28, 2001,
Congress enacted legislation that requires the President to propose, by the time of submission
for the 2003 fiscal year budget, a legislative proposal to create "a comprehensive program to
ensure fair, equitable, and prompt compensation for all United States victims of international
terrorism (or relatives of deceased United States victims of international terrorism) that
occurred or occurs on or after November 1, 1979." Departments of Commerce, Justice, and
State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77, §
626(a), 115 Stat. 748, 803 (2001).
397. 739 F. Supp. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
398. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (2003).
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the PLO into the lawsuit. s9 The district court held that because
the death occurred in navigable waters, the Klinghoffer family had
cognizable claims against the PLO under federal admiralty juris-
diction and the DOHSA.4°
Congress created 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2338 after the Klinghoffer
litigation to ensure that torts from terrorist activity occurring
outside the boundaries of the United States would be actionable,
even if the perpetrator were not subject to federal maritime
jurisdiction, as in the Klinghoffer case.4°' According to testimony at
Senate hearings upon the initial proposal of the statutes in 1990,°2
the "existence of such cause of action [18 U.S.C. § 2333] may deter
terrorist groups from maintaining assets in the United States, from
benefitting from investments in the United States, and from
soliciting funds from within the United States."" 3 One skeptic,
however, testified: "I don't know whether fundraising for a terrorist
is an act of international terrorism.... So if you want to provide an
effective remedy, liability has to extend to the organizations that
have assets in this country and the substantive liability provision
has to be written so that that is clear."' She further stated that
there is
399. Klinghoffer, 739 F. Supp. at 857. The PLO describes itself as:
the internationally recognized representative of a sovereign people who are
seeking to exercise their rights to self-determination, national independence,
and territorial integrity. The PLO is the internationally recognized embodiment
of the nationhood and sovereignty of the Palestinian people while they await the
restoration of their rights through the establishment of a [comprehensive], just
and lasting peace in the Middle East.
Id.
400. Id. at 858-59.
401. Antiterrorism Act of 1990: Hearing on S. 2465, Before the Senate Subcomm. on Courts
and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 12 (1990) [hereinafter
S. 2465 Hearing] (testimony of Alan J. Kreczko). Mr Kreczko testified that "[w]hereas that
opinion IKlinghoffer] rested on the special nature of our admiralty laws, this bill will provide
general jurisdiction to our Federal courts and a cause of action for cases in which an American
has been injured by an act of terrorism overseas." Id.
402. The proposed statute was in the Antiterrorism Act of 1990, which was not enacted.
See supra note 393.
403. S. 2465 Hearing, supra note 401, at 12 (testimony of Alan J. Kreczko). According to
prepared testimony by Daniel Pipes, the PLO had raised its funds through legal and illegal
means. Although most of its money was not maintained in the United States, the PLO had
bank accounts in New York at the Arab Bank and at the Chemical Bank. Id. at 114-15, 117
(testimony of Daniel Pipes).
404. Id. at 119 (testimony of Wendy Collins Perdue).
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a realistic likelihood of actually recovering money only from a
defendant who has assets which are located in the United
States. The individuals who actually carry out terrorist acts are
unlikely to fall into this category. It is the organizations,
businesses and nations who support, encourage and supply
terrorists who are likely to have reachable assets. Would a claim
under this statute reach these organizations? The language of
the bill is very unclear on this.4"5
This testimony was an accurate prediction.
In a case of first impression, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Institute, 4W
the parents of a teenage U.S. citizen, who also was a dual citizen of
Israel and who was murdered in Israel by Hamas terrorists, sued
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 several individuals, the Quranic Literacy
Institute (QLI), and Holy Land for the loss of their son. °7 The Boims
sought $100 million each of compensatory and punitive damages,
plus litigation costs and treble damages.' The Boims alleged that
QLI and Holy Land, ostensibly humanitarian charities recognized
in the United States as § 501(c)(3) organizations, provided material
support and resources to terrorists and their organization in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.4° They specifically
contended that QLI and Holy Land raised funds in the United
States, laundered them, and funneled them to Hamas in Gaza and
405. Id. at 126. Ms. Perdue further stated that the litigation that could arise from the
proposed statutes would be symbolic acts. Id at 133. But Perdue went on to state that
if you want the litigation to have practical implications, not simply a mechanism
for symbolic effect, then it has got to be structured so that there is actually
money that you can-Mr. Pipes has discussed the assets of the PLO. Well, if you
want to get at that, the liability provisions have to be clear so that you can get
at that.
Id.
406. 291 F.3d 1000 (7th Cir. 2002), affg 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002 (N.D. M. 2001). The suit also
named the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development as a defendant. Id.; see also
supra Part, I.C.4.b (describing OFAC's blocking of Holy Land's assets and accounts).
407. In a separate proceeding by the United States, the government brought an action to
seize funds of the individual Boim defendants. United States v. One 1997 E35 Ford Van, 50
F. Supp. 2d 789 (N.D. Ill. 1999). In that lawsuit, the government contended that the
individuals, employees of QLI, used domestic charitable organizations to raise and launder
funds in the United States for Hamas. Id. at 794-95.
408. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1004.
409. Id.
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the West Bank for use in financing terrorists.410 The Boims alleged
that Hamas depended on these contributions to carry out its
terrorist activities.'11 QLI and Holy Land moved to dismiss the
complaint, based on the argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2333 does not
support a cause of action for aiding and abetting international
terrorism.'12 The district court denied the motion.'13 QLI and Holy
Land filed an interlocutory appeal requesting that the Seventh
Circuit consider the viability of a claim brought under the previ-
ously untested statute.''
In considering the viability of the plaintiffs' claim, the Seventh
Circuit addressed three separate issues. The first issue was whether
funding a foreign terrorist organization "involves" an act of interna-
tional terrorism within the meaning of its definition in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331, which applies to 18 U.S.C. § 2333. The court held that it
does not." 5 The court reviewed congressional hearings and found
that Congress intended the statute to apply expansively and to
encompass all American tort law."6 The court found that the statute
clearly was intended "to reach beyond those persons who them-
selves commit the violent act that directly causes the injury.""7
Nonetheless, the court concluded that tort law requires proximate
cause for a person to be "involved" in a proscribed activity and that
foreseeability, its linchpin, was absent with respect to the case at
hand."8 Specifically, the court stated:
To say that funding simpliciter constitutes an act of terrorism is
to give the statute an almost unlimited reach. Any act which
turns out to facilitate terrorism, however remote that act may be
from actual violence and regardless of the actor's intent, could
be construed to "involve" terrorism. Without also requiring the
410. Id.
411. Id. at 1003.
412. Id. at 1004-05.
413. Id at 1001.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 1010 (citing 137 CONG. REC. S4511-04 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1991)); see also S. 2465
Hearing, supra note 401, at 12 (testimony of Joseph Morris); 136 CONG. REc. S4568-01 (daily
ed. Apr. 19, 1990).
417. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1011.
418. Id. at 1012.
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plaintiffs to show knowledge of and intent to further the payee's
violent criminal acts, such a broad definition might also lead to
constitutional infirmities by punishing mere association with
groups that engage in terrorism, as we shall discuss later in
addressing the First Amendment concerns raised here....
To hold the defendants liable for donating money without
knowledge of the donee's intended criminal use of the funds
would impose strict liability. Nothing in the language of the
statute or its structure or history supports that formulation. The
government, in its amicus brief, maintains that funding may be
enough to establish liability if the plaintiff can show that the
provider of funds was generally aware of the donee's terrorist
activity, and if the provision of funds substantially assisted the
terrorist act in question.... We will consider the government's
proposed standard separately in our discussion of aiding and
abetting liability. For now we note only that the complaint
cannot be sustained on the theory that the defendants them-
selves committed an act of international terrorism when they
donated unspecified amounts of money to Hamas, neither
knowing nor suspecting that Hamas would in turn financially
support the persons who murdered David Boim.4 19
The second issue that the court addressed was whether 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 incorporates the definitions of "international terrorism"
utilized in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, thus giving the Boims a
valid claim.42 The court ruled that it does. After determining
that the term "international terrorism" had not been interpreted
previously for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2333 or for purposes of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,421 which contains the same
terminology, the court drew upon legislative history and the
statutory structure and context of the term.422 In doing so, the court
reviewed the language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B and noted
that Congress had "undoubtedly intended that the persons provid-
ing financial support to terrorists should also be held criminally
liable."4' The court stated that it would be "counterintuitive" to
419. Id. at 1011.12.
420. Id. at 1015-16.
421. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c) (2003).
422. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1010.
423. Id. at 1014.
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conclude that Congress would intend persons to be subject to
criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B, but not civil
liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 as long as "knowledge and intent"
are demonstrated. 24 The court added that because Congress
intended 18 U.S.C. § 2333 to apply more broadly than 18 U.S.C. §§
2339A and 2339B, actual proof of a criminal violation under either
of the latter statutes is not required to maintain a claim under the
former provision.4 25 All that is needed for a justiciable claim under
18 U.S.C. § 2333, the court concluded, is a standard showing of
causation under tort law.426
Finally, the court addressed whether a civil cause of action under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 and 2333 can be maintained for aiding and
abetting an act of international terrorism.427 The court concluded in
the affirmative. It based its holding on several rationales. First,
the court reasoned that even though 18 U.S.C. § 2333 does not
incorporate the terminology of "aiding and abetting," the language,
structure, and legislative history of the statute indicated an
intention to import general tort law. 28 Second, the court found that
the tort concept of "aiding and abetting" includes conduct that
gives rise to a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A or 2339B, in that it
"involve[s]" acts that are violent or dangerous to human life within
the definition of "international terrorism."4' Third, the court firmly
stated that a failure to impose liability on aiders and abetters who
knowingly and intentionally fund acts of terrorism would thwart the
clear intent of Congress to sever the flow of money to terrorists "at
every point along the causal chain of violence."' °
424. Id. at 1014-15.
425. Id. at 1015.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 1016-21.
428. Id. at 1020. The court distinguished Central Bank of Denver, N.A v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, N.A, 511 U.S. 164 (1994), in which it was held that a private plaintiffcannot
maintain an aiding and abetting lawsuit under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, §
10(b) because it neither provides an express (direct) or implicit (indirect) right of private
action. Boirn, 291 F.3d at 170-78. By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Boim found the
legislative history to be clear that 18 U.S.C. § 2333 provides an express right of private action.
Id. at 1019.
429. Boim, 291 F.3d at 1020.
430. Id. at 1021.
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Contrary to the assertion of QLI and Holy Land, the court
specifically held that the defendants' associational rights under the
First Amendment were not abridged by its conclusion that a claim
can be maintained under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2339B.431 Reviewing relevant case law, the court reiterated
that the actual imposition of liability under the statute requires a
plaintiff to demonstrate more than a mere association with a group
engaged in illegal activity; it requires a showing of specific desire or
intent to support or help the group engage in illegal activity. 2 In
the instant case, the court determined that the Boims' allegations
were sufficient to support their lawsuit.' The Boims' allegations
were not based on QLI's or Holy Land's mere association with
Hamas;"' rather, the Boims sought to hold the organizations liable
for aiding and abetting their son's murder by raising funds that
would be laundered and supplied to carry out terrorist operations,
to purchase guns that would be used as murder weapons, to train
the killers, and to compensate the killers' families.' Stating that
proof would depend on the facts, the court held that the assertions
were sufficient to sustain an action under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 without
violating defendants' First Amendment rights of association. 36
Additionally, contrary to the assertions of QLI and Holy Land, the
court ruled that a § 2333 claim based solely on conduct that would
render the actor criminally liable under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B does not
abridge the actor's First Amendment political associational rights.3 7
That § 2339B is not narrowly drawn to apply only to persons
intending to support illegal goals but also can capture persons who
contribute money solely for humanitarian purposes was not fatal.'38
Relying on Humanitarian Law Project II, the court indicated that
terrorist organizations use funds for illegal activities regardless of
431. Id. at 1025.
432. Id. at 1022-25.
433. Id. at 1028.
434. ISl at 1024.
435. Id. at 1023-24.
436. Id. at 1028.
437. Id.
438. Id. at 1027.
1434 [Vol. 45:1341
2004] HIGH ALERT 1435
a donor's intent and that Congress was compelled statutorily to
attach liability to all contributions to such organizations.4 9
The Boim decision clearly opened the floodgates.' 0 That seminal
case arose from actions prior to September 11, 2001. Currently,
three multiple-plaintiff civil actions have been filed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 by families of victims of the heinous attacks of September 11,
and more lawsuits may follow."' At present, it is an open question
as to whether the courts consistently will consider the September 11
terrorist acts to fall within the statute's definition of "international
terrorism."" 2 In one case of first impression, Smith v. Islamic
Emirate ofAfghanistan, that arose from the events of September 11,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled
that those attacks constituted "international terrorism" rather than
"domestic terrorism," the latter of which is not covered by 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333." The court considered the September 11 attacks as having
"occur[red] primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States," and thus as satisfying that element of the term "domestic
terrorism."" Nonetheless, although wary of interpreting the term
439. Id.
440. Another lawsuit, Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v. Palestinian Authority, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 97-98 (D.R.I. 2001), and 228 F. Supp. 2d 40, 49-50 (D.R.I. 2002), involving 18
U.S.C. § 2333 preceded Boim. The administrator of the estates of a husband and wife killed
in Israel asserted a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2333 against the Palestinian Authority and the
Palestine Liberation Organization for encouraging terrorist activities, providing a safe haven
and base of operations to the terrorists who killed the deceased, and for supporting families
of terrorists. The court twice refused to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a justiciable
claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2333. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enter default
judgment against the Palestinian defendants. Estates of Ungar ex rel. Strachman v.
Palestinian Auth., 215 F.R.D. 36, 39-40 (D.R.I. 2003).
441. 18 U.S.C. § 2335 provides a four year statute of limitations, which can be tolled for
periods when terrorists have concealed their acts, identities, or remain outside of the United
States. See 18 U.S.C. § 2335 (2003).
442. See supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text (defining the term "international
terrorism").
443. 262 F. Supp. 2d 217,221-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The plaintiffs sued the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and Osama bin Laden under 18 U.S.C. § 2333, seeking
damages for the deaths of family members. Id.
444. Id. at 221 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003)). The statute defines the term "domestic
terrorism" to mean activities that:
(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws
of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
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"international terrorism" too expansively, the court determined that,
as required by the definition of "international terrorism," the
September 11 acts "transcend[ed] national boundaries in terms of
the means by which they [were] accomplished ... or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate [d] ." 5 In support of this conclusion,
the court relied on satisfactory evidence that the attacks were
carried out by foreign nationals who "apparently received their
orders and funding and some training from foreign sources" and
that Iraq provided material support to al Qaeda and Osama bin
Laden.' As a result, the court awarded the plaintiffs economic
damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2333."'
In another, consolidated case, Ashton v. Al Qaeda Islamic Army,
filed in the Southern District of New York on behalf of 1400 victims
and survivors of the September 11 attacks, plaintiffs seek more than
$1 trillion in damages, in part based on 18 U.S.C. § 2333.'6 Among
the defendants are individuals, banks, domestic § 501(c)(3) organi-
zations," 9 foreign terrorist organizations, and corporations alleged
to have provided funds and other material support to the terrorists.
The complaint filed in Ashton follows on the heels of a complaint
filed on August 15,2002, in the District of Columbia, by administra-
tors of the estates of victims and by survivors of the September 11
attacks. In that case, Burnett v. Al Baraka Investment and Develop-
ment Corp.,4' plaintiffs sought trillions of dollars in damages, over
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping, and
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2003).
445. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 221.
446. Id. at 221, 232.
447. Id. at 237. With respect to decedents George Smith and Timothy Soulas, the court
awarded the estate funeral service expenses, compensatory damages for lost earnings, pain
and suffering, and solatium damages (damages allowed for mental anguish, bereavement and
grief as permitted under Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1998)) to
select family members. Smith, 262 F. Supp. 2d at 234-39. The court denied punitive damages
because the statute does not provide for such an award. Id. at 239-40.
448. Nos. 02-CV-6977, 02-CV-6978, 2002 WL 32152069, at *38 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 3,
2002).
449. Id. at *10-11. The U.S. domestic § 501(cX3) organizations include Benevolence
International, Global Relief, the International Institute of Islamic Thought, and the SAAR
Foundation. Id.
450. No. 02-CV-1616 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 15,2002),availableathttp//www.dcd.uscourts.gov/
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$3 trillion of which is sought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333, against
several individuals alleged to be terrorist financiers, seven interna-
tional banks, eight Islamic foundations and their subsidiaries
(including the SAAR Foundation, the Safa Trust, and Benevolence
International), and a private foundation established in Saudi Arabia
with a branch created in the United States as a § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tion. '5 Allegations are based on aiding and abetting terrorists and
violations of RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962, as well as other federal
statutes.452
The Boim and Smith decisions, along with the other lawsuits
(Ashton and Burnett) filed as a result of the September 11 attacks,
compound the reasons for officers, directors, and trustees of well-
intentioned, legitimate domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations to
undertake "appropriate" due diligence before disseminating funds
either domestically or abroad for charitable purposes.
V. DUE DILIGENCE
A. Due Diligence by Members of Governing Bodies of§ 501(c)(3)
Organizations
For a variety of reasons, most § 501(c)(3) organizations are
created as corporations,453 with the remainder largely formed as
trusts. A range of legal obligations is imposed on decision makers
(officers, trustees, and directors) of § 501(c)(3) organizations to
ensure accountability to beneficiaries and to the public. Common
law and state statutory law impose fiduciary duties on each officer,
trustee, and director of a domestic § 501(c)(3) organization, whether
formed as a corporation or as a trust.' The fiduciary standards
02-1616order.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
451. Id. The defendant § 501(c)(3) organization is the AI-Haramain Islamic Foundation,
Inc. Id.
452. See id.
453. See Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation's Governance and Self
Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1133-35 (2001)
(providing statistics with respect to private foundations formed between 1962 and 2000); Note,
Developments in the Law-Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REv. 1578, 1593 (1992)
(stating that virtually all contemporary private foundations were created as corporations).
454. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 830 (1987); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PRoFrr
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applicable to trustees can be stricter than those applicable to
charitable corporations' directors and officers, and certain governing
principles may differ with respect to these two categories. For
example, under the common law, trustees of charitable trusts often
are not protected from personal tort liability and contract claims
that arise out of their actions or those of their subordinates.5 5 By
contrast, state laws may exempt directors and officers of nonprofit
charitable corporations from personal liability for tort or contract
claims unless the individual was grossly negligent or intended to
cause the resulting harm.' Nonetheless, to a large extent, trustees,
directors, and officers share similar fiduciary obligations.
Each corporate officer and director has a duty of obedience, a duty
of loyalty to the organization, and a duty of care. The common law
duty of obedience requires each officer and director to fulfill the
particular charitable purposes of the corporation. 7 As a corollary
to the duty of obedience, each officer and director must also ensure
that the entity conducts its affairs in a lawful manner. 4 ' The duty
of loyalty requires each officer and director to pursue the interests
and mission of the nonprofit corporation with undivided allegiance
by placing the interests of the entity above private interests. 5 9
Similarly, trustees have a strict duty of loyalty to administer the
trust solely in accordance with trust provisions and in the interests
of the charitable beneficiaries.' 0 The duty of care requires each
CORP. LAw §§ 101-1411 (McKinney 1997). If the § 501(cX3) organization is formed as a trust,
the trustees have fiduciary duties under state laws similar to those applicable to directors and
officers under nonprofit corporation laws. For a general discussion, see Crimm, supra note
453, at 1138-47.
State Attorneys General have statutory jurisdiction over the nonprofit organizations'
charitable assets and the fundraising activities of the organizations, and have authority to
bring lawsuits for an officer's, director's, or trustee's breach of fiduciary duties. See Crimm,
supra note 453, at 1184-86; Nina J. Crimm, Why All Is Not Quiet on the "Home Front" for
Charitable Organizations, 29 N.M. L. REV. 1, 1-4 (1999).
455. See, e.g., Lynch v. John M. Redfield Found., 9 Cal. App. 3d 293, 298 (Ct. App. 1970).
456. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FoR-PRoFIT CORP. LAW § 720-a (McKinney 1997) (providing that,
with few statutory exceptions, an uncompensated director, officer, or trustee of a nonprofit
corporation described in I.R.C. § 501(cX3) shall not be liable to any person other than the
corporation, unless the conduct was grossly negligent or "intended to cause the resulting harm
to the person asserting such liability"); see also Lynch, 9 Cal. App. 3d at 298.
457. See, e.g., Alco Gravure, Inc. v. The Knapp Found., 479 N.E.2d 752,756-57 (N.Y. 1985).
458. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, 717 F. Supp. 188, 194-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
459. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 1997).
460. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 169, 170 (1959).
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corporate officer and director to use reasonable care and act in good
faith in discharging their responsibilities.41 Likewise, trustees have
a duty of care to administer the charitable trust prudently and to
exercise all granted powers reasonably, in good faith, and with due
regard for the interests of the beneficiaries." 2
Breach of any fiduciary duty may result in the filing of a miscon-
duct action against the wrongdoer,' a lawsuit to remove or suspend
the offender,' and in cases involving particularly egregious conduct
or a specific statutory violation, a criminal proceeding against the
perpetrator.'" Because the nonprofit corporate veil can be pierced
or a trust's cloak set aside so as to impose civil and criminal
penalties on wrongdoing officers, directors, and trustees,' those
individuals have a strong incentive to shield organizational funds
from misuse or diversion for inappropriate or unlawful purposes."'
Guarding against such misappropriation requires due diligence
compliance.
Additionally, in order to preserve the income tax exemption of a
§ 501(c)(3) organization, particularly one making grants to foreign
persons or organizations, appropriate due diligence must be
undertaken. The nature of the due diligence required in part will
depend on whether the organization is a public charity or a private
461. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a).
462. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs §§ 172-82 (1959) (explaining various duties of
trustees).
463. See, e.g., N.Y. NoT-FoR-PRoFrr CORP. LAw §§ 623(a), 717, 720 (McKinney 1997)
(permitting the Attorney General, an officer or director of the nonprofit organization, a
member of the nonprofit organization by use of a derivative action, and others to bring
misconduct actions against officers and directors).
464. See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-OR-PROFrr CORP. LAw §§ 706(d), 714(c) (McKinney 1997)
(permitting the Attorney General or ten percent of the members of the nonprofit organization
to bring an action to remove a director); S.H. & Helen R. Scheuer Family Found., Inc. v. 61
Assocs., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662, 664 (App. Div. 1992) (permitting a member of the nonprofit
organization and board of directors to bring a claim for the removal of board members).
465. The Attorney General or other law enforcement agencies can bring criminal
proceedings against officers and directors of nonprofit organizations. See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.22 (1984); People v. Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1, 8
(N.Y. 1991); Heidi Evans & Dave Saltonstall, Indictments in Hale Scandal: Ex.Chief Hubby
Charged with Theft, Forgery, N.Y. DAILYNEws, Feb. 6,2002, at 2; Shelter Founder's Daughter
Sentenced, CHI. TRm., Oct. 25, 2002, at 14.
466. See Matthew D. Caudill, Piercing the Corporate Veil of A New York Not-for-Profit
Corporation, 8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & Fi. L. 449, 462-64 (2003).
467. See supra Part II.C (discussing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339B and 2339C).
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foundation.' While this Article is unable to address these due
diligence requirements in detail, the due diligence required also will
vary by the grant size and nature, by the capacity of the grant-
making organization, and by the recipient's country, depending on
the local infrastructure and on the presence or absence of informa-
tion sought. At a basic level, if funds are to be granted to nonexempt
organizations, the grant-making organization's decision makers
must demonstrate that the grantor retains control and discretion
over the use of the distributed funds, the use of the funds furthers
the grantor's exempt purpose, and records are maintained to
establish the use of the funds." 9
As previously discussed in Part II.C.3.b,470 the Voluntary Best
Practices Guidelines (Guidelines) issued by the Department of the
Treasury last year are essentially costly, voluntary due diligence
recommendations (not mandates) for grant-making U.S.-based
charities and private foundations. They are broad in scope and
lacking in detailed specifics. According to the Department of the
Treasury, compliance with the Guidelines does not provide a safe
haven that will protect a U.S.-based charity or private foundation
from either criminal or civil liability.47' One can infer from the
Treasury's assertion regarding the Guidelines' lack of protection
against potential liability that the Guidelines represent the Trea-
sury's perception of some "minimal reasonable" due diligence
standards.472 Based upon that reasoning, governmental authorities
468. Private foundations are subject to special rules under I.R.C. §§ 4942 and 4945, to
which public charities are not subject. For further discussion of these provisions, see Crimm,
supra note 21, at 72-89.
469. See Rev. Rul. 68-489, 1968-2 C.B. 210 (1968); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4942-6 (2003)
and 53.4945-5 (2003) (involving foreign grants by domestic private foundations). For further
discussion of these provisions, see Crimm, supra note 21, at 72-89. Moreover, if funds are
distributed to a foreign individual, Revenue Ruling 56-304 requires the domestic charitable
organization to make the distribution on a charitable basis, maintain adequate records as to
the recipient, the amount and the purpose, the selection process, and the relationship of the
recipient to the organization's trustees, officers, substantial contributors, and related entities.
Rev. Rul. 56-304, 1956-2 C.B. 306 (1956).
470. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
471. See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
472. According to the prepared testimony of David D. Aufhauser, General Counsel for the
Department of Treasury, the Voluntary Best Practices Guidelines are important because they
.offer a means by which charities can protect themselves against terrorist abuse and are
consistent with the principles espoused in both the private and international public sectors."
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might view the failure of trustees, officers, and directors of U.S.-
based charities and private foundations to comply fully with the
Guidelines, or even to go beyond the Guidelines, as a breach of one
or more of their fiduciary duties. If that is true, what might it take
to insulate officers, trustees, and directors from liability under state
statutes, common law, and federal law? 73 Further, is it reasonably
possible to undertake sufficient due diligence to achieve such
protection? Answering these questions requires a review of the
Guidelines.
Among the listed voluntary best practices are recommendations
under four broad categories: (1) the development of the U.S.-based
charity's or private foundation's own "adequate governing struc-
ture"; 7 ' (2) the disclosure and transparency of the organization's
governing structure, finances, and fundraising goals; 75 (3) the
creation and implementation of adequate financial and accountabil-
ity procedures; 76 and (4) the establishment and execution of
procedures enabling evaluation and review of "foreign recipient
organizations" and such organizations' financial operations, 77
including basic vetting of foreign grantee organizations.'7"
The adequate governing structure recommendations are straight-
forward and include common sense suggestions, although not all
organizations currently satisfy the recommendations, particularly
the first two. The recommendations are that (1) the board of
directors should be an active and independent governing body
composed of at least three members who meet at least three times
annually; (2) the board should maintain public records of its
decisions; and (3) the board should operate in accordance with its
governing instruments. 79
The disclosure and transparency guidelines include: (1) making
publicly available a list of board members and the five highest-
Prepared Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, supra note 7.
473. See supra notes 301-02 and accompanying text (discussing persons who "should have
known" about the provision of material support to terrorists and terrorist organizations).
474. See VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTICES, supra note 354, at 2.
475. See id. at 3.
476. See id. at 4.
477. See id. at 5.
478. See id.
479. Id. at 2-3.
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ranking key employees, and their salaries; (2) identifying subsidiar-
ies and other affiliates that receive funds from the charity; (3)
providing on request an annual report that describes the charity's
finances, purposes, programs, activities, tax-exempt status, and the
structure of its board and its members' responsibilities; (4) making
financial statements available; (5) soliciting funds in a manner that
informs donors how and where donations will be expended; (6)
stating clearly the charity's goals and purposes so that persons
examining the disbursements can determine whether the charity
adheres to those goals; and (7) substantiating on request the
veracity of solicitation and informational materials.' °
The financial practice and accountability provisions recommend:
(1) an annual budget adopted and overseen by the charity's board;
(2) the appointment of a financial/accounting officer responsible for
daily control of funds; (3) selection and review of finances by a
certified public accounting firm if the charity's total annual gross
income exceeds $250,000; (4) the use of generally accepted account-
ing principles with respect to the receipt and disbursement of funds,
the name of each recipient of funds, and the amount of funds
received; (5) the deposit of all cash funds into the charity's own bank
account upon receipt; and (6) disbursement of funds by check or wire
transfer rather than in cash."'
To enable evaluation of potential foreign recipient/grantee
organizations, the Guidelines' recommendations suggest establish-
ing procedures for collecting basic information. The recommenda-
tions suggest procedures for collecting information such as the
organization's name in English, its language of origin, its physical
place of jurisdiction, its legal place of jurisdiction, its contact
information, its principal purposes, the contact information of
subcontracting organizations that it utilizes, existing sources of
income, and organizational documents. 2
Finally, the Guidelines for basic vetting recommend that the U.S.-
based charity or private foundation be able to demonstrate that it:
(1) conducted a reasonable search of public information about the
foreign recipient/grantee organization; (2) verified that the foreign
480. Id. at 3-4.
481. Id. at 4-5.
482. Id. at 5-6.
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organization does not appear on a list of any government or the
United Nations as having links to terrorism or money laundering;
(3) obtained identifying information on key staff; (4) required the
organization to certify that it does not support terrorism or deal
with persons who support terrorism; (5) identified and determined
as legitimate the foreign organization's relations with financial
institutions with whom it maintains accounts and seeks bank
references; (6) requires periodic reports from the organization on its
operations and disbursement of funds; (7) undertakes reasonable
steps to ensure that the charity's funds are not used for terrorism;
and (8) performs on-site audits of the organization on a regular
basis.'
The Guidelines have been criticized as onerous, beyond the
abilities of most grant makers, and unlikely to have an impact on
terrorist financing.4 4 The final category-procedures to enable
483. Id. at 6-7.
484. See Harris, supra note 356, at 1009-10; Nancy Ortmeyer Kuhn, Best Practices for
Nonprofts to Stop Unintended Funding of Terrorists, BNA DAILYTAX REP., May 19,2003, at
J1, J3; Foundation Official Reports on Meeting on 'Best Practices" Guidelines, Tax Analysts:
Doc. 2003-2405, Jan. 24,2003,2003 TNT 17-15; Reps Say Guidelines for Charities on Terrorist
Funding May Be Costly, Impractical, 28 EOTR WEEKLY 1 (Nov. 25, 2002).
The IRS recently announced that it seeks public comments on the Guidelines to clarify how
diversions of charitable funds for noncharitable purposes might be averted. I.R.S.
Announcement 2003-29 I.R.B. 928 (May 19, 2003). In response to the IRS, Independent
Sector, in cooperation with InterAction, recently issued public comments on the Guidelines.
PUBLIC COMMENT ON "INTERNATIONAL GRANTMAKING AND INTERNATIONAL AcTImVEs BY
DOMESTIC 501(CX3) ORGANIZATIONS" SUBMITTED JOINTLY BY INTERACTION AND INDEPENDENT
SEcTOR, (July 18, 2003) [hereinafter PUBLIC COMMENT ON INT'L GRANTMAKING], available at
http:/www.independentsector.org/PDFs/IRScomments.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2004). Using
the experience of Independent Sector members, primarily domestic public charities, many of
which have had long track records of global grant making and have longstanding
relationships to foreign grantees, the comments clearly indicate that many of the "basic
vetting" Guidelines "go way beyond what is practiced and practicable, requesting an overly
broad sweep for information, much of it of no relevance to the charitable endeavor." Id. at 9.
The comments criticize the Guidelines as having the potential to require substantial
administrative costs, to impair, and in many cases, to preclude domestic nonprofit
organizations from operating abroad effectively, and to end many essential humanitarian and
development programs. Id. at 10. The comments further state that much of the requested
information in the Guidelines may not be available or may be impossible to obtain,
particularly by domestic grant makers without overseas field operations. Id. Also, the nature
of the foreign government, the technology, the location of supported foreign programs, and
suspicion of Americans by foreigners, particularly those operating in Muslim countries and
Palestine, make it unlikely that charities will be able to obtain much of the basic vetting
information recommended by the Guidelines. Id. at 11-12.
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evaluation of any potential foreign recipient/grantee organization
and for "basic" vetting of any such foreign recipient
organization 8-is reminiscent of the expenditure responsibility
rule of I.R.C. § 4945(h)." I.R.C. § 4945(h) has been criticized as
burdensome and a possible obstacle to global philanthropy,
particularly for domestic private foundations without relatively
large endowments or revenues and without substantial U.S. and
foreign staffs or established global networks."' In much the same
way, implementation of the Guidelines, particularly its latter
category of recommendations, would be costly and administratively
burdensome.
These criticisms certainly ring true with respect to the basic
vetting recommendations. The Guidelines first recommend that a
grant-making, U.S.-based charity or private foundation check public
records about any intended foreign recipient organization. How
would a grant-making organization check foreign language records
in a foreign country where record systems may not be state of the
art, where documents may be scattered geographically as well as
throughout governmental administrative, judicial, and other
operations? Is it possible to undertake a thorough verification that
On July 17, 2003, The National Council of Nonprofit Associations (NCNA) issued its
comments in response to IRS Announcement 2003-29. Letter from Audrey R. Alvarado,
Executive Director, NCNA, to Robert Fontenrose, I.R.S. (July 17, 2003), available at
http/www.ncna.org. The NCNA stated its support of the Treasury Department in
strengthening rules "to preclude the diversion of charitable assets for non-charitable
purposes" and reiterated its advocacy for nonprofit organizations' accountability. Id The
NCNA criticized the Treasury Department for not seeking more input from the nonprofit
sector before issuing Guidelines. Id. It also suggested that the substance of many of the
Guidelines are "vague and unclear," "have no relevance to federal income tax requirements
at all," and "are redundant with existing federal law, and thus not necessary." Id. Also, the
NCNA questioned: (1) the purpose of the Guidelines given the preamble's explicit statement
that compliance does not preclude criminal or civil sanctions; (2) whether the Guidelines are
intended to apply to private foundations, grant-making institutions, and private for-profit
entities; and (3) whether the government intends them to be purely voluntary or mandatory.
Id. If mandatory, the government should promulgate enforceable rules pursuant to the
appropriate procedure. Id.
485. See VOLUNTARY BEST PRACTIcES, supra note 354, at 5-7.
486. See I.R.C. § 4945(h) (2000). The expenditure responsibility rule, applicable under
certain circumstances, requires a domestic private foundation to satisfy due diligence
standards in making grants to foreign recipients. See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-5(b), (c), and -6(c)
(2003); see also Crimm, supra note 21, at 64-67 & nn.177-84 (discussing the expenditure
responsibility rule).
487. See PUBLIC COMMENT ON INT'L GRANTMAKING, supra note 484, at 10.
a foreign recipient organization does not appear on any U.S. or
foreign governmental or U.N. list linking the organization to
terrorism, money laundering, or other illegal activities? At the very
least, apart from any list that a particular foreign country might
maintain separately, this part of the basic vetting process would
require a check of the following sources,"' which, for convenience
are accessible through the Web site of the United States Interna-
tional Grantmaking Project: 9 (1) OFAC's regulations for exporting
goods; 49 (2) OFAC's list of SDNs;491 (3) the European Union's list,
pursuant to EU regulation 2580492 (4) the State Department's
Terrorist Exclusion List; "93 and (5) the United Nation's list pursuant
to U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1267 and 1390.
494
Further consideration of the vetting recommendations raises a
plethora of other questions. For example, how does a grant-making
charity or private foundation undertake an adequate investigation
from the United States to obtain sufficient information on whether
the key employees and governing body of the foreign recipient
organization are well intentioned and loyal? Must this search be
performed abroad to be potentially and reasonably thorough? With
respect to a signed statement submitted by a potential foreign
recipient organization declaring that it does not support terrorists
or terrorism, how much credence should the grant-making organiza-
tion attach to the statement? Is it reasonable to rely upon such a
488. In April 2003, the General Accounting Office recommended that the numerous "watch
lists" should be consolidated. See GAO, GAO-03-322, TERRORIST WATCH LIsTS SHOULD BE
CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE BETTER INTEGRATION AND SHARING, (2003), available at
http'//www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-322 (last visited Feb. 7, 2004).
489. See United States International Grantmaking Project, at httpJwww.usig.org (last
visited Feb. 7, 2004).
490. See OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL, U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, FOREIGN
ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS FOR EXPORTERS AND IMPORTERS (2004), available at
http'/www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/regulationsttllfacei.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2004).
491. See OFAC SDN LIST, supra note 105.
492. Council Decision of 27 June 2003, Official Journal of the European Union, L160/81,
available at http:/europa.eu.int.eur-lex/en/indexhtm (last visited Feb. 12, 2004).
493. U.S. Dep't of State, Terrorist Exclusion List, at httpJ/www.state.gov/s/ct/rlsfs/2002/
15222.htm (last modified Feb. 18, 2003).
494. United Nations, The New Consolidated List of Individuals and Entities Belonging to
or Associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida Organisation as Established and Maintained by
the 1267 Committee, available at http://www.un.orglDcos/sc/committeea/1267/
1267ListEng.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
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statement after checking all governmental and United Nations
prohibited recipient lists, or do good faith and reasonableness
require more, particularly if the foreign recipient organization
operates in a community or country that is predominantly composed
of religious fundamentalists or people who may be politically
antagonistic to American policies and values? With respect to
banking relationships of the foreign recipient organization, how
extensive a search is required to ensure legitimacy, given that an
organization can have numerous relationships with financial
systems, some of which may be open and legitimate but some of
which may be hidden and unlawful? What further steps can be
taken to assure that the funds of the grant-making institution are
not diverted for terrorist purposes by the foreign recipient organiza-
tion or its employees? Can an accounting or audit be taken at face
value, or must there be continual on-site observation or supervision
of programs?
Short of deciding that their § 501(c)(3) organizations should
abstain from global philanthropy, officers, directors, and trustees of
these organizations are left in a quandary as to what they must do
to protect themselves and their organizations from potential civil
and criminal liability on both the state and federal level. Now that
the Guidelines are in the public domain, the measure of good faith
and reasonable care required to discharge fiduciary duties would
seem to encompass compliance with the Guidelines. Like the limited
number of financially well-endowed private foundations that have
personnel or networks abroad that successfully have complied with
the expenditure responsibility due diligence rules, some U.S.-based
charities and private foundations will develop and implement
adequate procedures to comply with the Guidelines. Nonetheless,
such compliance may not fully protect the organization or its
officers, directors, or trustees from potential liability. Moreover,
meaningful, let alone full, due diligence compliance seems virtually
impossible especially for those charities and private foundations
that have limited resources and want to make grants to foreign
recipient organizations in technologically, linguistically, and
politically inaccessible locales. If the charitable mission of a
domestic § 501(c)(3) organization does not necessitate financial
support of projects abroad, numerous directors, officers, and
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trustees may opt to concentrate instead on domestic grant making.
Such results would not bode well for an expansion of, or even
stability in, the pecuniary level of global philanthropy.
B. Due Diligence by Donors
Donors also are well-advised to undertake their own due diligence
efforts prior to making any contribution to a domestic § 501(c)(3)
organization. 95 There are several means by which donors may
access and examine information about particular § 501(c)(3)
organizations. Aside from obtaining literature and checking Web
sites of specific organizations, there are a number of private,
nonprofit watchdog organizations in the United States that work to
safeguard charitable giving by promoting accountability by, and
transparency of, domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations. Some of these
watchdog organizations provide information on charitable organiza-
tions and make it readily accessible to the public, usually via Web
sites. For example, the Better Business Bureau Wise Giving
Alliance (BBB), focusing on hundreds of national organizations that
conduct broad-based fundraising, collects and distributes materials
about the organizations' governance, fundraising practices, pro-
grams, and finances. The BBB uses general guidelines, standards,
and measures to compare the efficiency and effectiveness of select
organizations and publicizes this information on its Web site.4'
Another group, the Philanthropic Research Institute, includes
Guidestar, which maintains an internet database containing
information on § 501(c)(3) organizations, including documents filed
with the IRS, such as informational tax returns (Forms 990 and
990-PF).497 Yet another, though more specialized, organization, the
495. See Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48 (1966) (amplifying Rev. Rul. 63-252, 1963-2 C.B.
101 (1963)). This ruling requires that income tax deductibility for contributions to domestic
charities that utilize the donations for foreign grants depends on the domestic charity
maintaining "control and discretion' over the donated funds to ensure their use furthers the
charity's exempt purposes. Id at 48-49. The charities, independent of the donor, must review
and approve the use of the donated funds. Id. The rulings provide guidance as to what
constitutes sufficient "control and discretion." See Crimm, supra note 21, at 64-67 & nn. 177-
81.
496. See BBB Wis GIVNQGALLiANCE, STANDARDs FOR CHARITY ACCOUNTABIUTY, available
at httpJ/www.give.org/standards/index.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
497. See GuideStar, Evaluating and Selecting Organizations that Match Your Giving Plan,
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Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability is an accreditation
organization that accredits organizations within its religious
community based on an examination of the organization's financial
practices and accomplishments. It too maintains an informational
Web site on its more than 1100 member organizations. 98
Several other resources are available to donors. Because state
Attorneys General are responsible for supervising charitable
organizations and their professional fundraisers, donors might
consult the state Attorney General's office in which the § 501(c)(3)
organization is registered and operates and in which the fundraiser
operates. Finally, as discussed in Part V.A, with respect to §
501(c)(3) organizations, donors should consult U.S. and foreign
governmental lists and the U.N.'s list of organizations and individu-
als who are considered terrorists, terrorist organizations, or
supporters of terrorism. 9' The importance of due diligence cannot
be overstated; donors, however, must realize that consultation of
these various sources may not fully protect them.
CONCLUSION
Over the past several years, terrorist threats and attacks in the
United States and abroad have prompted the government numerous
times to declare the nation on "high alert" status, warning of
potential intrusion and harm. The government has embarked on a
multifaceted war on terrorism, including efforts to deprive terrorists
and terrorist organizations of financial support. To accomplish this
goal, Congress has enacted legislation, President Bush has issued
Executive Order 13,224, and the Department of the Treasury and
other governmental agencies have aggressively pursued regulatory
and law enforcement efforts.
The government's evolving financial war on terrorism has had
far-reaching effects that extend well beyond its impact on terrorists
and foreign terrorist organizations. Some governmental attention
has centered on domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations, the backbone of
available at httpJ/www.guidestar.org/learn/evaluate.jsp (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
498. See Evangelical Council for Financial Accountability, Member Directory, at
http'//www.ecfa.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
499. See supra notes 490-94 and accompanying text.
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global philanthropy. Governmental reactions have been instigated
by reports of the reprehensible use of § 501(c)(3) organizations,
especially Muslim organizations, by unsavory individuals for the
collection, diversion, and distribution of financial resources to
terrorists and terrorist organizations. Terrorists and their support-
ers have targeted domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations--often religious
organizations, which generally enjoy less governmental scrutiny
and have long been considered upstanding pillars of American
society-as ripe for exploitation. As a result of this exploitation, the
reputations of Islamic and other domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations
have been tarnished. Part of the government's announced response
to this terrorist infiltration of the charitable community was to
"seek to ensure a regulatory climate in which donors can give to
charities without fear that their donations will be misused to
support terrorism."5°°
It is not clear, however, that the government has achieved that
goal. Instead, the government's arsenal of weapons-strengthened
statutory authority, regulatory efforts, and improved law enforce-
ment capabilities-that can be used in its financial war on terrorism
has engendered fears and concerns among some well-intentioned
and law-abiding donors and among domestic § 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions' officers, directors, and trustees.5 ' As this Article has demon-
500. See Testimony of Kenneth W. Dam, supra note 2.
501. Government officials have stated a contrary position. In his prepared testimony, David
D. Aufhauser, General Counsel to the Department of the Treasury stated:
But we must remember that the problem underlying this concern is the abuse
of charities by terrorist organizations. It is this abuse, not the consequential
freezing actions taken by our government, which undermines donor confidence.
In the absence of our designations, money intended for humanitarian assistance
would not be frozen; rather, it would finance further destruction. Our
designation actions protect U.S. charitable organizations and innocent donors
from abuse by illuminating those charities that finance terror rather than need.
These designations are essential in restoring donor confidence in the integrity
of the charitable sector and form a crucial part of our larger strategy to protect
charities from terrorist abuse. To assist U.S.-based charities concerned that
their distribution of funds abroad might reach terrorist-related entities and
thereby trigger a blocking action on the part of the Treasury Department, the
Department has developed guidelines for all U.S.-based charities.... The
Treasury Department developed these guidelines in response to requests from
the Arab American and American Muslim communities, who reported a
reduction in charitable giving and an increased apprehension among donors as
a consequence of the Treasury Department's blocking of the three domestic
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strated, these concerns are not totally unfounded. Protection against
potential civil and criminal liabilities is costly and burdensome, and
even impossible to obtain for many individuals and organizations.
One natural, albeit unfortunate, outcome has been that some
donors, especially Muslims, have reduced their level of, or abstained
from, charitable giving to domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations,
particularly Muslim charities. Furthermore, leaders of some of these
philanthropic institutions have decided that their organizations
should abstain from global philanthropic endeavors. While it is true
that abuses by terrorists and their private supporters have tainted
the reputations of some charities, and to some extent corrupted
the sanctity of charitable giving, our government must be wise in
waging its financial war on terrorism. It must guard against over-
zealous reactions, unjustifiable assertions, and the imposition of
unwarranted sanctions against well-intentioned and law-abiding
donors, domestic § 501(c)(3) organizations, and those organizations'
officers, directors, and trustees.60
If such cautions are not heeded by our government, widespread
withdrawal of legitimate global philanthropic support by U.S.
donors and charitable institutions readily could follow. A wholesale
blight on the provision of financial support for humanitarian aid,
the promotion of health, the enhancement of education and other
charitable causes, the facilitation of economic development, the
building of social capital, and the strengthening of social stability
could fuel the destabilization of struggling people abroad and
enhance the appeal of terrorist groups to these people. In that event,
the government ironically would have exacerbated, not reduced, one
charities. Although wholly voluntary, the guidelines, if implemented, offer a
means bywhich charities can protect themselves against terrorist abuse and are
consistent with the principles espoused in both the private and international
public sectors.
Prepared Testimony of David D. Aufhauser, supra note 7.
502. While not necessarily suggesting overzealousness, but likely cautiousness, to broaden
a Congressional investigation into alleged ties between tax-exempt organizations and terrorist
groups, the Senate Finance Committee sent a letter on December 22, 2003 to the I.R.S.
requesting confidential tax records, including donor lists, of Muslim charities and foundations.
See Dan Eggen & John Mintz, Muslim Groups' IRS Files Sought; Hill Panel Probing Alleged
Terror Ties, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2004, at Al.
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ultimate goal of fundamentalist and radical terrorists: the disrup-
tion of globalism. °3
503. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
